Chapter 11

 

     WHEN ATHEISTS TEACH EVOLUTION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

 

                              Is there a problem?

 

Over the past 20 or 30 years, across the United States, few are likely to have noticed much change in how evolution has been taught in K-12 public schools.  Science classes should teach science.  But this usually means that, to be considered  ÒscientificÓ, any hypothesis, theory or explanation must only use naturalistic or materialistic entities.  This has been called Òmethodological naturalismÓ.  ItÕs simply another way of stating that the methodology and presuppositions of science are necessary in order to obtain scientific information. (Ruse,88, 103, and Ruse, M. McClean v. Arkansas: Witness Testimony Sheet. In ÒBut is it Science?Ó ed, Michael Ruse. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1988, 103.)  The rational-empirical approach (of methodological naturalism) seems to work well enough to study secondary causes (as opposed to first or final causes) of events as long as they occur with sufficient repetition to be studied in such a  way.

However, if a biology teacher believes that truth about all events in reality can only be found using the scientific method, then thatÕs something quite different ÐthatÕs philosophical (or metaphysical) naturalism.  Few would disagree with methodological naturalism, because it is limited to the realm of science.  It does not apply to any question that science is unable to approach (because it lies beyond the legitimate domain of science).

Metaphysical naturalism is similar to ÒscientismÓ and Òphysicalism.Ó  Those views also hold that science has exclusive authority when it comes to matters involving any aspect of reality. (Ref. Ba7,4)

However, metaphysical naturalism, physicalism, and scientism all have serious philosophical problems.  First of all, they cannot yield any information about the meaning or purpose of an event. (Ref. Ne10, 10)  Legitimate scientific investigation uses the approach of methodological naturalism because answers are only sought within the contingent realm of nature itself.

But an appreciable percentage of scientists may not personally believe in philosophical naturalism, physicalism, or scientism.  Confusion should not exist between the philosophical foundation (presuppositions and premises) necessary to do science, and a philosophical view that limits reality only to what can be discovered using the scientific method. (Ref. Mo3,358)

Suppose we consider three historical events: (1) the origin of the universe (scientifically, known as the big bang), (2) the origin of the first living cell on earth, and (3) the origin of consciousness.

First, letÕs take the big bang.  Most physicists hold that matter, energy, time and space all began with the big bang.  But to discuss any materialistic or naturalistic explanations for why it occurred would be speculative at best.

Now, to consider the origin of the first living cell on earth.  H. P. Yockey  has calculated  (and reported in the Journal of Theoretical Biology) that the probability of assembling the genetic code for just one functional enzyme100 amino acids long is approximately 1065 per try. If we allow 1017 tries, then the probability of forming that enzyme over the earthÕs history, becomes one chance in 1048, still nearly infinitesimal.

We have already commented upon the number of different protein molecules  required to form the first living cell of the simplest conceivable type.  To make a sufficient number of enzymes or other specific necessary protein molecules for that first cell would also involve an almost infinitesimal probability. According to Henry Quastler, every naturalistic model proposed to explain the origin of the specific genetic information required for the first living cell has failed to explain where that information came from. (Quastler, as quoted by Stephen C. Meyer, p.31)

As for the origin of consciousness, let us refer to a statement by David Chalmers from chapter 4.  One can either deny that consciousness exists (Would you do that?), or believe it to be an eternal mystery. 

 It would be difficult to argue that the best explanations for each of these three events most likely involve only materialistic or naturalistic considerations.  If any aspect of a given explanation turns out to be metaphysical instead of scientific, then the choice of whether or not someone should believe that aspect to be true would depend upon his worldview.

What if intelligent design really was involved in the big bang, the origin of the first life-form, and the origin of consciousness?  Most K-12 science curriculum committees would probably Òwrite it offÓ as metaphysical speculation.  What if an instructor who believed in intelligent design wanted to present it to his class in terms of a rational argument?  The problem would be that a student could interpret his argument as encouraging  religious belief.

However, by the same token, what if an atheist instructor told his students that intelligent design would not have been necessary because evolutionary biology offers a completely satisfying explanation for how life originated and emerged to its present state.  That instructor could be accused of discouraging  religious belief.

Could intelligent design ever be supported empirically?  Perhaps not Ðat least not in a way that most scientists would use when they make their own empirical observations.  But theoretical physicists use rational arguments for propositions in their field  that have no empirical support (e.g. 11 dimensional string theory, and the Higgs boson).  However, this is little consolation to the intelligent design advocate because physicists do spend much effort seeking empirical confirmation, and propositions in theoretical physics are not likely to encourage or discourage the religious belief of a student.

But the big bang, the origin of the first life-form, and the origin of consciousness still seem to have been unique events.  Jacques Monod would claim that science can neither say, nor do anything about unique events. (Monod, 144)   

  How difficult would it be (depending upon the worldview held by the believer) to believe that rare events have occurred in the history of the universe, for which science (using its present methods, at least) will never be able to explain .  What about an event so rare that it may have happened only once in the history of the universe?  How could a scientist somehow discover the clues or details necessary to explain it (using the rational-empirical scientific method) if the non-repeatable event happened without leaving any trace of those necessary clues. Fredric Nelson has asked the question: If the event was the appearance of the first form of life on our planet, then why not broaden the range of causal agents to include intelligent design by aliens, a supernatural agency, or any other source imaginable.  Something is better than nothing, even though metaphysical speculation may be required. (Nelson, F.P., 2006, p.29)

When a question is raised (by a student in a K-12 science classroom), how is a teacher (constrained by methodological naturalism) to respond?  He might say that science has no answer at the present time.  Or, depending upon the question, he might say he does not know whether an answer will ever be found using the scientific method.  Or, depending upon his worldview, he might say that he does not believe the answer can (in principle) ever be found, using the scientific method.  Or, again depending upon his worldview, he could say he doesnÕt believe the question has an answer at all Ðor that even if it does, it will never be found by humans living on this planet.

However all teachers must avoid the risk that their response to a student question would be taken as one that either encourages  or discourages religious belief.  What if a teacher tells his students that since use of the scientific method seems to provide the best answer to questions about processes and events in the natural universe, isnÕt it reasonable to suppose that it can give us the best perspective from which to view all of reality?  Let us not forget that to either encourage or discourage religious belief  would violate section 60044(a) of the California Education  Code. WouldnÕt it be easier to say that science doesnÕt know --or that it is possible science may never know.  What is wrong with saying that events may have occurred in the past that could well be beyond the ability of science to explain (Òwell beyondÓ, for any reason)?

 

                                         Richard Dawkins

 

Let us suppose that Richard Dawkins, the best-known atheist since Bertrand Russell, moved to Long Beach, California.  (I have no doubt that at least the climate is better, here).  Let us also assume that Dawkins was a friend of the principal of the high school mentioned in chapter 1, and was asked to substitute for a science teacher suddenly taken ill one day.  Now suppose that, in response to a student question, Dawkins gave a reply that made his atheistic philosophical position very clear.

Dawkins would certainly express his metaphysical belief that all events that occur in the natural universe result from a single system of natural laws Ðthe laws of science.  In other words, no event ever occurs (in the universe) that could not, in principle, be explored using the naturalistic methods of science (in order to find the most valid explanation). Dawkins, then, presupposes that the natural universe, governed by its laws of science, is the sum total of reality.  But, to an atheist, laws of science, laws of logic, and moral laws as well, can have no source other than the cultural consensus of groups of human beings.  For anyone to argue that laws of logic and science are universal and invariant  must admit that only metaphysical transcendentals can be universal and invariant.  And as such, they are not falsifiable (at least not in the way that a scientific hypothesis would be falsifiable).

Suppose a student asked Dawkins whether or not every event that has ever occurred in reality requires a cause.  He would probably answer ÒnoÓ, because if an event happens by blind chance, then it must be uncaused.  If Dawkins were to reply ÒyesÓ, then he would be in trouble.  To assume that everything (and every event) in reality requires a cause leads to an infinite regression of causes.  This is impossible since outside of everything is nothing, and nothing cannot be a cause.  Therefore, in order to avoid an infinite regression of causes, only an eternal supreme being can himself be uncaused and the source of any first (or final) cause. 

For an atheist to deny the existence of a supreme being, he must argue that his disbelief is somehow more rational than belief.  This would be quite difficult to do if laws of logic are only conventions agreed upon among humans, and neither universal nor invariant.

Dawkins, in his ÒThe God DelusionÓ reveals that his competence in the philosophical area of metaphysics leaves much to be desired. (A. Latham, ÒThe Naked Emperor: Darwinism ExposedÓ, Janus 2005, 243)  Philosopher Thomas Nagel feels that Dawkins is only an amateur when it comes to his ability to deal with philosophical issues. (T. Nagel., ÒThe Fear of ReligionÓ The New Republic, www.ssl.tnr.com/p/docsub.mhtml) 

In California, Dawkins would be seriously troubled by Section 60044a of the State Education Code, but I donÕt think there would be  much he could do about it.