

Objective world" we mean, for example, my actual and possible experience of the world, as an experience belonging to me, the Ego who experiences himself as a man. Such experience of the world is more or less perfect; it always has its ¹ open undetermined horizon. For each man, every other is implicit in this horizon — physically, / psychophysically, in respect of what is internal to the other's psyche — and is thus in principle a realm of endless accessibilities, though in fact most other men remain horizontal.

§ 57. *Clarification of the parallel between explication of what is internal to the psyche and egological transcendental explication.*

On this basis it is not hard to clear up the *necessary parallel between explications of what is internal to the psyche and egological transcendental explications*, or the fact that, as was already said earlier, the pure psyche is a *self-Objectivation* of the monad, accomplished in the latter — a self-Objectivation the different levels of which are essential necessities, if Others are possibly to exist for the monad.

Connected with this is the fact that, a priori, every analysis or theory of transcendental phenomenology — including the theory whose main features have just been indicated, the theory of transcendental constitution of an Objective world — can be produced in the natural realm, when we give up the transcendental attitude. Thus transposed to the realm of transcendental naïveté, it becomes a theory pertaining to internal psychology. *Whether the two disciplines be eidetic or empirical*, a "pure" psychology — a psychology that merely explicates what belongs to a psyché, to a concrete human Ego, as its own intentional essence — corresponds to a *transcendental phenomenology*, and vice versa. That, however, is something to be made evident transcendently.

§ 58. *Differentiation of problems in the intentional analysis of higher intersubjective communities. I and my surrounding world.*

The *constitution of humanity*, or of that community which belongs to the full essence of humanity, does not end with what

¹ Reading with Typescript C, "*sie hat stets ihren*", instead of "*aber doch mindestens als*". Cf. the French: "*elle a toujours ses*".

has been considered up to now. On the basis, however, of community in the last sense acquired, it is easy to understand ¹ the possibility of *acts of the Ego that reach into the other Ego through the medium of appresentative experience of someone else* and, indeed, the possibility of *specifically personal acts of the Ego* that have the character of acts of mine directed to you ², the character of *social acts*, by means of which all human personal communication is established. To study these acts carefully in their different forms and, starting from there, to make the essence of all *sociality* transcendently understandable is an <160> important task. With / communalization proper, *social communalization*, there become constituted within the Objective world, as spiritual Objectivities of a peculiar kind, the various types of social communities with their possible hierarchical order —, among them the pre-eminent types that have the character of "*personalities of a higher order*".

Consequently there would come into consideration, as inseparable from and (in a certain sense) correlative to the set of problems indicated, the problem of the constitution of the specifically human surrounding world, a surrounding world of culture for each man and each human community; likewise the problem of the genuine, though restricted, kind of Objectivity belonging to such a world. Its Objectivity is restricted, though concretely the world is given to me and to everyone only as a cultural world and as having the sense: accessible to everyone. But, as soon becomes apparent when its sense is explicated precisely, there are essential constitutional reasons why this accessibility is not unconditional. In this respect it is manifestly different from that absolutely unconditional accessibility to everyone which belongs essentially to the constitutional sense of Nature, of the animate organism, and therefore of the psychophysical man (understood with a certain generality). To be sure, the following is also included in the sphere of unconditional universality which is the correlate of the essential form

¹ Reading with Typescript C: "*Aber verständlich ist sehr leicht*", instead of "*Aber selbstverständlich ist es sehr leicht*" (But of course it is very easy), which makes the sentence incomplete. Cf. the French: "*on comprend facilement*".

² The phrase, "the character of acts of mine directed to you", supplied in accordance with Typescript C, "*von Ich-Du-Akten*", and the French, "*d'actes allant 'de moi à toi'*".

of world constitution: Everyone, as a matter of apriori necessity, lives in the same Nature, a Nature moreover that, with the necessary communalization of his life and the lives of others, he has fashioned into a *cultural world* in his individual and communalized living and doing — a world having human significances, even if it belongs to an extremely low cultural level. But this, after all, does not exclude, either a priori or de facto, the truth that men belonging to one and the same world live in a loose cultural community — or even none at all — and accordingly constitute different surrounding worlds of culture, as concrete life-worlds in which the relatively or absolutely separate communities live their passive and active lives. Each man understands first of all, in respect of a core and as having its unrevealed horizon, *his* concrete surrounding world or *his* culture; and he does so precisely as a man who belongs to the community fashioning it historically. A deeper understanding, one that opens up the horizon of the past (which is co-determinant for an understanding of the present itself), is essentially possible to all members of that community, with a certain originality possible to them alone / and barred to anyone from <161> another community who enters into relation with theirs. At first such an individual necessarily understands men of the alien world as generically men, and men of a "certain" cultural world. Starting from there, he must first produce for himself, step by step, the possibilities of further understanding. Starting from what is most generally understandable, he must first open up ways of access to a sympathetic understanding of broader and broader strata of the present and then of the historical past, which in turn helps him to gain broader access to the present.

Constitution of "worlds" of any kind whatever, beginning with one's own stream of subjective processes, with its openly endless multiplicities, and continuing up through the Objective world with its various levels of Objectivation, is subject to the law of "*oriented*" constitution,¹ a constitution that presupposes at various levels, but within the extension of a sense conceived with maximal breadth, something "primordially" and something

¹ In accordance with Typescript C and the French translation, the passage of the published text that follows here, p. 161, ll. 15–21, is assigned a later position. See the next note.

"secondarily" constituted. At each of the levels in question, the primordial enters, with a new stratum of sense, into the secondarily constituted world; and this occurs in such a fashion that the primordial becomes the central member, in accordance with orientational modes of givenness. The secondarily constituted, as a "world", is necessarily given as a horizon of being that is accessible from the primordial and is discoverable in a particular order. It is already thus in the case of the first, the "immanent" world, which we call the stream of subjective processes. As a system of mutual externalities, this stream is given in an orientation around the primordially constituted living present, from which everything else outside it (but belonging to immanent temporality) is accessible. Again, within the sphere that is primordial in our specific sense, my animate organism is the central member of "Nature", the "world" that becomes constituted by means of governance of my organism. In like manner, my psychophysical organism is primordial for the constitution of the Objective world of mutual externalities, and, in accordance with the oriented mode of givenness of this world, enters it as the central member. If the "world" that is primordial in our

<162> distinctive sense / does not itself become the center of the Objective world, the reason is that this whole primordial "world" becomes Objectivated in such a fashion that it produces no new mutual externalities. On the other hand, the multiplicity of the Other's world is given as oriented peripherally to mine, and is thus a world, because it becomes constituted with a common Objective world immanent in it, and the spatiotemporal form of this Objective world functions at the same time as a form that gives access to it.

If we return to our case, that of the cultural world, we find that it too, as a world of cultures, is given orientedly on the underlying basis of the Nature common to all and on the basis of the spatiotemporal form that gives access to Nature and must function also in making the multiplicity of cultural formations

<161> and cultures accessible. / We see that in this fashion the cultural world too is given "orientedly", in relation to a zero member or a <zero> "personality". Here I and my culture are primordial, over against every alien culture. To me and to those who share in my culture, an alien culture is accessible only by a kind of

"experience of someone else", a kind of "empathy", by which we project ourselves into the alien cultural community and its culture. This empathy also calls for intentional investigations.¹ /

We must forgo a more precise exploration of the sense-stratum <162> that gives to the world of humanity and culture, as such, its specific sense, thus making it a world endowed with specifically "spiritual" predicates. Our constitutional explications have shown the intentional motivational complexes wherein accrued that coherent substratum of the full concrete world which is left us if we abstract from all predicates belonging to "Objective spirit". We retain the whole of Nature, already constituted as a concrete unity in itself. We retain, as included in Nature, the animate organisms of men and brutes; but we no longer retain psychic life as concretely complete, since human existence as such is always related consciously to an existent practical world as a surrounding world already endowed with humanly significant predicates, and this relationship presupposes a psychological constitution of such predicates.

That every such predicate of the world accrues from a *temporal* genesis and, indeed, one that is rooted in human undergoing and doing, needs no proof. A presupposition for the origin of such predicates in the particular subjects (and for the origin of their intersubjective acceptance as abiding predicates of the common life-world) is, consequently, that a community of men and each particular man are vitally immersed in a concrete surrounding world, are related to it in undergoing and doing — that all of this is already constituted. With this continual change in the human life-world, manifestly *the men themselves also change as persons*, since correlatively they must always be taking on new habitual properties. In this connexion / far-reaching problems <163> of static and genetic constitution make themselves keenly felt, those of genetic constitution as part of the problem of all-embracing genesis, which presents so many enigmas. For example: regarding personality, not only the problem of the static constitution of a unity of personal character, over against the multiplicity of instituted and subsequently annulled habitualities,

¹ In accordance with Typescript C and the French translation, the passage beginning "We see . . ." has been transposed. See the preceding note.

but also the *genetic* problem, which leads back to enigmas concerning "*innate*" character.

For the present it must suffice that we have indicated these problems of a higher level as problems of constitution and thereby made it understandable that, with the systematic progress of transcendental-phenomenological explication of the apodictic ego, the transcendental sense of the world must also become disclosed to us ultimately in the *full concreteness* with which it is incessantly the *life-world* for us all. That applies likewise to all the particular formations of the surrounding world, wherein it presents itself to us according to our personal upbringing and development or according to our membership in this or that nation, this or that cultural community. All these matters are governed by essential necessities; they conform to an essential style, which derives its necessity from the transcendental ego and then from the transcendental intersubjectivity which discloses itself in that ego — accordingly, from the essential forms of transcendental motivation and transcendental constitution. If we succeed in uncovering these forms, the aforesaid apriori style acquires a rational clarification that has the highest dignity, the dignity of an ultimate, a transcendental intelligibility.

§ 59. *Ontological explication and its place within constitutional transcendental phenomenology as a whole.*

By our coherent bits of actually executing analysis and, in part, by the accompanying predelineation of inevitable new problems and the form of order they demand, we have acquired philosophically fundamental insights. Starting from the experiential world given beforehand as existent and (with the shift to the eidetic attitude) from any experiential world whatever, conceived as given beforehand as existent, we exercised transcendental reduction — that is: we went back to the / transcendental ego, who constitutes within himself givenness-beforehand and all modes of subsequent givenness; or (with eidetic self-variation) we went back to any transcendental ego whatever.

The transcendental ego was conceived accordingly as an ego who experiences within himself a world, who proves a world

harmoniously. Tracing the essence of such constitution and its egological levels, we made visible an Apriori of a completely ¹ novel kind, namely the Apriori of constitution. We learned to distinguish, on the one hand, the self-constitution of the ego for himself and in his primordial own-essentialness and, on the other hand, the constitution of all the alienesses of various levels, by virtue of sources belonging to his own essentialness. There resulted the all-embracing unity of the essential form belonging to the total constitution accomplished in my own ego — the constitution as whose correlate the Objectively existing world, for me and for any ego whatever, is continually given beforehand, and goes on being shaped in its sense-strata, with a ² correlative apriori form-style. And this constitution is itself an Apriori. With this most radical and consequential explication of what is intentionally included and what becomes intentionally motivated in “my” ego and in my essential variants, it becomes apparent that the universal de facto structure of the given Objective world — as mere Nature, as psychophysical being, as humanness, sociality of various levels, and culture — is, to a very great extent (and perhaps much further than we yet can see), an *essential necessity*. An understandable and necessary consequence is that the *task of an apriori ontology of the real world* — which is precisely discovery of the Apriori belonging to this world’s universality — is inevitable but, on the other hand, one-sided and not philosophical in the final sense. Such an ontological Apriori (for example: of Nature, of the psychophysical, of sociality and culture) does indeed confer on the ontic fact, on the de facto world in respect of its “accidental” features, a relative intelligibility, that of an evident necessity of being thus and so by virtue of eidetic laws; but it does not confer *philosophical* — that is, *transcendental*, intelligibility. Philosophy, after all, demands an elucidation by virtue of the *ultimate* and *most concrete* essential necessities; and these are the necessities that satisfy the essential rootedness of any Objective world in transcendental subjectivity and thus make the world intelligible concretely: *as a constituted sense*. Only then, moreover, / do the <165>

¹ Supplied in accordance with Typescript C and the French translation.

² Reading “*einem*” instead of “*meinem*” (my), as in both the published text and Typescript C. Cf. the French translation: “*une forme*”.

"supreme and final" questions become disclosed, those that are still to be addressed to the world even as understood in this manner.

One consequence of the beginning phase of phenomenology was that its method of pure but at the same time eidetic intuition led to attempts at a new ontology, fundamentally different in essence from the ontology of the eighteenth century, which operated logically with concepts remote from intuition; or, this being the same thing, attempts to draw *directly from concrete intuition*, in order to build particular apriori sciences (pure grammar, pure logic, pure jurisprudence, the eidetic theory of intuitively experienced Nature, and so forth) and, embracing them all, a universal ontology of the Objective world. As regards this, nothing prevents starting at first quite concretely with the human life-world around us, and with man himself as essentially related to this our surrounding world, and exploring, indeed purely intuitively, the extremely copious and never-discovered Apriori of any such surrounding world whatever, taking this Apriori as the point of departure for a systematic explication of human existence and of world strata that disclose themselves correlatively in the latter. But what is acquired there straightforwardly, though it is a system of the Apriori, becomes philosophically intelligible and (according to what was said just now) an Apriori related back to the ultimate sources of understanding, only when problems of constitution, as problems of the specifically philosophical level, become disclosed and the natural realm of knowledge is at the same time exchanged for the transcendental. This implies that everything natural, everything given beforehand in straightforward intuition, must be built up again with a new originariness and not interpreted merely sequaciously as already definitive. That a procedure drawing insight from eidetic intuition is called phenomenological and claims philosophical significance is justified only by the circumstance that every genuine intuition has its place in the constitutional nexus. For this reason every intuitive ascertainment, in the attitude of positivity, concerning the sphere of eidetically necessary (axiomatic) fundamentals serves as *preliminary work* and is even indispensable a priori. It furnishes ¹

¹ Reading with Typescript C and the French translation. According to the published text: "Its result must become . . .".

the transcendental clue for discovery of the full constitutive concretion, as having both a noetic and a noematic aspect.

Regardless of the fact that it / uncovers hidden horizons of <166> sense on the ontic side (the overlooking of which seriously restricts the value of apriori ascertainments and makes their application uncertain), the significance and complete novelty of this going back into the constitutive is shown by the "monadological" results of our investigation.

§ 60. *Metaphysical results of our explication of experiencing someone else.*

Our monadological results are *metaphysical*, if it be true that ultimate cognitions of being should be called metaphysical. On the other hand, what we have here is *anything but metaphysics in the customary sense*: a historically degenerate metaphysics, which by no means conforms to the sense with which metaphysics, as "first philosophy", was instituted originally. Phenomenology's purely intuitive, concrete, and also apodictic mode of demonstration excludes all "metaphysical adventure", all speculative excesses.

Let us bring into relief some of *our* metaphysical results and at the same time draw further consequences.

A priori, my ego, given to me apodictically — the only thing I can posit in absolute apodicticity as existing — can be a world-experiencing ego only by being in communion with others like himself: a member of a community of monads, which is given orientedly, starting from himself. In that the Objective world of experience shows itself consistently, other monads show themselves consistently to be existent. Conversely, I cannot conceive a plurality of monads otherwise than as explicitly or implicitly in communion. This involves being a plurality of monads that constitutes in itself an Objective world and that spatializes, temporalizes, realizes itself — psychophysically and, in particular, as human beings — within that world. It is essentially necessary that the *togetherness* of monads, their mere co-existence, be a *temporal* co-existence and then also an existence temporalized in the form: "*real*" temporality.

But that entails further extremely important metaphysical

results. Is it conceivable (to me, the subject who asks this, or, starting from me, any conceivable subject who might ask it) — is it, I ask, *conceivable* that two or more *separate pluralities of monads*, i.e. pluralities *not in communion*, co-exist, each of which accordingly constitutes *a world of its own*, so that together they <167> constitute *two* / worlds that are separate ad infinitum, *two* infinite *spaces and space-times*? Manifestly, instead of being a conceivability, that is a pure absurdity. A priori, as the *unity* of an intersubjectivity (an intersubjectivity, moreover, that possibly lacks every actual relation of community with the other intersubjectivity), each of two such groups of monads has, to be sure, its possibly quite different looking “world”. But the two worlds are then necessarily *mere* “*surrounding worlds*”, belonging to these two intersubjectivities respectively, and mere aspects of a single Objective world, which is *common* to them. For indeed the two intersubjectivities are not absolutely isolated. As imagined by me, each of them is in necessary communion with me (or with me in respect of a possible variant of myself) as the constitutive primal monad relative to them. Accordingly they belong in truth to a single universal community, which includes me and comprises unitarily all the monads and groups of monads that can be conceived as co-existent. Actually, therefore, *there can exist only a single community of monads*, the community of *all* co-existing monads. Hence there can exist *only one Objective world*, only one Objective time, only one Objective space, only one Objective Nature. Moreover this one Nature *must* exist, if there are any structures in me that involve the co-existence of other monads. This alone is possible: that different groups of monads and different worlds are related to one another as those that may belong to stellar worlds we cannot see are related to us — that is, with animalia who lack all *actual* connexion with us. Their worlds, however, are surrounding worlds with open horizons that are only de facto, only accidentally, undiscoverable to them.

But the sense of this uniqueness of both the monadological world and the Objective world “innate” in it must be correctly understood. Naturally Leibniz is right when he says that infinitely many monads and groups of monads are conceivable but that it does not follow that all these possibilities are *com-*

possible; and, again, when he says that infinitely many worlds might have been "created", but not two or more at once, since they are impossible. It is to be noted in this connexion that, in a free variation, I can phantasy *first of all myself*, this apodictic *de facto ego*, as otherwise and can thus acquire the *system of possible variants of myself*, each of which, however, is annuled by each of the others and by the ego who I actually am. It is a *system of apriori / impossibility*. Furthermore the fact, "I <168> am", prescribes *whether* other monads are others for me and *what* they are for me. I can only find them; I cannot create others that shall exist for me. If I phantasy myself as a pure possibility different from what I actually am, that possibility in turn prescribes what monads exist for him as others. And, proceeding in this fashion, I recognize that *each monad having the status of a concrete possibility predelineates a compossible universe*, a closed "world of monads", and that two worlds of monads are impossible, just as two possible variants of my ego (or of any presupposedly phantasied ego whatever) are impossible.

Such results and the course of the investigations leading to them enable us to understand how questions that, for traditional philosophy, had to lie beyond all the limits of science can acquire sense (regardless of how they may be decided) — for example, problems we touched on earlier.

§ 61. *The traditional problems of "psychological origins" and their phenomenological clarification.*

Within the world of men and brutes, we encounter the familiar natural-scientific problems of psychophysical, physiological, and psychological genesis. Among them is included the problem of psychic genesis. It is suggested to us by the development, in the course of which every child must build up his "idea of the world". The apperceptive system in which a world, as a realm of actual and possible experience, is there for him and always given beforehand must first of all become constituted in the course of the child's psychic development. The child, considered Objectively, comes "into the world". How does he come to a "beginning" of his psychic life?

This psychophysical coming into the world leads back to the problem of live-bodily (purely "biological") individual development and phylogenesis, which, for its part, has its parallel in a psychological phylogenesis. But does that not point to corresponding interconnexions among the transcendental absolute monads, since indeed, so far as their psyches are concerned, men and brutes are self-Objectivations of monads? Should not this whole situation indicate most serious essential problems for a constitutional phenomenology, as "transcendental philosophy"?/

<169> To a great extent genetic problems, and naturally those of the first and most fundamental level, have indeed already been dealt with in the actual work of phenomenology. The fundamental level is, of course, the one pertaining to "my" ego in respect of his primordial own-essentialness. Constitution on the part of the consciousness of internal time and the whole phenomenological theory of association belong here; and what my primordial ego finds in original intuitive self-explication applies to every other ego forthwith, and for essential reasons. But with that, to be sure, the above-indicated *genetic problems of birth and death and the generative nexus of psychophysical being* have not yet been touched. Manifestly they belong to a higher dimension and presuppose such a tremendous labor of explication pertaining to the lower spheres that it will be a long time before they can become problems to work on.

Within the working sphere, however, let us indicate more precisely certain vast domains of problems (both static and genetic) that bring us into a closer relation to the philosophical tradition. Our connected intentional clarifications of the experience of someone else and the constitution of an Objective world took place on a basis given us beforehand in the transcendental attitude: a structural articulation of the primordial sphere, in which we already found a world, a primordial one. It had become accessible to us starting from the concrete world, taken qua "phenomenon", by means of that peculiar primordial reduction of the latter to what belongs to my ownness: a "world" of immanent transcendencies. It included the whole of Nature, reduced to the Nature appertaining to me myself by virtue of *my* pure sensuousness; but it included likewise the psychophysical man (with his psyche) as correspondingly reduced. As regards

"Nature", not only "sight things", "touch things", and the like, but also to some extent complete physical things as substrates of causal properties were included, along with the all-embracing forms: space and time. Obviously the *first* problem for the constitutional clarification of the existential sense of the Objective world is to clarify the *origin of this primordial "Nature"* and that of the *primordial unity¹ of animate organism and psyche* — to clarify the constituting of them / as immanent <170> transcendencies. Actually to do so requires extraordinarily extensive investigations.

In this connexion we are again reminded of the problems concerning the "psychological origin" of the "idea of space", the "idea of time", the "idea of a physical thing" — problems dealt with so often in the last century by the most distinguished physiologists and psychologists. Much as the great projects bore the stamp of their distinguished authors, no actual clarification has as yet been attained.

When we turn from them to the set of problems that we have delimited and fitted into the phenomenological system of levels, it is evident that the whole of modern psychology and epistemology has failed to grasp the *proper sense* of the problems to be set here, both *psychologically and transcendently* — their sense, namely, as problems of (static and genetic) *intentional explication*. To grasp it was, after all, impossible even for those who had accepted Brentano's doctrine of "psychic phenomena" as intentional processes. There was a lack of understanding for the peculiar character of an intentional "analysis" and all the tasks disclosed by consciousness as such, in respect of noesis and noema, a lack of understanding for the fundamentally novel methods these tasks require. About problems that concern the "psychological origins of the ideas of space, time, and the physical thing" no physics or physiology and no experimental or non-experimental psychology that moves similarly in the realm of inductive externalities has anything to say. Those are quite exclusively problems of intentional constitution that concern phenomena which are already given us beforehand as "clues" (or perhaps can become given beforehand, in particular, with

¹ Reading „*Einheit*“ instead of „*Einheiten*“ (unities) as in both the published text and Typescript C. In the French translation: „*unités*“.

the aid of an experiment), but which must now be interrogated for the first time according to the intentional method and *within the universal complexes of psychic constitution*. The kind of universality meant here is shown with sufficient distinctness in the case of the systematic unitary complex of those constitutions that are explicata of my ego, in respect of what is peculiar to my own self and what is other.

Phenomenology signifies indeed a fundamental refashioning of psychology too. Accordingly, by far the greater part of psychological research belongs in an *apriori and pure intentional psychology*. (Here the word "pure" means: kept free from everything psychophysical.) It is the same psychology, concerning which we
 <171> have already/indicated repeatedly that, by means of a change of the natural into the transcendental attitude, it is open to a "Copernican conversion", wherewith it assumes the new sense of a completely radical transcendental consideration of the world and impresses this sense on all phenomenological-psychological analyses. This sense alone makes such a psychology utilizable for transcendental philosophy and, indeed, gives it a place within a transcendental "metaphysics". Precisely in this lies the ultimate clarification and overcoming of the *transcendental psychologism* that has misled and paralysed the whole of modern philosophy.

As in the case of transcendental phenomenology, so also in the parallel case of intentional psychology (as a "positive" science) our exposition has manifestly predelineated a *fundamental structure*, a division of the corresponding investigations of eidetic psychology into those that explicate intentionally what is included in the *concrete own-essentiality of any psyche whatever* and those that explicate the intentionality pertaining to the otherness that becomes constituted therein. To the former sphere of research belongs the chief and fundamental part of the intentional explication of one's "idea of the world" — stated more precisely, explication of the "phenomenon", which makes its appearance within the human psyche: the existing world, as the world of universal experience. If this experiential world is reduced to the world constituted primordially in the single psyche, it is no longer everyone's world, the world that gets its sense from communalized human experience, but is exclusively this intentional correlate of the experiencing life that goes on in

a single psyche, and first of all my experiencing life and its sense-fashionings in primordial originariness at various levels. Tracing these fashionings, intentional explication has to make constitutionally understandable this primordial core of the phenomenal world — this core, which every one of us men and, above all, every psychologist can acquire by the already-described exclusion of sense-moments pertaining to “otherness”. If, within this primordial “world”, we abstract from the reduced psychophysical being, “I, the man”, primordial bare Nature remains, as the Nature pertaining to my own “bare sensuousness”. As an initial problem concerning the psychological origin of the experiential world, there emerges here the problem concerning the origin of the “thing-phantom”, or “thing pertaining to the senses”, with its strata (sight thing, <touch thing, > and so forth) and their synthetic unity. The thing-phantom is / given (always <172> within the limits set by this primordial reduction) purely as a unity belonging to modes of sensuous appearance and their syntheses. The thing-phantom, in its variants as “near thing” and “far thing”, all of which belong together synthetically, is not yet the “real thing” of the primordial psychic sphere. Even in this sphere the “real thing” becomes constituted at a higher level, as a causal thing, an identical substrate of causal properties (a “substance”). Obviously substance and causality indicate constitutional problems of a higher level. The constitutional problem of the thing pertaining to the senses, along with the problem of the spatiality and temporality that are fundamentally essential to it, is precisely the problem just now indicated. It is a problem of descriptive inquiry that concerns only the synthetic complexes of thing-appearances (apparencies, perspective aspects). Moreover, it is one-sided. The other side concerns the relation of the appearances back to the functioning animate organism, which in turn must be described in respect of its self-constitution and the signal peculiarity of its constitutive system of appearances.

When we proceed in this manner, new problems of descriptive explication continually arise, all of which must be solved systematically if even the constitution of the primordial “world”, as a world of “realities” — along with the great problem of the constitution of spatiality and temporality, as essential to

"realities" in that world — is to be dealt with seriously. As its execution shows, this task alone comprises a tremendous province of investigations; still it furnishes only the underlying level for a full phenomenology of Nature, as Objective and yet as pure Nature — which itself is far from being the concrete world.

Our discussion of psychology has given us occasion to translate the distinction between what is primordial and what is constituted as alien into terms of the purely psychic and to sketch as psychological problems (though only hastily) the problems relating to a primordial, and to an Objective, Nature.

If, however, we return to the transcendental attitude, our outlines of the problems relating to the psychological origin of the "idea of space", and the like, provide us conversely with outlines for the parallel problems of transcendental phenomenology — namely the problems involved in a concrete explication of primordial Nature and the primordial world as a whole. This fills a great gap in our earlier statement of the problems relating
 <173> to / constitution of the world as a transcendental phenomenon.

The extraordinarily vast complex of researches pertaining to the primordial world makes up a whole discipline, which we may designate as "transcendental aesthetics" in a very much broadened sense. We adopt the Kantian title here because the space and time arguments of the critique of reason obviously, though in an extraordinarily restricted and unclarified manner, have in view a noematic Apriori of sensuous intuition. Broadened to comprise the concrete Apriori of (primordial) Nature, as given in purely sensuous intuition, it then requires phenomenological transcendental supplementation by incorporation into a complex of constitutional problems. On the other hand, it would not be consistent with the sense of the correlative Kantian title, "transcendental analytics", if we used this as a name for the upper stories of the constitutional Apriori, which pertain to the *Objective* world itself and the multiplicities constituting it (at the highest level, the Apriori pertaining to the "idealizing" and theorizing acts that ultimately constitute scientific Nature and the scientific world). The theory of experiencing someone else, the theory of so-called "empathy", belongs in the first story above our "transcendental aesthetics". There is need only

to indicate that what we said about the psychological problems of origin in the lower story applies here as well: For the first time, the problem of empathy has been given its true sense, and the true method for its solution has been furnished, by constitutional phenomenology. Precisely on that account all previous theories (including Max Scheler's) have failed to give an actual solution, and it has never been recognized that the otherness of "someone else" becomes extended to the whole world, as its "Objectivity", giving it this sense in the first place.

We would also state expressly that it would of course be pointless to treat the positive science of *intentional psychology* and *transcendental phenomenology separately*. Obviously the work of actual execution must devolve upon the latter, whereas psychology, unconcerned about the Copernican shift, will take over the results. Yet it is important to note that, just as the psyche and the whole Objective world do not / lose their existence and <174> existential sense when considered transcendently (since they are merely rendered originarily understandable, by the uncovering of their concrete all-sidedness), so positive psychology does not lose its rightful content but rather, freed of naïve positivity, becomes a discipline within universal transcendental philosophy itself. From this point of view we may say that, among the sciences that have been raised above the level of naïve positivity, intentional psychology is intrinsically the first.

Indeed, it enjoys yet another advantage over all other positive sciences. If it is built up in the positive attitude according to the right method of intentional analysis, it can have no "problems of fundamentals", like those that infect the other positive sciences: problems that arise from the one-sidedness of naïvely constituted Objectivity, which finally demands that, in order to attain all-sidedness, we shift to a transcendental consideration of the world. But intentional psychology already has the transcendental hiddenly within itself; only a final clarification of its sense is needed in order to make the Copernican shift, which does not change the content of psychology's intentional results but only leads back to its "ultimate sense". Psychology has just one fundamental problem [*Fundamental-problem*], which (it may be objected) is ultimately a problem of

fundamentals [*Grundlagenproblem*], albeit the only one: the concept of the psyche..

§ 62. *Survey of our intentional explication of experiencing someone else.*

Let us return now, at the conclusion of this chapter, to the objection by which at first we let ourselves be guided, the objection to our phenomenology, so far as, from the very beginning, it claimed to be transcendental philosophy and, as such, to have the ability to solve the problems that concern the possibility of Objective knowledge. The objection runs as follows. Starting from the transcendental ego of the phenomenological reduction and thenceforth restricted to him, phenomenology is incapable of solving those problems. Without admitting that it does so, it lapses into a transcendental solipsism; and the whole step leading to other subjectivity and to genuine Objectivity is possible only by virtue of an unacknowledged metaphysics, a concealed adoption of Leibnizian traditions. /

<175> Our actual explications have dissipated the objection as groundless. The following is to be noted above all. At no point was the transcendental attitude, the attitude of transcendental epoché, abandoned; and our "theory" of experiencing someone else, our "theory" of experiencing others, did not aim at being and was not at liberty to be anything but explication of the sense, "others", as it arises from the constitutive productivity of that experiencing: the sense¹, "truly existing others", as it arises from the corresponding harmonious syntheses. What I demonstrate to myself harmoniously as "someone else" and therefore have given to me, by necessity and not by choice, as an actuality to be acknowledged, is *eo ipso* the existing Other for me in the transcendental attitude: the alter ego demonstrated precisely within the experiencing intentionality of my ego. Within the bounds of positivity we say and find it obvious that, in my own experience, I experience not only myself but others — in the particular form: experiencing someone else. The indubitable²

¹ Reading, with Typescript C, "*des Sinnes*", instead of "*des Limes*" (the limit). Cf. the French: "*le sens*".

² Reading with Typescript C, "*zweifellose*" instead of "*zweifellos*" (indubitably).

transcendental explication showed us not only that this positive statement is transcendently legitimate but also that the concretely apprehended transcendental ego (who first becomes aware of himself, with his undetermined horizon, when he effects transcendental reduction) grasps himself in his own primordial being, and likewise (in the form of his transcendental experience of what is alien) grasps others: *other transcendental egos*, though they are given, not originaliter and in unqualifiedly apodictic evidence, but only in an evidence belonging to "external" experience. "In" myself I experience and know the Other; in me he becomes constituted — appresentatively mirrored, not constituted as the original. Hence it can very well be said, in a *broadened* sense, that the ego acquires — that I, as the one who meditatively explicates, acquire by "self-explication" (explication of what I find in myself) every transcendence: as a transcendently constituted transcendence and not as a transcendence accepted with naïve positivity. Thus the *illusion* vanishes: that *everything I*, qua transcendental ego, *know*¹ *as existing in consequence of myself*², and explicate as *constituted in myself*, must belong to me as *part of my own essence*. This is true only of "immanent transcendences". As a title for the systems of synthetic actuality and potentiality that confer sense and being on me as ego in my own essentialness, constitution signifies constitution of immanent objective actuality. *At the start / of phenomenology*, when my attitude is that of <176> someone who is *only starting*, who is instituting phenomenological reduction for the first time, as a universal condition under which to pursue constitutional research, *the transcendental ego who comes into view is, to be sure, grasped apodictically* — but as having a *quite undetermined horizon*, a horizon restricted only by the general requirement that the world and all I know about it shall become a mere "phenomenon". Consequently, when I am starting in this manner, all those distinctions are lacking which are made only subsequently by intentional explication but which nevertheless (as I now see) pertain to me essentially. There is lacking, above all, self-understanding with respect to my primordial essence, my sphere of ownness in the pregnant

¹ Reading, with Typescript C, "*erkenne*" instead of "*erkennen*".

² Reading, with Typescript C, "*aus mir selbst*" instead of simply "*mir selbst*".

sense, and with respect to what, within that sphere itself, becomes constituted as an Other in experiencing someone else, as something appresented but essentially non-given (and never to become given) within my primordial sphere. I must first explicate *my own as such, in order to understand that, within my own, what is not my own likewise receives existential sense* — and does so as something appresented analogically. Therefore at the beginning I, the meditator, do not understand how I shall ever attain others and myself <as one among others>, since all other men are “parenthesized”. At bottom moreover I do not yet understand, and I recognize only reluctantly, that, when I “parenthesize” myself qua man and qua human person, I myself am nevertheless to be retained qua ego. Thus I can as yet know nothing about a transcendental intersubjectivity; involuntarily I take myself, the ego, to be a *solus ipse* and still regard all constitutional components as merely contents of this one ego, even after I have acquired an initial understanding of constitutive performances. The further explications made in the present chapter were therefore necessary. Thanks to them, the *full and proper sense of phenomenological transcendental “idealism” becomes understandable* to us for the first time. The *illusion* of a solipsism is dissolved, *even though* the proposition that everything existing for me must derive its existential sense exclusively from me myself, from my sphere of consciousness retains its validity and fundamental importance. Phenomenological transcendental idealism has presented itself as a *monadology*, which, despite all our deliberate suggestions of Leibniz’s

<177> metaphysics, / draws its content purely from phenomenological explication of the transcendental experience laid open by transcendental reduction, accordingly from the most originary evidence, wherein all conceivable evidences must be grounded — or from the most originary legitimacy, which is the source of all legitimacies and, in particular, all legitimacies of knowledge. Actually, therefore, phenomenological explication is nothing like “metaphysical construction”; and it is neither overtly nor covertly a theorizing with adopted presuppositions or helpful thoughts drawn from the historical metaphysical tradition. It stands in sharpest contrast to all that, because it proceeds within the limits of pure “intuition”, or rather of pure sense-explication

based on a fulfilling givenness of the sense itself. Particularly in the case of the Objective world of realities (as well as in the case of each of the many ideal Objective worlds, which are the fields of purely apriori sciences) — and this cannot be emphasized often enough — phenomenological explication does nothing but *explicate the sense this world has for us all, prior to any philosophizing*, and obviously gets solely from our experience — *a sense which philosophy can uncover but never alter*, and which, because of an essential necessity, not because of our weakness, entails (in the case of any actual experience) horizons that need fundamental clarification.

CONCLUSION

§ 63. *The task of criticizing transcendental experience and knowledge.*

In the investigations of this meditation and already in those of the two preceding meditations, we have been moving within the realm of transcendental experience, of self-experience proper and experience of someone else. We have trusted transcendental experience because of its originally lived-through evidence; and similarly we have trusted the evidence of predicative description and ¹ all the other modes of evidence belonging to transcendental science. Meanwhile we have lost sight of the demand, so seriously made at the beginning — namely that an *apodictic* knowledge, as the only “genuinely scientific” knowledge,² be achieved; but we have by no means dropped it. Only we preferred / to sketch in outline the tremendous wealth of problems <178> belonging to the *first stage of phenomenology* — a stage which in its own manner is itself *still infected with a certain naïveté (the naïveté of apodicticity)* but contains the great and most characteristic accomplishment of phenomenology, as a refashioning of science on a higher level — instead of entering into the *further and ultimate problems of phenomenology*: those pertaining to its *self-criticism*, which aims at determining not only the

¹ Supplied in accordance with Typescript C and the French translation.

² Reading, with Typescript C, “*eine apodiktische Erkenntnis, als die allein ‘echt wissenschaftliche’*”, instead of “*einer apodiktischen Erkenntnis, als der allein echt wissenschaftlichen*”, which is syntactically impossible.

range and limits but also the *modes of apodicticity*. At least a preliminary idea of the kind of criticism of transcendental-phenomenological knowledge required here is given by our earlier indications of how, for example, a criticism of transcendental recollection discovers in it an apodictic content. All transcendental-philosophical theory of knowledge, as "*criticism of knowledge*", leads back ultimately to criticism of transcendental-phenomenological knowledge (in the first place, criticism of transcendental experience); and, owing to the essential reflexive relation of phenomenology to itself, this criticism also demands a criticism. In this connexion, however, there exist no endless regresses that are infected with difficulties of any kind (to say nothing of absurdities), despite the evident possibility of re-iterable transcendental reflections and criticisms.

§ 64. *Concluding word.*

Our meditations, we may venture to say, have in the main fulfilled their purpose, namely to show the concrete possibility of the Cartesian idea¹ of a philosophy as an all-embracing science grounded on an absolute foundation. To exhibit this concrete possibility, to show the feasibility <of such a philosophy> — though of course in the form of an endless program — means exhibiting a necessary and indubitable beginning and an equally necessary and always employable method — whereby, at the same time, a systematic order of all sensful problems is predelineated. This much we have actually done. The only things that remain are the easily understandable ramifications of transcendental phenomenology — as a beginning philosophy that grows and branches out into particular Objective sciences <179> — and its relation to the sciences of naïve positivity, which are given beforehand as examples. We now direct our attention to these sciences.

Daily practical living is naïve. It is immersion in the already-given world, whether it be experiencing, or thinking, or valuing, or acting. Meanwhile all those productive intentional functions

¹ Reading "*der Cartesianischen Idee*", instead of "*die Cartesianische Idee*" (the concrete possibility, the Cartesian idea), as in both the published text and Typescript C. Cf. the French: "*de l'idée cartésienne*".