Philosophy Day Symposium FA26

Please join us on Friday December 4th for CSULB’s twenty-third Philosophy Day symposium. The event starts with a small poster session at 11:30am in room PSYC–153, with talks in the adjacent PSYC–150 lecture hall through the later afternoon.

Program:

11:30am–12:00pm: Poster Session
Similar to last FA25, there will be a poster session in which some of the first-semester graduate students present their proseminar work.

12:00pm–12:45pm: Graduate Student Research Presentation
Oliver di Martino (Cal State Long Beach)
‘The metaphysics of conjoined twinning’

• Abstract: Abby and Brittany Hensel are identical twins. They live in Minnesota, where they teach math to elementary students. Each twin has her own teaching credential. Brittany describes herself as rather quiet and reserved, whereas Abby is outgoing and bubbly. Abby is married, while Brittany is not. Abby and Brittany appear to be two, distinct persons in these and other respects. But there is at least one way in which Abby and Brittany are not apparently distinct: Abby and Brittany seem to share one and the same body. They are dicephalic parapagus conjoined twins, meaning their two heads are joined to the same torso. Cases like the Hensel twins’ pose a challenge for some theories of personal identity. Common sense would indicate that Abby and Brittany are two, distinct persons. But some theories—especially animalism—seem to imply that Abby and Brittany are one-and-the-same person, since they are the very same organism. This presentation explores whether another theory of personal identity—Baker’s (2000) constitution account—has the resources to handle conjoined twins cases where two persons appear to have one body. I will defend a version of the constitution account according to which two materially constituted human persons could have the same body.

12:45pm–1:00pm: Break / Spillover Q&A

1:00pm–1:45pm: Graduate Student Research Presentation
Lancy Lopez (Cal State Long Beach)
‘Intervening agents and vicarious moral responsibility’

• Abstract: Intervening agents are those whose actions affect the moral valence of another agent’s actions. Suppose that you hear on the local news of an increase in attempted home robberies. You dislike your neighbor and want to take advantage of the uptick to bring him some harm. You break your neighbor’s locks and cross your fingers a thief burglarizes his home. Your hopes come to fruition. The thief, the intervening agent, steals your neighbor’s valuables. We might think that, in breaking your neighbor’s locks, you are eo ipso blameworthy. Are your actions as wrong as they would be in the case where the thief does not rob your neighbor? Does the fact that someone else realized your malevolent ends make your action more wrong? It seems, at times, our actions can set the scene for another agent’s wrong. I ask whether we are morally responsible for that other agent’s wrong in such cases. If I create the circumstances conducive to another’s agent’s wrong, does their wrong affect my own? Do the potential wrongs of others affect what we ought to and not to do? The answer to each of these questions is affirmative. I will argue that agents can be morally responsible for the wrongs their actions were conducive toward. You are morally responsible for the robbery because you broke your neighbor’s locks (and you are wrong for breaking the locks). This project will be to the end of supporting the legitimacy of vicarious moral responsibility, which finds itself disavowed largely due to concerns involving legal responsibility.

1:45pm–2:15pm: Socializing

2:15pm–3:45pm: Faculty Speaker
Kevin R. Busch (Cal State Long Beach)
‘A problem for Humean modality’

• Abstract: Systematic accounts of de dicto, non-epistemic modality trace back at least to Hume, whose foundational project was to explain modal thought and talk. I argue that standard interpretations compromise this project by introducing a form of circularity: the explanans can be specified only by using the very modal resources it is meant to explain. I defend this through two claims. First, across reductionist, projectivist, and realist interpretations of Hume’s causal metaphysics, modal thought and talk are explained partly by a “determination of the mind,” or mental determination. Second, on standard construals of mental determination—as a causal transition, a cognitively unavoidable process, or a dispositional outcome—it cannot be specified without modal thought or talk. The pressure falls on interpreters to provide a non-modal account of mental determination.

3:45pm–4:00pm: Break / Spillover Q&A

4:00–5:45pm: Keynote Speaker
Craig Callender (University of California San Diego)
‘From epistemic pollution to epistemic clean-up’

• Abstract: Everyone is worried about disinformation. The UN, EU, World Economic Forum, WHO, the Pope, and even Taylor Swift warn of its dangers. Disinformation is a threat to public health, democracy, and our ability to respond to collective challenges. Yet some of the very institutions charged with producing and safeguarding knowledge—universities, scientific journals and societies, and other trusted authorities—help spread it. Why? In this talk, I argue that we can understand this puzzle by thinking of our shared epistemic environment as a fragile ecosystem. Like a natural ecosystem, the epistemic commons depends on complex relationships and can be pushed into unhealthy states. Drawing on case studies, I’ll show how a tragedy of the commons-like situation can result even without overt coercion or corruption; I’ll then explain how powerful vested interests can further exploit vulnerabilities in this system. The results are sometimes institutions undermining their very mission. I'll conclude by proposing specific ways to clean up this toxic mess and protect our epistemic commons.

6:00–8:30pm: Dinner and Afterparty
All are invited to Per Milam's residence after the symposium for a bite to eat and some socializing. Come join us and celebrate the end of the term and coming break. (To RSVP, please contact Kyle Banick so that he has an accurate headcount.)