

monious — is essentially related to intersubjectivity (itself constituted as having the ideality of endless openness), whose component particular subjects are equipped with mutually corresponding and harmonious constitutive systems. Consequently *the constitution of the world essentially involves a “harmony” of the monads*: precisely this harmony among particular constitutions in the particular monads; and accordingly it involves also a harmonious generation that goes on in each particular monad. That is not meant, however, as a “metaphysical” hypothesizing of monadic harmony, any more than the monads themselves are metaphysical inventions or hypotheses. On the contrary, it is itself part of the explication of the intentional components implicit in the fact of the experiential world that exists for us. Here again it is to be noted that, as has been repeatedly emphasized, the ideas referred to are not phantasies or modes of the “as if”, but arise constitutionally in integral connexion with all Objective experience and have their modes of legitimation and their development by scientific activity.

What we have just presented is a preliminary view of the course to be followed, level by level, in the intentional explication that we must carry out, if we are to solve the transcendental problem in the only conceivable way and actually execute the transcendental idealism of phenomenology.

§ 50. *The mediate intentionality of experiencing someone else, as “appresentation” (analogical apperception).*

After we have dealt with the prior stage, which is very important transcendently — namely, definition and articulation of the primordial sphere —, the genuine difficulties (and in fact they are not inconsiderable) are occasioned by the *first* of the above-indicated steps toward constitution of an Objective world: *the step taking us to the “other” ego*. They lie, accordingly, in the transcendental clarification of experiencing “someone else” — in the sense in which the other has not yet attained the sense “man”. /

<139> Experience is original consciousness; and in fact we generally say, in the case of experiencing a man: the other is himself there

before us "in person". On the other hand, this being there in person does not keep us from admitting forthwith that, properly speaking, neither the other Ego himself, nor his subjective processes or his appearances themselves, nor anything else belonging to his own essence, becomes given in our experience originally. If it were, if what belongs to the other's own essence were directly accessible, it would be merely a moment of my own essence, and ultimately he himself and I myself would be the same. The situation would be similar as regards his animate organism, if the latter were nothing else but the "body" that is a unity constituted purely in my actual and possible experiences, a unity belonging — as a product of *my* "sensuousness" exclusively — in my primordial sphere. *A certain mediacy of intentionality* must be present here, going out from the substratum, "primordial world", (which in any case is the incessantly underlying basis) and making present to consciousness a "there too", which nevertheless is not itself there and can never become an "itself-there". We have here, accordingly, a kind of *making "co-present"*, a kind of "*appresentation*".

An appresentation occurs even in external experience, since the strictly seen front of a physical thing always and necessarily appresents a rear aspect and prescribes for it a more or less determinate content. On the other hand, experiencing someone else cannot be a matter of just this kind of appresentation, which already plays a role in the constitution of primordial Nature: Appresentation of this sort involves the possibility of verification by a corresponding fulfilling presentation (the back becomes the front); whereas, in the case of that appresentation which would lead over into the other original sphere, such verification must be excluded a priori. How can appresentation of another original sphere, and thereby the sense "someone else", be motivated in my original sphere and, in fact, motivated as experience — as the word "appresentation" (making intended as co-present) already indicates? Not every non-originary making-present can do that. A non-originary making-present can do it only in combination with an originary presentation, an itself-giving proper; and only as demanded by the originary presentation can it have the character of appresentation — somewhat as, in the case of experiencing a physical thing, what

is there perceptually motivates <belief in> something else being there too.

The perception proper that functions as the underlying basis is <140> offered us by our / *perception of the primordially reduced world*, with its previously described articulation — a perception going on continually within the general bounds of the ego's *incessant self-perception*. The problem now is: In the perception of that reduced world, what in particular must be of account here? How does the motivation run? What becomes uncovered as involved in the very complicated intentional performance of the apprehension, which does in fact come about?

Initial guidance can be furnished by the verbal sense, *an Other*: an Other Ego. "Alter" signifies alter ego. And the ego involved here is I myself, constituted within my primordial ownness, and uniquely, as the psychophysical unity (the primordial man): as "personal" Ego, governing immediately in my animate organism (the only animate organism) and producing effects mediately¹ in the primordial surrounding world; the subject, moreover, of a concrete intentional life, <and (?)> of a psychic sphere relating to himself and the "world". All of that — with the grouping under types that arises in experiential life and the familiar forms of flow and combination — is at our disposal. As for the intentionalities by which it has become constituted (and they too are highly complicated) — admittedly we have not investigated them <in these meditations>. They belong to a distinct stratum and are the theme of vast investigations into which we did not and could not enter.

Let us assume that another man enters our perceptual sphere. Primordially reduced, that signifies: In the perceptual sphere pertaining to my primordial Nature, a body is presented, which, as primordial, is of course only a determining part of myself: an "immanent transcendancy". Since, in this Nature and this world, my animate organism is the only body that is or can be constituted originally as an animate organism (a functioning organ), the body over there, which is nevertheless apprehended as an animate organism, must have derived this sense by an *apperceptive transfer from my animate organism*, and done so in

¹ According to the published text, Typescript C and the French translation: "immediately".

a manner that excludes an actually direct, and hence primordial, showing of the predicates belonging to an animate organism specifically, a showing of them in perception proper. It is clear from the very beginning that only a similarity connecting, within my primordial sphere, that body over there with my body can serve as the motivational basis for the "*analogizing*" *apperception* of that body as another animate organism. /

There would be, accordingly, a certain assimilative apper- <141>
ception; but it by no means follows that there would by an inference from analogy. Apperception is not inference, not a thinking act. *Every* apperception in which we apprehend at a glance, and noticingly grasp, objects given beforehand — for example, the already-given everyday world — every apperception in which we understand their sense and its horizons forthwith, points back to a "*primal instituting*", in which an object with a similar sense became constituted for the first time. Even the physical things of this world that are unknown to us are, to speak generally, known in respect of their type. We have already seen like things before, though not precisely this thing here. Thus *each everyday experience* involves an *analogizing transfer* of an originally instituted objective sense to a new case, with its anticipative apprehension of the object as having a similar sense. To the extent that there is givenness beforehand, there is such a transfer. At the same time, that sense-component in further experience which proves to be actually new may function in turn as institutive and found a *pregivenness* that has a richer sense. The child who already sees physical things understands, let us say, for the first time the final sense of scissors; and from now on he sees scissors at the first glance *as* scissors — but naturally not in an explicit reproducing, comparing, and inferring. Yet the manner in which apperceptions arise — and consequently in themselves, by their sense and sense-horizon, point back to their genesis — varies greatly. There are different levels of apperception, corresponding to different layers of objective sense. Ultimately we always get back to the *radical differentiation of apperceptions* into those that, according to their genesis, belong purely to the *primordial sphere* and those that present themselves *with the sense "alter ego"* and, *upon* this sense, have built a new one — thanks to a genesis at a higher level.

§ 51. "*Pairing*" as an associatively constitutive component of my experience of someone else.

If we attempt to indicate the peculiar nature of that analogizing apprehension whereby a body within my primordial sphere, being similar to my own animate body, becomes *apprehended as likewise an animate organism*, we encounter: first, the <142> circumstance that here the *primally institutive original* / is always *livingly present*, and the primal instituting itself is therefore always going on in a livingly effective manner; secondly, the peculiarity we already know to be necessary, namely that what is *appresented* by virtue of the aforesaid analogizing can never attain actual presence, never become an object of perception proper. Closely connected with the first peculiarity is the circumstance that *ego* and *alter ego* are always and necessarily given in an original "*pairing*".

Pairing, occurrence in configuration as a pair and then as a group, a plurality, is a *universal* phenomenon of the transcendental sphere (and of the parallel sphere of intentional psychology); and, we may add forthwith, as far as a pairing is actually present, so far extends that remarkable kind of primal instituting of an analogizing apprehension — its continuous primal institution in living actuality — which we have already stressed as the first peculiarity of experiencing someone else. Hence it is not exclusively peculiar to this experience.

First of all, let us elucidate the essential nature of any "*pairing*" (or any forming of a plurality). Pairing is a *primal form of that passive synthesis* which we designate as "*association*", in contrast to passive synthesis of "*identification*". In a *pairing association* the characteristic feature is that, in the most primitive case, two data are given intuitionally, and with prominence, in the unity of a consciousness and that, on this basis — essentially, already in pure passivity (regardless therefore of whether they are noticed or unnoticed) —, as data appearing with mutual distinctness, they *found phenomenologically a unity of similarity* and thus are always constituted precisely as a pair. If there are more than two such data, then a phenomenally unitary group, a plurality, becomes constituted. On more precise analysis we find essentially present here an intentional overreaching, coming^a about genet-

ically (and by essential necessity) as soon as the data that undergo pairing have become prominent and simultaneously intended; we find, more particularly, a living mutual awakening and an overlaying of each with the objective sense of the other. This overlaying can bring a total or a partial coincidence, which in any particular instance has its degree, the limiting case being that of complete "likeness". As the result of this overlaying, there takes place in the paired data a mutual transfer of sense — that is to say: an apperception of each according to the sense of the other, so far as / moments of sense actualized in what is <143> experienced do not annul this transfer, with the consciousness of "different".

In that case of association and apperception which particularly interests us — namely apperception of the alter ego by the ego — pairing first comes about when the Other enters my field of perception. I, as the primordial psychophysical Ego, am always prominent in my primordial field of perception, regardless of whether I pay attention to myself and turn toward myself with some activity or other. In particular, my live body is always there and sensuously prominent; but, in addition to that and likewise with primordial originariness, it is equipped with the specific sense of an animate organism. Now in case there presents itself, as outstanding in my primordial sphere, a body "similar" to mine — that is to say, a body with determinations such that it must enter into a phenomenal *pairing* with mine — it *seems* clear without more ado that, with the transfer of sense, this body must forthwith appropriate from mine the sense: animate organism. But is the apperception actually so transparent? Is it a simple apperception by transfer, like any other? What makes this organism another's, rather than a second organism of my own? Obviously what we designated as the *second fundamental characteristic* of the apperception in question plays a part here: that none of the *appropriated* sense specific to an animate organism can become actualized originarily in my primordial sphere.

§ 52. *Appresentation as a kind of experience with its own style of verification.*

But now there arises for us the difficult problem of making it understandable *that such an apperception is possible* and need

not be annulled forthwith. How does it happen that, as the fact tells us, the transferred sense is appropriated with existence-status, as a set of "psychic" determinations existing in combination with that body over there, even though they can never show themselves *as themselves* in the domain of originality, belonging to the primordial sphere (which alone is available)?

Let us look at the intentional situation more closely. The appresentation which gives that component of the Other which is not accessible originaliter is combined with an original presentation (of "his" body as part of the Nature given as included in my ownness). In this combination, moreover, the Other's
 <144> animate body and his governing Ego / are given in the manner that characterizes *a unitary transcending experience*. Every experience points to further experiences that would fulfil and verify the appresented horizons, which include, in the form of non-intuitive anticipations, potentially verifiable syntheses of harmonious further experience. Regarding experience of someone else, it is clear that its fulfillingly verifying continuation can ensue *only by means of new appresentations that proceed in a synthetically harmonious fashion*, and only by virtue of the manner in which *these appresentations owe their existence-value to their motivational connexion with the changing presentations proper, within my ownness*, that continually appertain to them.

As a suggestive *clue* to the requisite clarification, this proposition may suffice: The experienced animate organism of another continues to prove itself as actually an animate organism, solely in its changing but incessantly *harmonious "behavior"*. Such *harmonious* behavior (as having a physical side that indicates something psychic appresentatively) must present itself fulfillingly in original experience, and do so throughout the continuous change in behavior from phase to phase. The organism becomes experienced as a pseudo-organism, precisely if there is something discordant about its behavior.

The character of the existent "other" has its basis in this kind of verifiable accessibility of what is not originally accessible. Whatever can become presented, and evidently verified, *originally* — is something *I* am; or else it belongs to me as peculiarly my own. Whatever, by virtue thereof, is experienced in that founded manner which characterizes a primordially unfulfillable

experience — an experience that does not give something itself originally but that consistently verifies something indicated — is “other”. It is therefore conceivable only as an analogue of something included in my peculiar ownness. Because of its sense-constitution it occurs necessarily as an “*intentional modification*” of that Ego of mine which is the first to be Objectivated, or as an intentional modification of my primordial “world”: the Other as phenomenologically a “modification” of myself (which, for its part, gets this character of being “my” self by virtue of the contrastive pairing that necessarily takes place). It is clear that, with the other Ego, there is appresented, in an analogizing modification, everything that belongs to his concretion: first, *his* primordial world, and then his fully concrete ego. In other words, *another monad* becomes constituted appresentatively in mine.

Similarly (to draw an instructive comparison), within my ownness and moreover within / the sphere of its living present, <145> my past is given only by memory and is characterized in memory as my past, a past present — that is: an intentional modification. The experiential verification of it, as a modification, then goes on necessarily in harmonious syntheses of recollection; only thus does a past as such become verified. Somewhat as my memorial past, as a modification of my living present, “transcends” my present, the appresented other being “transcends” my own being (in the pure and most fundamental sense: what is included in my primordial ownness). In both cases the modification is inherent as a sense-component in the sense itself; it is a correlate of the intentionality constituting it. Just as, in my living present, in the domain of “internal perception”, my past becomes constituted by virtue of the harmonious memories occurring in this present, so in my primordial sphere, by means of appresentations occurring in it and motivated by its contents, an ego other than mine can become constituted — accordingly, in non-originary presentations [*in Vergegenwärtigungen*] of a new type, which have a modificatum of a new kind as their correlate. To be sure, as long as I consider non-originary presentations <of something lying> within the sphere of my ownness, the Ego in whom they center is the one identical I-myself. On the other hand, to everything alien (as long as it remains whitin

the appresented horizon of concreteness that necessarily goes with it) centers in an appresented Ego who is not I myself but, relative to me, a *modificatum*: an *other* Ego.

An actually sufficient explication of the noematic complexes involved in experience of what is alien — such an explanation as is absolutely necessary to a complete clarification of what this experience does constitutively, by constitutive association — is not yet completed with what has been shown up to now. There is need of a supplement, in order to reach the point where, on the basis of cognitions already acquired, the possibility and scope of a transcendental constitution of the Objective world can become evident and transcendental-phenomenological idealism can thus become entirely manifest.

§ 53. *Potentialities of the primordial sphere and their constitutive function in the apperception of the Other.*

As reflexively related to itself, my animate bodily organism (in my primordial sphere) ¹ has the central "Here" as its mode <146> of givenness; every other body, / and accordingly the "other's" body, has the mode "There". This orientation, "There", can be freely changed by virtue of my kinesthesias. Thus, in my primordial sphere, the *one spatial "Nature"* is constituted throughout the change in orientations, and constituted moreover with an intentional relatedness to my animate organism as functioning perceptually. Now the fact that my bodily organism can be (and is) apprehended as a *natural body existing and movable in space like any other* is manifestly connected with the possibility expressed in the words: By free modification of my kinesthesias, particularly those of locomotion, I can change my position in such a manner that I convert any There into a Here — that is to say, I could occupy any spatial locus with my organism. This implies that, perceiving from there, I should see the same physical things, only in correspondingly different modes of appearance, such as pertain to my being there. It implies, then, that not only the systems of appearance that pertain to my current perceiving "from here", but other quite determinate systems, corresponding

¹ Supplied in accordance with Typescript C and the French translation.

to the change of position that puts me "there", belong constitutively to each physical thing. And the same in the case of every other "There".

Should not these interconnexions, or rather these instances of belonging together, which are involved in the primordial constitution of "my" Nature and are themselves characterized as associative — should not they be quite essential to clarification of the associative performance, experiencing someone else? After all, I do not apperceive the other ego simply as a duplicate of myself and accordingly as having my original sphere or one completely like mine. I do not apperceive him as having, more particularly, the spatial modes of appearance that are mine from here; rather, as we find on closer examination, I apperceive him as having spatial modes of appearance like those I should have if I should go over there and be where he is. Furthermore the Other is appresentatively apperceived as the "Ego" of a primordial world, and of a monad, wherein his animate organism is originally constituted and experienced in the mode of the absolute Here, precisely as the functional center for his governing. In this appresentation, therefore, the body in the mode *There*, which presents itself in *my* monadic sphere and is apperceived as another's live body (the animate organism of the alter ego) — that body indicates "the same" body in the mode *Here*, as the body experienced by the other ego in *his* monadic sphere. Moreover it indicates the "same" body concretely, with all the constitutive intentionality pertaining to this mode of givenness in the other's experience. /

§ 54. *Explicating the sense of the appresentation wherein I experience someone else.* <147>

Manifestly what has just now been brought to light points to the course of the association constituting the mode "Other". The body that is a member of my primordial world (the body subsequently of the other ego) is for me a body in the mode *There*. Its manner of appearance does not become paired in a direct association with the manner of appearance actually belonging at the time to my animate organism (in the mode *Here*);

rather it awakens reproductively *another*, an immediately¹ similar appearance included in the system constitutive of my animate organism as a body in space. It brings to mind the way my body would look "if I were there". In this case too, although the awakening does not become a memory *intuition*, *pairing* takes place. The first-awakened manner of appearance of my body is not the only thing that enters into a pairing; my body itself does so likewise: as the synthetic unity pertaining to this mode, and the many other familiar modes, of its appearance. *Thus the assimilative apperception becomes possible* and established, by which the external body over there receives analogically from mine the sense, animate organism, and consequently the sense, organism belonging to another "world", analogous to my primordial world.

The *general style* of this and every other apperception that arises associatively is therefore to be described as follows: With the associative overlapping of the data founding the apperception, there takes place an association at a higher level. If the one datum is a particular mode of appearance of an intentional object, which is itself an index pointing to an associatively awakened system of manifold appearances wherein it would show itself, then the other datum is "supplemented" to become likewise an appearance *of* something, namely an analogous object. But it is not as though the unity and multiplicity "thrust upon" the latter datum merely supplemented it with modes of appearance taken from these others. On the contrary, the analogically apprehended object and its indicated system of appearances are indeed *analogically adapted* to the analogous appearance, which has awakened this whole system too. Every overlapping-at-a-distance, which occurs by virtue of associative pairing, is *at the same time a fusion* and² therein, so far as incompatibilities do not interfere, an assimilation, an accommodation of the sense of the one member to that of the other. /

< 148 > If we return to our case, that of apperception of the alter ego, it is now self-understood that what is appresented by the "body" over there, in my primordial "surrounding world", is not

¹ The words "another" and "immediately" supplied in accordance with Typescript C and the French translation.

² Supplied in accordance with Typescript C and the French translation.

something psychic of mine, nor anything else in my sphere of ownness. I am *here* somatically, the center of a primordial "world" oriented around me. Consequently my entire primordial ownness, proper to me as a monad, has the content of the Here — not the content varying with some "I can and do", which might set in, and belonging to some There or other; accordingly, not the content belonging to that definite There.¹ Each of these contents excludes the other; they cannot both exist <in my sphere of ownness> at the same time. But, since the other body there enters into a pairing association with my body here and, being given perceptually, becomes the core of an appresentation, the core of my experience of a coexisting ego, that ego, according to the whole sense-giving course of the association, must be appresented as *an ego now coexisting in the mode There*, "such as I should be if I were there". My own ego however, the ego given in constant self-perception, is actual now with the content belonging to his Here. Therefore an ego is *appresented*, as *other* than mine. That which is primordially incompatible, in simultaneous coexistence, becomes compatible: because my primordial ego constitutes the ego who is other for him by an appresentative apperception, which, according to its intrinsic nature, never demands and never is open to fulfilment by presentation.

Likewise easy to understand is the manner in which, as the effective association goes on continuously, such an appresentation of someone else continually furnishes new appresentational contents — that is to say, brings the changing contents of the other ego to definite notice; and, on the other hand, the manner in which, by virtue of the combination with a continual presentation and the associational demands expectantly addressed to this presentation, a *consistent confirmation* becomes possible. The *first determinate content* obviously must be formed by the understanding of the other's organism and specifically organismal conduct: the understanding of the members as hands groping or functioning in pushing, as feet functioning in walking, as eyes functioning in seeing, and so forth. With this the Ego at first is determined only as governing thus somatically [*so leiblich waltendes*] and, in a familiar manner, proves himself continually, so

¹ Reading with the original typescript, as given in the appendix to the published text.

far as the whole stylistic form of the sensible processes manifest to me primordially must correspond to the form whose type is familiar from my own organismal governing [*leibliches Walten*].
 <149> / It is quite comprehensible that, as a further consequence, an "empathizing" of definite contents belonging to the "*higher psychic sphere*" arises. Such contents too are indicated somatically and in the conduct of the organism toward the outside world — for example: as the outward conduct of someone who is angry or cheerful, which I easily understand from my own conduct under similar circumstances. Higher psychic occurrences, diverse as they are and familiar as they have become, have furthermore their style of synthetic interconnexions and take their course in forms of their own, which I can understand associatively on the basis of my empirical familiarity with the style of my own life, as exemplifying roughly differentiated typical forms. In this sphere, moreover, every successful understanding of what occurs in others has the effect of opening up new associations and new possibilities of understanding; and conversely, since every pairing association is reciprocal, every such understanding uncovers my own psychic life in its similarity and difference and, by bringing new features into prominence, makes it fruitful for new associations.

§ 55. *Establishment of the community of monads.*
The first form of Objectivity: intersubjective Nature.

But it is more important to clarify the *community*, developing at various levels, which is produced forthwith by virtue of experiencing someone else: the community between me, the primordial psychophysical Ego governing in and by means of my primordial organism, and the appresentatively experienced Other; then, considered more concretely and radically, between my monadic ego and his.

The first thing constituted in the form of community, and the *foundation for all other intersubjectively common things*, is the *commonness of Nature*, along with that of the *Other's organism* and his *psychophysical Ego*, as paired with *my own psychophysical Ego*.

Since other subjectivity, by appresentation within the exclusive own-essentialness of my subjectivity, arises with the

sense and status of a subjectivity that is other in its own essence¹, it might at first seem to be a mystery how community — even the first community, in the form of a common world — becomes established. The other organism, as appearing in my primordial sphere, is first of all a body in my / primordial Nature, which is <150> a synthetic unity belonging to me and therefore, as a determining part included in my own essence, inseparable from me myself. If that body functions appresentatively, then, in union with it, the other Ego becomes an object of my consciousness — and primarily the other Ego with his organism, as given to him in the manner of appearance pertaining to his “absolute Here”. How can I speak at all of *the same* body, as appearing within my primordial sphere in the mode There and within his and to him in the mode Here? These two primordial spheres, mine which is for me as ego the original sphere, and his which is for me an appresented sphere — are they not *separated* by an abyss I cannot actually cross, since crossing it would mean, after all, that I acquired an original (rather than an appresenting) experience of someone else? If we stick to our de facto experience, our experience of someone else as it comes to pass at any time, we find that actually the *sensuously seen body* is experienced forthwith as *the body of someone else* and not as merely an indication of someone else. Is not this fact an enigma?

The body belonging to my original sphere and the body constituted, after all, quite separately in the other ego become identified and are called the identical body of someone else. How does this identification come about? How *can* it come about? But the enigma appears only if the two original spheres have already been distinguished — a distinction that already presupposes that experience of someone else has done its work. Since we are not dealing here with a temporal genesis of such experience, on the basis of a temporally antecedent self-experience, manifestly only a precise explication of the intentionality actually observable in our experience of someone else and discovery of the motivations essentially implicit in that intentionality can unlock the enigma.

¹ Reading, with Typescript C, “*einer eigenwesentlich-anderen*” instead of “*einer eigenwesentlichen anderen*” (another subjectivity having its own essence). Cf. the French: “*ayant un être essentiellement propre*”.

As we said once before, appresentation as such presupposes a core of presentation. It is a making present combined by associations with presentation, with perception proper, but a making present that is fused with the latter in the particular function of "co-perception". In other words, the two are so fused that they stand within the *functional community of one perception*, which simultaneously presents and appresents, and yet furnishes for the total object a consciousness of its being itself there. Therefore, <151> in the object of / such a presentive-appresentive perception (an object making its appearance in the mode, itself-there), we must distinguish noematically between that part which is genuinely perceived and the rest, which is not strictly perceived and yet is indeed there too. Thus every perception of this type is transcending: it posits more as itself-there than it makes "actually" present at any time. Every external perception belongs here — for example, perception of a house (front — rear); but at bottom absolutely every perception, indeed every evidence, is thus described in respect of a most general feature, provided only that we understand "presenting" in a broader sense.

Let us apply this general cognition to the case of experiencing someone else. In this case too it should be noted that experience *can appresent only because it presents*, that here too appresentation can exist only in the aforesaid functional community with presentation. That implies, however, that, from the very beginning, *what this experience presents must belong to the unity of the very object appresented*. In other words: It is not, and cannot be, the case that the body belonging to my primordial sphere and indicating to me the other Ego (and, with him, the whole of the other primordial sphere or the other concrete ego) could appresent his factual existence and being-there-too, unless *this primordial body* acquired the sense, "a body belonging to the other ego", and, according to the whole associative-apperceptive performance, *the sense: "someone else's animate organism itself"*. Therefore it is not as though the body over there, in my primordial sphere, remained separate from the animate bodily organism of the other Ego, as if that body were something like a signal for its analogue (by virtue of an obviously inconceivable motivation); it is not as though consequently, with the spreading of the association and appresentation, my primordial Nature

and the other's appresented primordial Nature — therefore my concrete ego and the other concrete ego — remained separate. On the contrary, this natural body belonging to my sphere appresents the other Ego, by virtue of the pairing association with my bodily organism, and with my Ego governing in my organism, within my primordially constituted Nature. In so doing, it appresents first of all the other Ego's governing in this body, the body over there, and mediately his governing in the Nature that appears to him perceptually — identically the Nature to which the body over there belongs, identically the Nature that / is my primordial Nature. It is the same Nature, but in the <152> mode of appearance: "as if I were standing over there, where the Other's body is". The body is the same, given to me as the body there, and to him as the body here, the central body. Furthermore, "my" whole Nature is the same as the Other's. In *my* primordial sphere it is constituted as an identical unity of my manifold modes of givenness — an identical unity in changing orientations around *my* animate organism (the zero body, the body in the absolute Here), an identical unity of even richer multiplicities that, as changing modes of appearance pertaining to different "senses", or else as changeable "perspectives", belong to each particular orientation as here or there and also, in a quite particular manner, belong to my animate organism, which is inseparable from the absolute Here. All of this has for me the originality of something included in my particular ownness, something directly accessible in original explication of my own self. In the *appresented other ego* the synthetic systems are *the same*, with all their modes of appearance, accordingly with all the possible perceptions and the noematic contents of these: except that the *actual* perceptions and the modes of givenness actualized therein, and also in part the objects actually perceived, are *not the same*; rather the objects perceived are precisely those perceivable *from there*, and *as* they are perceivable from there. Something similar is true of anything else of my own and the corresponding alien thing, even where original explication does not go on in perceptions. I do not have an appresented second original sphere with a second "Nature" and, in this Nature, a second animate bodily organism (the one belonging to the other ego himself), so that I must then ask how I can apprehend

my Nature and this other as modes of appearance of the same Objective Nature. On the contrary, the *identity*-sense of "my" primordial Nature and the presentiated other primordial Nature is *necessarily* produced by the appresentation and the unity that it, *as* appresentation, necessarily has with the presentation co-functioning for it — this appresentation by virtue of which an Other and, consequently, his concrete ego are there for me in the first place. Quite rightly, therefore, we speak of *perceiving* someone else and then of perceiving the Objective world, perceiving that the other Ego and I are looking at the same world, and so forth — though this perceiving goes on exclusively within the sphere of my ownness. That does not at all contravene the fact that the intentionality of this sphere transcends my ownness, <153> or the fact that accordingly my ego / constitutes in himself another ego — and constitutes this ego, moreover, as existent. What I actually see is not a sign and not a mere analogue, a depiction in any natural sense of the word; on the contrary, it is someone else. And what is grasped with actual originality in this seeing — namely that corporeality over there, or rather only one aspect of its surface — is the Other's body itself, but seen just from my position and in respect of this aspect: According to the sense-constitution involved in perceiving someone else, what is grasped originaliter is the body of a psyche essentially inaccessible to me originaliter, and the two are comprised in the unity of one psychophysical reality.

On the other hand, it is implicit in the intentional essence of this perception of the Other — the Other who exists henceforth, as I do myself, within what is henceforth the Objective world — that I as perceiver can find the aforesaid distinction between my primordial sphere and the merely presentiated primordial sphere of the Other, and consequently can trace the peculiarities of the division into two noetic strata and explicate the complexes of associative intentionality. The experiential phenomenon, Objective Nature, has, besides the primordially constituted stratum, a superimposed second, merely appresented stratum originating from my experiencing of someone else; and this fact concerns, first of all, *the Other's animate bodily organism*, which is, so to speak, *the intrinsically first Object*, just as *the other man is constitutionally the intrinsically first <Objective> man*. In the case of

this primal phenomenon of Objectivity, the situation is already clear to us: If I screen off my experience of someone else, I have the lowest constitution, the one-layered presentive constitution of the other body within my primordial sphere; if I add that experience, I have appresentationally, and as coinciding synthetically with the presentational stratum, the same animate organism as it is given to the other Ego himself, and I have the further possible modes of givenness available to him.

From that, as is easily understandable, *every* natural Object experienced or experienceable by me in the lower stratum receives an appresentational stratum (though by no means one that becomes explicitly intuited), a stratum united in an identifying synthesis with the stratum given to me in the mode of primordial originality: the same natural Object in its possible modes of givenness to the other Ego. This is repeated, *mutatis mutandis*, in the case of subsequently constituted mundanities of the concrete Objective world as it always exists for us: namely as a world of men and culture. /

The following should be noted in this connexion. It is implicit <154> in the sense of my successful apperception of others that their world, the world belonging to their appearance-systems, must be experienced forthwith as the same as the world belonging to my appearance-systems; and this involves an identity of our appearance-systems. Now we know very well that there are such things as "*abnormalities*" (for example: in the case of subjects who are blind or deaf); we know that therefore the appearance-systems are by no means always absolutely identical and that whole strata (though not all strata) can differ. But abnormality must first be *constituted* as such; and the constituting of abnormality is possible only on the basis of an intrinsically antecedent normality. This points to new tasks, which belong to a higher level of phenomenological analysis of the constitutional origin of the Objective world — as the Objective world existing for us and only by virtue of our own sense-producing sources, a world that can have neither sense nor existence for us otherwise. The Objective world has existence by virtue of a harmonious confirmation of the apperceptive constitution, once this has succeeded: a confirmation thereof by the continuance of experiencing life with a consistent harmoni-

ousness, which always becomes re-established as extending through any "corrections" that may be required to that end. Now harmoniousness is preserved also by virtue of a recasting of apperceptions through distinguishing between normality and abnormalities (as modifications thereof), or by virtue of the constitution of new unities throughout the changes involved in abnormalities. Among the problems of abnormality the problem of non-human animality and that of the levels of "higher and lower" brutes are included. Relative to the brute, man is, constitutionally speaking, the normal case — just as I myself am the primal norm constitutionally for all other men. Brutes are essentially constituted for me as abnormal "variants" of my humanness, even though *among* them in turn normality and abnormality may be differentiated. Always it is a matter of intentional modifications in the sense-structure itself, as what becomes evinced. All of that, to be sure, needs a more thorough phenomenological explication. This general account, however, is enough for our present purposes.

After these clarifications it is no longer an enigma how I can constitute in myself another Ego or, more radically, how I can constitute in my monad another monad, and can experience what is constituted in me as nevertheless other than me. At the same time, this being indeed inseparable from such constitution, <155> it is no longer an enigma how I / can identify a Nature constituted in me with a Nature constituted by someone else (or, stated with the necessary precision, how I can identify a Nature constituted in me with one constituted in me *as* a Nature constituted by someone else). This identification is no greater enigma than any other synthetic identification. It is therefore no more mysterious than any, by virtue of which, as an identification confined to my own original sphere, no matter what objective unity acquires sense and being for me through the medium of *presentiations*. Let us consider the following instructive example and use it to bring out a thought that takes us further: the notion of a *connexion* constituted through the medium of presentation. How does one of my own subjective processes acquire for me the sense and status of an existent process, something existing with its identical temporal form and identical temporal content? The original is gone; but, in repeated presentiations,

I go back to it and do so with the evidence: "I can always do so again." But these repeated presentations are evidently themselves a temporal sequence; and each is separate from the others. In spite of that, however, an identifying synthesis connects them in the evident consciousness of "the Same" — which implies the same, never repeated temporal form, filled with the same content. Here, as everywhere else, "the Same" signifies therefore an *identical intentional object of separate conscious processes*, hence an object immanent in them only as something *non-really* inherent. Another case, very important in itself, is that of the constitution of objects that are ideal in the pregnant sense — for example: all logically ideal objects. In a living, many-membered thinking action I produce a structure: a theorem or a numerical structure. Subsequently I repeat the producing, while recollecting my earlier producing. At once, and by essential necessity, an identifying synthesis takes place; furthermore a new identifying synthesis occurs with each additional repetition (a repetition performed with a consciousness that the producing can be repeated again at will): It is identically the same proposition, identically the same numerical structure, *but repeatedly produced* or, this being equivalent, repeatedly made evident. Therefore in this case, through the medium of recollective presentations, the synthesis extends — within my stream of subjective processes (which always is already constituted) — from my living present into my currently relevant separate pasts and thus makes a *connexion* between my present and these pasts. With that, moreover, the supremely significant *transcendental problem of ideal objectivities* ("ideal" in the specific sense) is solved. Their supertemporality turns out to be *omnitemporality*, as a correlate of free / produceability and <156> reproduceability at all times. After constitution of the Objective world with its Objective time and its Objective men as possible thinking subjects, that obviously carries over to ideal structures, as themselves Objectivated, and to their Objective omnitemporality. Thus the contrast between them and Objective *realities*, as spatiotemporally individuated structures, becomes understandable.

If we return now to our case, the experience of someone else, we find that, with its complicated structure, it effects a similar

connexion mediated by presentation: namely a connexion between, on the one hand, the uninterruptedly living self-experience (as purely passive original self-appearance) of the concrete ego — accordingly, his primordial sphere — and, on the other hand, the *alien sphere* presentiated therein. It effects this, first, by its identifying synthesis of the *primordially given* animate body of someone else and the same animate body, but *ap-presented* in other modes of appearance, and secondly, spreading out from there, by its identifying synthesis of the same Nature, given and verified primordially (with pure sensuous originality) and at the same time appresentationally. In that way the *coexistence of my <polar> Ego and the other Ego*, of my whole concrete ego and his, my intentional life and his, my “realities” and his — in short, a *common time-form* — is primally instituted; and thus every primordial temporality automatically acquires the significance of being merely an original mode of appearance of Objective temporality to a particular subject. In this connexion we see that the temporal community of the constitutively interrelated monads is indissoluble, because it is tied up essentially with the constitution of *a world and a world time*.

§ 56. *Constitution of higher levels of intermonadic community.*

With these considerations we have clarified the *first and lowest level of communalization* between me, the primordial monad for myself, and the monad constituted in me, yet as other and accordingly as existing for himself but only appresentationally demonstrable to me. The only conceivable manner in which others can have for me the sense and status of existent others, thus and so determined, consists in their being constituted *in me* as others. If they get that sense and status from sources that yield a continual confirmation, then they do indeed *exist* (as I /
 <157> am *compelled* to say), but exclusively as having the sense with which they are constituted: as monads, existing for themselves precisely as I exist for myself, yet existing also in communion, therefore (I emphasize the expression already used earlier) in *connexion with me* qua concrete ego, qua monad. To be sure, they are separate from my monad, so far as really inherent constituents are concerned, since no really inherent connexion leads

from their subjective processes to my subjective processes or from anything included in their peculiar ownness to anything included in mine. To that separation there corresponds, after all, the “*real*”, the mundane separation of my psychophysical existence from someone else’s, a separation that shows itself as spatial, owing to the spatial character of our Objective animate organisms. On the other hand, this original communion is not just nothing. Whereas, really inherently, each monad is an absolutely separate unity, the “*irreal*” intentional reaching of the other into my primordially is not *irreal* in the sense of being dreamt into it or being present to consciousness after the fashion of a mere phantasy. *Something that exists is in intentional communion with something else that exists*. It is an essentially *unique connectedness*, an actual community and precisely the one that makes transcendently possible the being of a world, a world of men and things.

After the first level of communalization and (this being almost equivalent) the first constitution of an Objective world, starting from the primordial world, have been sufficiently clarified, the *higher levels* offer relatively minor difficulties. Though comprehensive investigations and a progressive differentiation of problems relating to these levels are necessary for purposes of an all-round explication, here we can be satisfied with rough general indications, easily understandable on the basis already laid. Starting from me, from the one who is constitutionally the primal monad, I acquire what are for me other monads and, correlatively, others as *psychophysical* subjects. This implies that I do *not* acquire the latter *merely as over against me* somatically and — by virtue of associative pairing — as *related back to my psychophysical existence* (which indeed is universally “central”, and particularly the “central member” in the communalized world of the present level because of the necessarily oriented manner in which this world is given). On the contrary (and this carries over to the sociality of brute animals), in the sense of a *community of men* and in that of *man* — who, even as solitary, has the sense: member of a community — there is implicit a *mutual being for one another*, which / entails an *Objectivating equalization* <158> of my existence with that of all others — consequently: I or anyone else, as a man among other men. If, with my under-

standing of someone else, I penetrate more deeply into him, into his horizon of ownness, I shall soon run into the fact that, just as his animate bodily organism lies in my field of perception, so my animate organism lies in his field of perception and that, in general, he experiences me forthwith as an Other for him, just as I experience him as *my* Other. Likewise I shall find that, in the case of a plurality of Others, they are experienced also by one another as Others, and consequently that I can experience any given Other not only as himself an Other but also as related in turn to *his* Others and perhaps — with a mediatedness that may be conceived as reiterable — related at the same time to me. It is also clear that men become apperceivable only as finding Others and still more Others, not just in the realm of actuality but likewise in the realm of possibility, at their own pleasure. Openly endless Nature itself then becomes a Nature that includes an open plurality of men (conceived more generally: animalia), distributed one knows not how in infinite space, as subjects of possible intercommunion. To this community there naturally corresponds, in transcendental concreteness, a similarly¹ open *community of monads*, which we designate as *transcendental intersubjectivity*. We need hardly say that, as existing for me,² it is constituted purely within me, the meditating ego, purely by virtue of sources belonging to my intentionality; nevertheless it is constituted thus *as* a community constituted also in every other monad (who, in turn, is constituted with the modification: "other") as the same community — only with a different subjective mode of appearance — and as necessarily bearing within itself the same Objective world. Manifestly it is essentially necessary to the world constituted transcendently in me (and similarly necessary to the world constituted in any community of monads that is imaginable by me) that it be a *world of men* and that, *in each particular man*, it be more or less perfectly constituted *intrapsychically* — in intentional processes and potential systems of intentionality, which, as "psychic life", are themselves already constituted as existing in the world. By "the psychic constitution of the

¹ Reading "*entsprechend*" instead of "*entsprechende*" (similar), as in both the published text and Typescript C.

² Reading with Typescript C and the French version. According to the published text: "that for me".

Objective world" we mean, for example, my actual and possible experience of the world, as an experience belonging to me, the Ego who experiences himself as a man. Such experience of the world is more or less perfect; it always has its ¹ open undetermined horizon. For each man, every other is implicit in this horizon — physically, / psychophysically, in respect of what is internal to the other's psyche — and is thus in principle a realm of endless accessibilities, though in fact most other men remain horizontal.

§ 57. *Clarification of the parallel between explication of what is internal to the psyche and egological transcendental explication.*

On this basis it is not hard to clear up the *necessary parallel between explications of what is internal to the psyche and egological transcendental explications*, or the fact that, as was already said earlier, the pure psyche is a *self-Objectivation* of the monad, accomplished in the latter — a self-Objectivation the different levels of which are essential necessities, if Others are possibly to exist for the monad.

Connected with this is the fact that, a priori, every analysis or theory of transcendental phenomenology — including the theory whose main features have just been indicated, the theory of transcendental constitution of an Objective world — can be produced in the natural realm, when we give up the transcendental attitude. Thus transposed to the realm of transcendental naïveté, it becomes a theory pertaining to internal psychology. *Whether the two disciplines be eidetic or empirical*, a "pure" psychology — a psychology that merely explicates what belongs to a psyché, to a concrete human Ego, as its own intentional essence — corresponds to a *transcendental phenomenology*, and vice versa. That, however, is something to be made evident transcendently.

§ 58. *Differentiation of problems in the intentional analysis of higher intersubjective communities. I and my surrounding world.*

The *constitution of humanity*, or of that community which belongs to the full essence of humanity, does not end with what

¹ Reading with Typescript C, "*sie hat stets ihren*", instead of "*aber doch mindestens als*". Cf. the French: "*elle a toujours ses*".