Chapter 11
WHEN ATHEISTS TEACH
EVOLUTION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Is there a problem?
Over the past 20 or 30 years, across the United
States, few are likely to have noticed much change in how evolution has been
taught in K-12 public schools.
Science classes should teach science. But this usually means that, to be considered ÒscientificÓ, any hypothesis, theory or
explanation must only use naturalistic or materialistic entities. This has been called Òmethodological
naturalismÓ. ItÕs simply another
way of stating that the methodology and presuppositions of science are
necessary in order to obtain scientific information. (Ruse,88, 103, and Ruse,
M. McClean v. Arkansas: Witness Testimony Sheet. In ÒBut is it Science?Ó ed,
Michael Ruse. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1988, 103.) The rational-empirical approach (of
methodological naturalism) seems to work well enough to study secondary causes
(as opposed to first or final causes) of events as long as they occur with
sufficient repetition to be studied in such a way.
However, if a biology teacher believes that truth
about all events in reality can only be found using the scientific method, then
thatÕs something quite different ÐthatÕs philosophical (or metaphysical)
naturalism. Few would disagree
with methodological naturalism, because it is limited to the realm of
science. It does not apply to any
question that science is unable to approach (because it lies beyond the
legitimate domain of science).
Metaphysical naturalism is similar to ÒscientismÓ and
Òphysicalism.Ó Those views also
hold that science has exclusive authority when it comes to matters involving
any aspect of reality. (Ref. Ba7,4)
However, metaphysical naturalism, physicalism, and
scientism all have serious philosophical problems. First of all, they cannot yield any information about the
meaning or purpose of an event. (Ref. Ne10, 10) Legitimate scientific investigation uses the approach of
methodological naturalism because answers are only sought within the contingent
realm of nature itself.
But an appreciable percentage of scientists may not
personally believe in philosophical naturalism, physicalism, or scientism. Confusion should not exist between the
philosophical foundation (presuppositions and premises) necessary to do
science, and a philosophical view that limits reality only to what can be
discovered using the scientific method. (Ref. Mo3,358)
Suppose we consider three historical events: (1) the
origin of the universe (scientifically, known as the big bang), (2) the origin
of the first living cell on earth, and (3) the origin of consciousness.
First, letÕs take the big bang. Most physicists hold that matter,
energy, time and space all began with the big bang. But to discuss any materialistic or naturalistic
explanations for why it occurred would be speculative at best.
Now, to consider the origin of the first living cell
on earth. H. P. Yockey has calculated (and reported in the Journal of
Theoretical Biology) that the probability of assembling the genetic code for
just one functional enzyme100 amino acids long is approximately 1065 per
try. If we allow 1017 tries, then the probability of forming that
enzyme over the earthÕs history, becomes one chance in 1048, still
nearly infinitesimal.
We have already commented upon the number of different
protein molecules required to form
the first living cell of the simplest conceivable type. To make a sufficient number of enzymes
or other specific necessary protein molecules for that first cell would also
involve an almost infinitesimal probability. According to Henry Quastler, every
naturalistic model proposed to explain the origin of the specific genetic
information required for the first living cell has failed to explain where that
information came from. (Quastler, as quoted by Stephen C. Meyer, p.31)
As for the origin of consciousness, let us refer to a
statement by David Chalmers from chapter 4. One can either deny that consciousness exists (Would you do
that?), or believe it to be an eternal mystery.
It would
be difficult to argue that the best explanations for each of these three events
most likely involve only materialistic or naturalistic considerations. If any aspect of a given explanation
turns out to be metaphysical instead of scientific, then the choice of whether
or not someone should believe that aspect to be true would depend upon his
worldview.
What if intelligent design really was involved in the
big bang, the origin of the first life-form, and the origin of
consciousness? Most K-12 science
curriculum committees would probably Òwrite it offÓ as metaphysical
speculation. What if an instructor
who believed in intelligent design wanted to present it to his class in terms
of a rational argument? The
problem would be that a student could interpret his argument as
encouraging religious belief.
However, by the same token, what if an atheist
instructor told his students that intelligent design would not have been
necessary because evolutionary biology offers a completely satisfying
explanation for how life originated and emerged to its present state. That instructor could be accused of
discouraging religious belief.
Could intelligent design ever be supported
empirically? Perhaps not Ðat least
not in a way that most scientists would use when they make their own empirical
observations. But theoretical
physicists use rational arguments for propositions in their field that have no empirical support (e.g. 11
dimensional string theory, and the Higgs boson). However, this is little consolation to the intelligent
design advocate because physicists do spend much effort seeking empirical
confirmation, and propositions in theoretical physics are not likely to
encourage or discourage the religious belief of a student.
But the big bang, the origin of the first life-form,
and the origin of consciousness still seem to have been unique events. Jacques Monod would claim that science
can neither say, nor do anything about unique events. (Monod, 144)
How
difficult would it be (depending upon the worldview held by the believer) to
believe that rare events have occurred in the history of the universe, for
which science (using its present methods, at least) will never be able to
explain . What about an event so
rare that it may have happened only once in the history of the universe? How could a scientist somehow discover
the clues or details necessary to explain it (using the rational-empirical
scientific method) if the non-repeatable event happened without leaving any
trace of those necessary clues. Fredric Nelson has asked the question: If the
event was the appearance of the first form of life on our planet, then why not
broaden the range of causal agents to include intelligent design by aliens, a
supernatural agency, or any other source imaginable. Something is better than nothing, even though metaphysical
speculation may be required. (Nelson, F.P., 2006, p.29)
When a question is raised (by a student in a K-12
science classroom), how is a teacher (constrained by methodological naturalism)
to respond? He might say that
science has no answer at the present time. Or, depending upon the question, he might say he does not
know whether an answer will ever be found using the scientific method. Or, depending upon his worldview, he
might say that he does not believe the answer can (in principle) ever be found,
using the scientific method. Or,
again depending upon his worldview, he could say he doesnÕt believe the
question has an answer at all Ðor that even if it does, it will never be found
by humans living on this planet.
However all teachers must avoid the risk that their
response to a student question would be taken as one that either
encourages or discourages
religious belief. What if a
teacher tells his students that since use of the scientific method seems to
provide the best answer to questions about processes and events in the natural
universe, isnÕt it reasonable to suppose that it can give us the best
perspective from which to view all of reality? Let us not forget that to either encourage or discourage
religious belief would violate
section 60044(a) of the California Education Code. WouldnÕt it be easier to say that science doesnÕt know
--or that it is possible science may never know. What is wrong with saying that events may have occurred in
the past that could well be beyond the ability of science to explain (Òwell
beyondÓ, for any reason)?
Richard Dawkins
Let us suppose that Richard Dawkins, the best-known
atheist since Bertrand Russell, moved to Long Beach, California. (I have no doubt that at least the
climate is better, here). Let us
also assume that Dawkins was a friend of the principal of the high school
mentioned in chapter 1, and was asked to substitute for a science teacher
suddenly taken ill one day. Now
suppose that, in response to a student question, Dawkins gave a reply that made
his atheistic philosophical position very clear.
Dawkins would certainly express his metaphysical
belief that all events that occur in the natural universe result from a single
system of natural laws Ðthe laws of science. In other words, no event ever occurs (in the universe) that
could not, in principle, be explored using the naturalistic methods of science
(in order to find the most valid explanation). Dawkins, then, presupposes that
the natural universe, governed by its laws of science, is the sum total of
reality. But, to an atheist, laws
of science, laws of logic, and moral laws as well, can have no source other
than the cultural consensus of groups of human beings. For anyone to argue that laws of logic
and science are universal and invariant
must admit that only metaphysical transcendentals can be universal and
invariant. And as such, they are
not falsifiable (at least not in the way that a scientific hypothesis would be
falsifiable).
Suppose a student asked Dawkins whether or not every
event that has ever occurred in reality requires a cause. He would probably answer ÒnoÓ, because
if an event happens by blind chance, then it must be uncaused. If Dawkins were to reply ÒyesÓ, then he
would be in trouble. To assume
that everything (and every event) in reality requires a cause leads to an
infinite regression of causes.
This is impossible since outside of everything is nothing, and nothing
cannot be a cause. Therefore, in
order to avoid an infinite regression of causes, only an eternal supreme being
can himself be uncaused and the source of any first (or final) cause.
For an atheist to deny the existence of a supreme
being, he must argue that his disbelief is somehow more rational than
belief. This would be quite
difficult to do if laws of logic are only conventions agreed upon among humans,
and neither universal nor invariant.
Dawkins, in his ÒThe God DelusionÓ reveals that his
competence in the philosophical area of metaphysics leaves much to be desired.
(A. Latham, ÒThe Naked Emperor: Darwinism ExposedÓ, Janus 2005, 243) Philosopher Thomas Nagel feels that
Dawkins is only an amateur when it comes to his ability to deal with
philosophical issues. (T. Nagel., ÒThe Fear of ReligionÓ The New Republic,
www.ssl.tnr.com/p/docsub.mhtml)
In California, Dawkins would be seriously troubled by
Section 60044a of the State Education Code, but I donÕt think there would
be much he could do about it.