

## FIFTH MEDITATION

### UNCOVERING OF THE SPHERE OF TRANSCENDENTAL BEING AS MONADOLOGICAL INTERSUBJECTIVITY

§ 42. *Exposition of the problem of experiencing someone else, in rejoinder to the objection that phenomenology entails solipsism.*

As the point of departure for our new meditations, let us take what may seem to be a grave objection. The objection concerns nothing less than the claim of transcendental phenomenology to be itself transcendental *philosophy* and therefore its claim that, in the form of a constitutional problematic and theory moving within the limits of the transcendently reduced ego, it can solve the transcendental problems pertaining to the *Objective world*. When I, the meditating I, reduce myself to my absolute transcendental ego by phenomenological epoché do I not become *solus ipse*; and do I not remain that, as long as I carry on a consistent self-explication under the name phenomenology? Should not a phenomenology that proposed to solve the problems of Objective being, and to present itself actually as philosophy, be branded therefore as transcendental solipsism?

Let us consider the matter more closely. Transcendental reduction restricts me to the stream of my pure conscious processes and the unities constituted by their actualities and potentialities. And indeed it seems<sup>1</sup> obvious that such unities are inseparable from my ego and therefore belong to his concreteness itself.

But what about other egos, who surely are not a mere intending and intended *in me*, merely synthetic unities of possible verification *in me*, but, according to their sense, precisely *others*? Have we not therefore done transcendental realism an injustice? The doctrine may lack a phenomenological foundation; but essentially it is right in the end, since it / looks for <122> a path from the immanency of the ego to the transcendency of the Other. Can we, as phenomenologists, do anything but agree with this and say: "The Nature and the whole world that are

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: Seems? Is.

constituted 'immanently' in the ego are only my 'ideas' and have behind them the world that exists in itself. The way to this world must still be sought." ? Accordingly can we avoid saying likewise: "The very question of the possibility of actually transcendent knowledge — above all, that of the possibility of my going outside my ego and reaching other egos (who, after all, as others, are not actually in me but only consciously intended in me) — this question cannot be asked purely phenomenologically" ? Is it not *self-understood* from the very beginning that my field of transcendental knowledge does not reach beyond my sphere of transcendental experience and what is synthetically comprised therein ? Is it not self-understood that all of that is included without residue in my own transcendental ego ?

But perhaps there is some mistake in thoughts like these. Before one decides in favor of them and the "self-understood" propositions they exploit, and then perchance embarks on dialectical argumentations and self-styled "metaphysical" hypotheses (whose supposed possibility may turn out to be complete absurdity), it might indeed be more fitting to undertake the *task of phenomenological explication* indicated in this connexion by the "alter ego" and carry it through in concrete work. We must, after all, obtain for ourselves insight into the explicit and implicit intentionality wherein the alter ego becomes evinced and verified in the realm of our transcendental ego ; we must discover in what intentionalities, syntheses, motivations, the sense "other ego" becomes fashioned in me<sup>1</sup> and, under the title, harmonious experience of someone else, becomes verified as existing and even as itself there in its own manner. These experiences and their works are facts belonging to my<sup>2</sup> phenomenological sphere. How else than by examining them can I explicate the sense, existing others, in all its aspects ?

§ 43. *The noematic-ontic mode of givenness of the Other,  
as transcendental clue for the constitutional theory  
of the experience of someone else.*

<123> First of all, / my "transcendental clue" is the experienced Other, given to me in straightforward consciousness and as I

<sup>1</sup> The phrase rendered by "in me" crossed out.

<sup>2</sup> The word rendered as "belonging to my" crossed out. Marginal comment: "The dangerous first person singular ! This should be expanded terminologically."

immerse myself in examining the noematic-ontic content belonging to him (purely as correlate of my cogito, the particular structure of which is yet to be uncovered). By its remarkableness and multiplicity, that content already indicates the many-sidedness and difficulty of the phenomenological task. For example: In changeable harmonious multiplicities of experience I experience others as actually existing and, on the one hand, as world Objects — not as mere physical things belonging to Nature, though indeed as such things in respect of one side of them. They are in fact experienced also as *governing psychically* in their respective natural organisms<sup>1</sup>. Thus peculiarly involved with animate organisms, as “psychophysical” Objects, they are “*in*” the world. On the other hand, I experience them at the same time as *subjects for this world*, as experiencing it (this same world that I experience) and, in so doing, experiencing me too, even as I experience the world and others in it. Continuing along this line, I can explicate a variety of other moments noematically.

In any case then, within myself, within the limits of my transcendently reduced pure conscious life, I *experience* the world (including others) — and, according to its experiential sense, *not* as (so to speak) my *private* synthetic formation but as other than mine alone [*mir fremde*], as an *intersubjective* world, actually there for everyone, accessible in respect of its Objects to everyone. And yet each has his experiences, his appearances and appearance-unities, his world-phenomenon; whereas the experienced world exists in itself, over against all experiencing subjects and their world-phenomena.

What is the explanation of this? Imperturbably I must hold fast to the insight that every sense that any existent whatever has or can have for me — in respect of its “what” and its “it exists and actually is” — is a sense *in* and *arising from* my intentional life, becoming clarified and uncovered for me in consequence of my life’s constitutive syntheses, in systems of harmonious verification. Therefore, in order to provide the basis for answering all imaginable questions that can have any sense <here> — nay, in order that, step by step, these questions themselves may be propounded and solved — it is necessary to begin with a systematic explication of the overt and implicit

<sup>1</sup> This sentence crossed out. Three exclamation points in the margin.

intentionality in which the being of others for me becomes "made" and explicated in respect of its rightful content — that is, its fulfilment-content.

Thus the problem is stated at first as a special one, namely / <124> that of the "thereness-for-me" of others, and accordingly as the theme of a *transcendental theory of experiencing someone else*, a transcendental theory of so-called "empathy". But it soon becomes evident that the range of such a theory is much greater than at first it seems, that it contributes to the founding of a *transcendental theory of the Objective world* and, indeed, to the founding of such a theory in every respect, notably as regards Objective Nature. The existence-sense [*Seinssinn*] of the world and of Nature in particular, as Objective Nature, includes after all, as we have already mentioned, thereness-for-everyone. This is always cointended wherever we speak of Objective actuality. In addition, Objects with "spiritual" predicates belong to the experienced world. These Objects, in respect of their origin and sense, refer us to subjects, usually other subjects, and their actively constituting intentionality. Thus it is in the case of all cultural Objects (books, tools, works of any kind, and so forth), which moreover carry with them at the same time the experiential sense of thereness-for-everyone (that is, everyone belonging to the corresponding cultural community, such as the European or perhaps, more narrowly, the French cultural community, and so forth).

#### § 44. *Reduction of transcendental experience to the sphere of ownness.*

If the transcendental constitution of other subjects and accordingly the transcendental sense, "other subjects", are in question, and consequently a universal sense-stratum<sup>1</sup> that emanates from others<sup>2</sup> and is indispensable to the possibility of an Objective world for me is also in question, then the sense, "other subjects", that is in question here cannot as yet be the

<sup>1</sup> Reading, with Typescript C, "*Sinnesschichte*" instead of "*Sinngeschichte*" (sense history).

<sup>2</sup> Reading "*ihnen*" (them) instead of "*innen*" (within), as in both the published text and Typescript C.

sense: "Objective subjects, subjects existing in the world". As regards method, a prime requirement for proceeding correctly here is that first of all we carry out, *inside the universal transcendental sphere, a peculiar kind of epoché* with respect to our theme. For the present we exclude from the thematic field everything now in question: we *disregard all constitutional effects of intentionality relating immediately or mediately to other subjectivity* and delimit first of all the total nexus of that actual and potential intentionality in which the ego constitutes *within himself a peculiar ownness*<sup>1</sup>. /

This *reduction to my transcendental sphere of peculiar ownness* <125> or to my transcendental concrete I-myself, by abstraction from everything that transcendental constitution gives me as Other, has an unusual sense. In the natural, the world-accepting attitude, I find differentiated and contrasted: myself and others. If I "abstract" (in the usual sense) from others, I "alone" remain. But such abstraction is not radical; such aloneness in no respect alters the natural world-sense, "experienceable by everyone", which attaches to the naturally understood Ego and would not be lost, even if a universal plague had left only me. Taken however in the transcendental attitude and at the same time with the constitutional abstraction that we have just characterized, my (the meditator's) ego in his transcendental ownness is not the usual I, this man, reduced to a mere correlate phenomenon and having his status within the total world-phenomenon. What concerns us is, on the contrary, *an essential structure, which is part of the all-embracing constitution* in which the transcendental ego, as constituting an Objective world, lives his life.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Originally: constitutes himself in his peculiar ownness and synthetic unities inseparable from his peculiar ownness, which are therefore to be accounted as part of it.

The following comment was appended later:

§ 44. "inside the universal transcendental sphere" — "peculiar epoché". But it is misleading when the text goes on to say: "in that we exclude from the theoretical <sic> field everything now in question, in that we <disregard> all constitutional effects that relate immediately or mediately to other subjectivity," etc.

The question after all concerns, not other men, but the manner in which the ego (as the transcendental onlooker experiences him transcendentially) constitutes within himself the distinction between Ego and Other Ego — a difference, however, that presents itself first of all in the phenomenon, "world": as the difference between my human Ego (my Ego in the usual sense) and the other human Ego (the other Ego <likewise in the usual sense>).

<sup>2</sup> Strasser attaches here the following note, which Husserl wrote on a separate sheet:

*What is specifically peculiar to me as ego, my concrete being as a monad, purely in myself and for myself with an exclusive ownness, includes <my> every intentionality and therefore, in particular, the intentionality directed to what is other*<sup>1</sup>; but, for reasons of method, the synthetic effect of such intentionality (the actuality for me of what is other) shall at first remain excluded from the theme. In this pre-eminent intentionality there becomes constituted for me the new existence-sense that goes beyond my monadic very-ownness; there becomes constituted an ego, not as "I myself", but as mirrored in my own Ego, in my monad. The second ego, however, is not simply there and<sup>2</sup> strictly presented; rather is he constituted as "alter ego" — the ego indicated as one moment by this expression being I myself in my ownness. The "Other", according to his own constituted sense, points to me myself; the other is a "mirroring" of my own self and yet not a mirroring proper, an analogue of my own self and yet again not an analogue in the usual sense. Accordingly <126> if, as / a first step, the ego in his peculiar ownness has been delimited, has been surveyed and articulated in respect of his constituents — not only in the way of life-processes but also in the way of accepted unities concretely inseparable from him —, the question must then be asked: *How* can my ego, within his peculiar ownness, constitute under the name, "experience of something other", precisely something *other* — something, that is, with a sense that excludes the constituted from the concrete make-up of the sense-constituting I-myself, as somehow the latter's analogue? In the first place the question concerns no matter what alter egos; then however it concerns everything that acquires sense-determinations from them — in short, an Objective world in the proper and full signification of the phrase.

The total appearance of the world — the world always intended in the flux.

The total appearance of Nature.

The total intending of the world, the particular intending — the particular appearance of the particular wordly object. But the intending has strata; I can abstract. Physical-thing appearance, stratum of culture or stratum of human existence as <blank-space> in the flowing present. The stream of world-"appearances", of "perceptual appearances"; what is intended ontologically. Cogito-strata, such that each stratum has a stratum of the cogitatum. The ego directed to what is intended.

<sup>1</sup> Marginal comment: ?! To men and to myself as a man.

<sup>2</sup> Reading, with Typescript C, "und" instead of "uns" (to us).

These problems will become more understandable if we proceed to characterize the ego's sphere of ownness or, correlatively, to carry out explicitly the abstractive epoché that yields it. Thematic exclusion of the constitutional effects produced by experience of something other, together with the effects of all the further modes of consciousness relating to something other, does not signify merely phenomenological epoché with respect to naïve acceptance of the being of the other, as in the case of everything Objective existing for us in straightforward consciousness. After all, the transcendental attitude is and remains presupposed, the attitude according to which everything previously existing for us in straightforward consciousness is taken exclusively as "phenomenon", as a sense meant and undergoing verification, purely in the manner in which, as correlate of uncoverable constitutive systems, it has gained and is gaining existential sense. We are now preparing for just this uncovering and sense-clarification by the novel epoché, more particularly in the following manner.

As Ego in the transcendental attitude I attempt first of all to delimit, within my horizon of transcendental experience, *what is peculiarly my own*. First I say that it is *non-alien* [*Nicht-Fremdes*]. I begin by freeing that horizon abstractively from everything that is at all alien. A property of the transcendental phenomenon "world" is that of being given in harmonious straightforward experience; accordingly it is necessary to survey this world and pay attention to how something alien makes its appearance as jointly determining the sense of the world and, so far as it does so, to exclude it abstractively. Thus we abstract first of all from what gives men and brutes their specific sense as, so to speak, Ego-like living beings and / consequently from <127> all determinations of the phenomenal world that refer by their sense to "others" as Ego-subjects and, accordingly, presuppose these. For example, all cultural predicates. We can say also that we abstract from everything "*other-spiritual*", as that which makes possible, in the "alien" or "other" that is in question here, its specific sense. Furthermore the *characteristic of belonging to the surrounding world*, not merely for others who are also given at the particular time in actual experience, but also *for everyone*, the characteristic of being there for and accessible to

everyone, of being capable of mattering or not mattering to each in his living and striving, — a characteristic of all Objects belonging to the phenomenal world and the characteristic wherein their otherness consists — should not be overlooked, but rather excluded abtractively.

In this connexion we note something important. When we thus abstract, *we retain a unitarily coherent stratum of the phenomenon world*, a stratum of the phenomenon that is the correlate of continuously harmonious, continuing world-experience. *Despite* our abstraction, we can *go on continuously in our experiencing intuition*, while remaining exclusively in the aforesaid stratum. This unitary stratum, furthermore, is distinguished by being essentially the *founding* stratum — that is to say: I obviously cannot have the “alien” or “other” as experience, and therefore cannot have the sense “Objective world” as an experiential sense, without having this stratum in actual experience; whereas the reverse is not the case.

Let us observe more closely the result of our abstraction and, accordingly, what it leaves us. From the phenomenon world, from the world appearing with an Objective sense, a substratum becomes separated, as the “*Nature*” included in my ownness, a Nature that must always be carefully distinguished from Nature, pure and simple — that is to say: from the Nature that becomes the theme of the natural scientist. *This* Nature, to be sure, is likewise a result of abstraction, namely abstraction from everything psychic and from those predicates of the Objective world that have arisen from persons. But what is acquired by this abstraction on the part of the natural scientist is a stratum that belongs to the Objective world itself (viewed in the transcendental attitude, a stratum that belongs to the *objective sense*: “Objective world”) and is therefore itself Objective — just as, on the other hand, what is abstracted *from* is Objective (the Objective psychic, Objective cultural predicates, and so forth). But in the case of *our* abstraction the sense “Objective”, which belongs to everything worldly — as constituted intersubjectively, <128> as / experienceable by everyone, and so forth — *vanishes completely*. Thus there is included in my ownness, as purified from every sense pertaining to other subjectivity, a sense, “*mere Nature*”, that has lost precisely that “by everyone” and therefore

must not by any means be taken for an abstract stratum of the world or of the world's sense. Among the bodies belonging to this "Nature" and included in my peculiar ownness, I then find my *animate organism* as *uniquely* singled out — namely as the only one of them that is not just a body but precisely an animate organism: the sole Object within my abstract world-stratum to which, in accordance with experience, I ascribe *fields of sensation* (belonging to it, however, in different manners — a field of tactual sensations, a field of warmth and coldness, and so forth), the only Object "in" which I "*rule and govern*" *immediately*, governing particularly in each of its "organs". Touching kinesthetically, I perceive "with" my hands; seeing kinesthetically, I perceive also "with" my eyes; and so forth; moreover I can perceive thus at any time. Meanwhile the *kinesthesias* pertaining to the organs flow in the mode "I am doing", and are subject to my "I can"; furthermore, by calling these kinesthesias into play, I can push, thrust, and so forth, and can thereby "*act*" *somatically* — immediately, and then mediately. As *perceptively* active, I *experience* (or can experience) *all of Nature, including my own animate organism*, which therefore in the process is reflexively related to itself. That becomes possible because I "can" perceive one hand "by means of" the other, an eye by means of a hand, and so forth — a procedure in which *the functioning organ must become an Object and the Object a functioning organ*. And it is the same in the case of my generally possible original *dealing* with Nature and with my animate organism itself, by means of this organism — which therefore is reflexively related to itself *also in practice*.

Bringing to light my animate organism, reduced to what is included in my ownness, is itself part of bringing to light the *ownness-essence* of the Objective phenoemnon: "*I, as this man*". If I reduce *other* men to what is included in my ownness, I get *bodies* included therein; if I reduce *myself* as a man, I get "*my animate organism*" and "*my psyche*", or myself as a *psychophysical unity* — in the latter, my *personal Ego*, who operates in this animate organism and, "by means of" it, in the "*external world*", who is affected by this world, and who thus in all respects, by virtue of the continual experience of such unique modes of Ego- and life-relatedness, is constituted as psychophysically

united with the animate corporeal organism. If *ownness-purification of the external world, the animate organism, / and the psychophysical whole*, has been effected, I have lost my natural sense as Ego, since every sense-relation to a possible Us or We remains excluded, and have lost likewise all my worldliness, in the natural sense. But, in my spiritual ownness, I am nevertheless the identical Ego-pole of my manifold "pure" subjective processes, those of my passive and active intentionality, and the pole of all the habitualities instituted or to be instituted by those processes.

Accordingly this peculiar abstractive sense-exclusion of what is alien leaves us a *kind of "world"* still, a Nature reduced to what is included in our ownness and, as having its place in this Nature thanks to the bodily organism, the psychophysical Ego, with "body and soul" and personal Ego — utterly *unique* members of this reduced "world". Manifestly predicates that get significance from *this* Ego also occur in the reduced world — for example: "value" predicates and predicates of "works" as such. None of this is worldly in the natural sense (therefore all the quotation-marks); it is all exclusively what is mine in my world-experience, pervading my world-experience through and through and likewise cohering unitarily in my intuition. Accordingly the members we distinguish in this, my peculiarly own world-phenomenon, are *concretely* united, as is further shown by the fact that the *spatiotemporal form* — as reduced, however, to the form included in my ownness — also goes into this reduced world-phenomenon. Hence the reduced "Objects" — the "physical things", the "psychophysical Ego" — are likewise *outside one another*.

But here something remarkable strikes us: a sequence of evidences that yet, *in* their sequence, seem paradoxical. The psychic life of my Ego (this "psychophysical" Ego), including my whole world-experiencing life and therefore including my actual and possible experience *of* what is other, is wholly unaffected by screening off what is other. Consequently there belongs within my psychic being the whole constitution of the world existing for me and, in further consequence, the differentiation of that constitution into the systems that constitute what is included in my peculiar ownness and the systems that constitute

what is other. I, the reduced "human Ego" ("psychophysical" Ego), am constituted, accordingly, as a member of the "world" with a multiplicity of "objects outside me". But I myself constitute all this in my "psyche" and bear it intentionally within me. If perchance it could be shown that everything constituted as part of my peculiar ownness, including then the reduced "world", / belonged to the concrete essence of the constituting subject as <130> an inseparable internal determination, then, in the Ego's self-explication, his peculiarly own world would be found as "inside" and, on the other hand, when running through that world straightforwardly, the Ego would find himself as a member among its "externalities" and would distinguish between himself and "the external world".

§ 45. *The transcendental ego, and self-apperception as a psychophysical man reduced to what is included in my ownness.*

These last meditations, like all the others, have been carried on by us in the attitude that effects transcendental reduction — carried on, that is to say, by me (the meditator) as transcendental ego. We now ask how I, the human Ego reduced to what is purely my own and, as thus reduced, included in the similarly reduced world-phenomenon and, on the other hand, I as transcendental ego are related to one another. The transcendental ego emerged by virtue of my "parenthesizing" of the entire Objective world and all other (including all ideal) Objectivities. In consequence of this parenthesizing, I have become aware of myself as the transcendental ego, who constitutes in his constitutive life everything that is ever Objective for me — the ego of all constitutions, who exists in his actual and potential life-processes and Ego-habitualities and who constitutes in them not only everything Objective but also himself as identical ego. We can say now: In that I, as this ego, have constituted and am continually further constituting as a phenomenon <sup>1</sup> (as a correlate) the world that exists for me, I have carried out a *mundanizing self-apperception* — under the title "Ego in the usual sense" — in corresponding constitutive syntheses and am maintaining a

<sup>1</sup> The phrase "as a phenomenon" supplied in accordance with Typescript C and the French translation.

continuing acceptance and further development of it. By virtue of this mundanization everything included in the ownness belonging to me transcendently (as this ultimate ego) enters, as something *psychic*, into "my psyche". I find the mundanizing apperception; and now, from the psyche as phenomenon and part of the phenomenon man, I can go back to the all-inclusive *absolute* ego, the *transcendental* ego. Therefore if I, as this ego, reduce my phenomenon, "the Objective world", to what is included in my peculiar ownness and take in addition whatever else I find as peculiarly my *own* (which can no longer contain anything "alien" or "other", after that reduction), then all this ownness of my ego is to be found again, in the reduced world-  
 <131> phenomenon, as the ownness / of "*my psyche*". Here, however, as a component pertaining to my world-apperception, it is something *transcendentally secondary*. Restricting ourselves to the ultimate transcendental ego and the universe of what is constituted in him, we can say that a division of his whole transcendental field of experience belongs to him immediately, namely the division into the sphere of his ownness — with the coherent stratum consisting in his experience of a world reduced to what is included in his ownness<sup>1</sup> (an experience in which everything "other" is "screened off") — and the sphere of what is "other". Yet every *consciousness of* what is other, every mode of appearance of it, belongs in the former sphere. Whatever the transcendental ego constitutes in that *first* stratum, whatever he constitutes as non-other, as his "peculiarly own" — that indeed belongs to him as *a component of his own concrete essence* (as we shall show); it is inseparable from his concrete being. Within and by means of this ownness the transcendental ego constitutes, however, the "Objective" world, as a universe of being that is other than himself — and constitutes, at the first level, the other in the mode: alter ego.

§ 46. *Ownness as the sphere of the actualities and potentialities of the stream of subjective processes.*

Up to now we have characterized the fundamental concept of "my own" only indirectly: as *non-alien* or *non-other* — a charac-

<sup>1</sup> The phrase "reduced to what is included in his ownness" supplied in accordance with Typescript C and the French translation.

terization that is based on, and thus presupposes, the concept of another ego. In order to clarify the sense of this "my own" it is important, however, to bring out its positive characteristic, or the positive characteristic of "the ego in his<sup>1</sup> ownness". This characteristic was merely indicated in the last sentences of the preceding section.

As our point of departure let us take something more general. If a concrete object stands out for us in experience as something particular, and our attentively grasping regard then becomes directed to it, it becomes appropriated in this simple grasping merely as "an undetermined object of empirical intuition". It becomes a determined object, and one undergoing further determination, in a continuation of the experience in the form of a determining experience, which at first unfolds only what is included in the object itself: a pure *explication*. In its articulated synthetic course, on the basis of the object given as self-identical in a continuous intuitive synthesis of identification, this pure explication unfolds, in a concatenation of particular intuitions the object's very / own determinations, the "internal" determi- > 132 > nations. These present themselves originaliter as determinations *in* which it, the Identical itself, is<sup>2</sup> what it is and, moreover, exists in itself, "in and of itself" — determinations wherein its identical being becomes explicated as the particulars making up its ownness: what it is, in particular. This own-essential content is only generally and horizonally anticipated beforehand; it then becomes constituted originaliter — with the sense: internal, own-essential feature (specifically, part or property) — by explication.

Let us apply this. When I am effecting transcendental reduction and reflecting on myself, the transcendental ego, I am given to myself *perceptually* as this ego — in a grasping perception. Furthermore I become aware that, although not grasped before this perception, I was "already given", already there for myself continually as an object of original intuition (as perceived in the broader sense). But I am given, in any case, with an open infinite horizon of still undiscovered *internal features of my own*.

<sup>1</sup> Reading "*seiner*" instead of "*meiner*" (my), as in both the published text and Typescript C.

<sup>2</sup> Supplied in accordance with Typescript C and the French translation

My own too is discovered by explication and gets its original sense by virtue thereof. It becomes uncovered originaliter when my experiencing-explicating regard is directed to myself, to my perceptually and even apodictically given "I am" and its abiding identity with itself <sup>1</sup> in the continuous unitary synthesis of original self-experience. Whatever is included in this identical being's own essence is characterized as its actual or possible explicatum, as a respect in which I merely unfold my own identical being as what it, as identical, is in particular: it in itself.

Now the following is to be noted here. Though I speak rightly of *self-perception*, and indeed as regards my concrete ego, that is not to say that, like explication of a perceptually given "visual thing", self-explication always goes on in particular *perceptions*, in the proper sense, and accordingly yields just perceptual explicata and no others. After all, when explicating the horizon of being that is included in my own essence, one of the first things I run into is my immanent temporality and, with it, my existence in the form of an open infiniteness, that of a stream of subjective processes, and in the form of all those "ownnesses" of mine that are somehow included in the stream — one of which is my explicating. Since it goes on in the living present, self-explication <133> can / find, strictly *perceptively*, only what is going on in the living present. In the most original manner conceivable it uncovers my own past by means of recollections. Therefore, though I am continually given to myself originaliter and can explicate progressively what is included in my own essence, this explication is *carried out largely in acts of consciousness that are not perceptions* of the own-essential moments it discovers. Thus alone can my stream of subjective processes, the stream in which I live as the identical Ego, become accessible to me: first of all, in respect of its actualities, and then in respect of the potentialities that manifestly are likewise moments of my own essence. All possibilities of the kind subsumed under the I "can" or "could have" set this or that series of subjective processes going (including in particular: I can look ahead or look back, I can penetrate and uncover the horizon of my temporal being) — all such possibilities manifestly belong to me as moments of my own essence.

In every case, however, explication is original if, precisely on

<sup>1</sup> According to Typescript C: "and my abiding identity with myself".

the basis of original self-experience, it unfolds the experienced itself and confers upon the experienced that self-giveness which is, for it, the *most original conceivable*. The *apodictic evidence* of transcendental self-perception (the apodictic evidence of the "I am") extends into such explication, though with a previously stated *restriction*. In unqualifiedly apodictic evidence self-explication brings out only the all-embracing structural forms in which I exist as ego — that is to say: in which I exist with an essentially necessary all-inclusiveness and without which I could not exist. They include (among others) the mode of existence in the form of a certain all-embracing life of some sort or other, that of existence in the form of the continuous self-constitution of that life's own processes, as temporal within an all-embracing time, and so forth. In this *all-embracing apodictic Apriori*, with its undetermined universality and, on the other hand, its determinability, every explication of single egological data then participates — for example: as a certain, albeit imperfect, evidence contained in the recollection of my own past. The participation in apodicticity appears in the *formal law* (which is itself apodictic): So much illusion, so much being — which is only covered up and falsified thereby and which therefore can be asked about, sought, and (by following a predelineated way) found, even if only with approximation to its fully determined content. This fully determined content itself, with the sense of something firmly identifiable again and again, in respect of all its parts and moments, is an "idea", valid a priori. /

§ 47. *The intentional object also belongs to the full monadic concretion of ownness. Immanent transcendence and primordial world.* <134>

Manifestly (and this is of particular importance) the own-essentiality belonging to me as ego comprises more than merely the actualities and potentialities of the stream of subjective processes. Just as it comprises the constitutive systems, it *comprises the constituted unities* — but with a certain *restriction*. That is to say: Where, and so far as, *the constituted unity is inseparable from the original constitution itself*, with the inseparableness that

characterizes an immediate<sup>1</sup> *concrete* oneness, not only the constitutive perceiving but also the perceived existent belongs to my concrete very-ownness.

That is not only the case with sensuous data, which, taken as mere data of sensation, become constituted as peculiarly my own: as "*immanent temporalities*" within the limits of my ego. It is also the case with all my *habitualities*, which are likewise peculiarly my own: the habitualities that begin with institutive acts of my own and become constituted as abiding convictions in which *I myself* become abidingly convinced of such and such, and by virtue of which I, as polar Ego (Ego in the particular sense: mere Ego-pole), acquire determinations that are specifically Ego-determinations. But "*transcendent objects*" (for example: the objects of "*external*" *sensuousness*, unities belonging to multiplicities of sensuous modes of appearance) also belong here: if I, as ego, take into account just what is constituted *actually originaliter* as an appearing spatial object by my own sensuousness, my own apperceptions, *as itself concretely inseparable from them*. We see forthwith that the *entire reduced "world"*, which we previously obtained by excluding the sense-components pertaining to what is other or alien, belongs in this sphere and is rightly included in the positively defined concrete make-up of the ego: as something peculiarly his *own*. As soon as we exclude from consideration the intentional effects produced by "empathy", by our experience of others, we have a Nature (including an animate organism) that is constituted, to be sure, as a unity of spatial objects "transcending" the stream of subjective processes, yet constituted as merely a multiplicity of  
 <135> objects / of possible experience — this experience being purely *my own* life, and what is experienced in this experience being nothing more than a synthetic unity inseparable from this life and its potentialities.

In this manner it becomes clear that *the ego, taken concretely*, has a *universe of what is peculiarly his own*, which can be uncovered by an original explication of his apodictic "ego sum" — an explication that is itself apodictic or at least predelineative of an apodictic form. *Within* this "*original sphere*" (the sphere

<sup>1</sup> Reading "*unmittelbarer*" instead of "*unmittelbar*" (immediately), as in both the published text and Typescript C. Cf. the French: "*immédiate et concrète*".

of original self-explication) we find also a "transcendent world", which accrues on the basis of the intentional phenomenon, "Objective world", by reduction to what is peculiarly the ego's own (in the positive sense, which is now preferred). But, provided only that they are subjected to our reduction to what is included in the ego's ownness, all the corresponding illusions, phantasies, "pure" possibilities, and eidetic objectivities, which offer themselves as "transcendent", likewise belong in this domain — the domain of my peculiarly own essentiality, of what I am in myself, in my full concreteness or (as we may also say) what I am in myself as this monad <sup>1</sup>.

§ 48. *The transcendency of the Objective world as belonging to a level higher than that of primordial transcendency.*

That my own essence can be at all contrasted for me with something else, or that I (who am I) can become aware of someone else (who is not I but someone other than I), presupposes that *not all my own modes of consciousness are modes of my self-consciousness*. Since actual being is constituted originally by harmoniousness of experience, my own self must contain, in contrast to self-experience and the system of its harmoniousness (the system, therefore, of self-explication into components of my ownness), yet other experiences united in harmonious systems. And now the *problem* is how we are to understand the fact that the ego has, and can always go on forming, in himself such intentionalities of a different kind, intentionalities with an existence-sense whereby *he wholly transcends his own being*. How can something actually existent for me — and, as that, not just somehow meant but undergoing harmonious verification in me — be anything else than, so to speak, a point of intersection belonging to my constitutive synthesis? As concretely inseparable from my synthesis, is it peculiarly my own? But even the / possibility of a vaguest, emptiest intending of something alien <136> is problematic, if it is true that, essentially, every such mode of consciousness involves its possibilities of an uncovering of what is intended, its possibilities of becoming converted into either

<sup>1</sup> Reading with Typescript C and the French translation. According to the published text: "or (as we may also say) in my monad".

fulfilling or disillusioning experiences of what is meant, and moreover, (as regards the genesis of the consciousness) points back to such experiences of the same intended object or a similar one.

The fact of experience of something alien (something that is not I), is present as experience of an Objective world and others in it (non-Ego in the form: other Ego); and an important result of the ownness-reduction performed on these experiences was that it brought out a substratum belonging to them, an intentional substratum in which a reduced "world" shows itself, as an "immanent transcendency". In the order pertaining to constitution of a world *alien to my Ego* — a world "*external*" to *my own concrete Ego* (but not at all in the natural spatial sense) — that reduced world is the intrinsically first, the "*primordial*" *transcendency* (or "world"); and, regardless of its *ideality* as a synthetic unity belonging to an infinite system of my potentialities, it is *still a determining part of my own concrete being*, the being that belongs to me as concrete ego.

It must now be made understandable *how*, at the founded higher level, the sense-bestowal pertaining to transcendency proper, to constitutionally secondary *Objective transcendency*, comes about — and does so as an experience. Here it is not a matter of uncovering a genesis going on in time, but a matter of "*static analysis*". The Objective world is constantly there before me as already finished, a datum of my livingly continuous Objective experience and, even in respect of what is no longer experienced, something I go on accepting habitually. It is a matter of examining this experience itself and uncovering intentionally the manner in which it bestows sense, the manner in which it can occur as experience and become verified as evidence relating to an actual existent with an explicable essence of *its* own, which is not *my* own essence and has no place as a constituent part thereof, though it nevertheless can acquire sense and verification only in my essence. /

<137> § 49. *Predelineation of the course to be followed by intentional explication of experiencing what is other.*

Constitution of the existence-sense, "Objective world", on the basis of my primordial "world", involves a number of levels.

As the *first* of these, there is to be distinguished the constitutional level pertaining to the "other ego" or to any "other egos" whatever — that is: to egos *excluded* from my own concrete being (from me as the "primordial ego"). In connexion with that and, indeed, motivated by it, there occurs a *universal super-addition of sense to my primordial world*, whereby the latter becomes the *appearance "of"* a determinate "Objective" world, as the identical world for everyone, myself included. Accordingly *the intrinsically first other* (the first "non-Ego") *is the other Ego*. And the other Ego makes constitutionally possible a new infinite domain of what is "other": an *Objective Nature* and a whole Objective world, to which all other Egos and I myself belong. This constitution, arising on the basis of the "*pure*" others (the other Egos who as yet have no worldly sense), is essentially such that the "others"-for-me do not remain isolated; on the contrary, an *Ego-community*, which includes me, becomes constituted (in my sphere of ownness, naturally) as a community of Egos existing with each other and for each other — *ultimately a community of monads*, which, moreover, (in its communalized intentionality) constitutes the *one identical world*. *In this world* all Egos again present themselves, but *in an Objectivating apprehension* with the sense "*men*" or "psychophysical men as worldly Objects".

By virtue of the mentioned communalization <of constitutive intentionality>, the transcendental intersubjectivity has an *intersubjective* sphere of ownness, in which it constitutes the Objective world; and thus, as the transcendental "We", it is a subjectivity for this world and also for the world of men, which is the form in which it has made itself Objectively actual. If, however, intersubjective sphere of ownness and Objective world are to be distinguished here, nevertheless, when I as ego take my stand on the basis of the intersubjectivity constituted from sources within my own essence, I can recognize that the Objective world does not, in the proper sense, / *transcend* that <138> sphere or that sphere's own intersubjective essence, but rather inheres in it as an "immanent" transcendency. Stated more precisely: The Objective world as an *idea* — the ideal correlate of an intersubjective (intersubjectively communalized) experience, which ideally can be and is carried on as constantly har-

monious — is essentially related to intersubjectivity (itself constituted as having the ideality of endless openness), whose component particular subjects are equipped with mutually corresponding and harmonious constitutive systems. Consequently *the constitution of the world essentially involves a “harmony” of the monads*: precisely this harmony among particular constitutions in the particular monads; and accordingly it involves also a harmonious generation that goes on in each particular monad. That is not meant, however, as a “metaphysical” hypothesizing of monadic harmony, any more than the monads themselves are metaphysical inventions or hypotheses. On the contrary, it is itself part of the explication of the intentional components implicit in the fact of the experiential world that exists for us. Here again it is to be noted that, as has been repeatedly emphasized, the ideas referred to are not phantasies or modes of the “as if”, but arise constitutionally in integral connexion with all Objective experience and have their modes of legitimation and their development by scientific activity.

What we have just presented is a preliminary view of the course to be followed, level by level, in the intentional explication that we must carry out, if we are to solve the transcendental problem in the only conceivable way and actually execute the transcendental idealism of phenomenology.

§ 50. *The mediate intentionality of experiencing someone else, as “appresentation” (analogical apperception).*

After we have dealt with the prior stage, which is very important transcendently — namely, definition and articulation of the primordial sphere —, the genuine difficulties (and in fact they are not inconsiderable) are occasioned by the *first* of the above-indicated steps toward constitution of an Objective world: *the step taking us to the “other” ego*. They lie, accordingly, in the transcendental clarification of experiencing “someone else” — in the sense in which the other has not yet attained the sense “man”. /

<139> Experience is original consciousness; and in fact we generally say, in the case of experiencing a man: the other is himself there