Kevin MacDonald, Ph.D.

CSULB, Department of Psychology


Reply to David Lieberman

By Kevin MacDonald
This appeared on H-ANTISEMITISM on May 4, 2000.

Lieberman says that I have a 'deeply personal relationship' to my subject matter, 'a relationship that has had a significant impact on his scholarly practice and which cannot be brushed aside by his occasional self-depracating observations on the inevitability of 'researcher bias.'

Far from brushing this criticism aside, I take it to heart and invite criticisms of my scholarship and theories where it can be shown that they are in error due to personal bias. Instead of taking up this challenge and admission of fallibility, Lieberman persists in his ad hominems. As I have said repeatedly, I am quite aware that subtle and unconscious biases may color anyone's work and I do not exempt myself from this problem. Issues related to deception and self-deception and issues related to attributional biases in favor of self, relatives, and ingroup certainly do not surprise an evolutionist. What Lieberman has to do is dispute the theories and data I have presented, and I don't really see him doing this. It is not relevant to argue that I am ideologically biased simply because I hold certain views, including the view that, as Lieberman rather coarsely puts it, I hold 'the Jewish evolutionary strategy largely (if not entirely) responsible for the devaluation of evolutionary thinking in the social sciences 'i.e., for the marginalization of MacDonald's own discipline.' Lieberman is correct that personal bias (whether conscious or unconscious) would be shown if indeed I engaged in 'distortions and inaccuracies' in my presentation in a systematic way. However, I don't think there is any evidence for this. Several errors in citations have been pointed out to me on H-ANTISEMISM and from other sources, and I have corrected all of them in later printings of my books. I most definitely do not regard the exchange over Jaff Schatz's work as indicating bias on my part and have not changed anything in my book related to my interpretation of his work. Lieberman should ask whether personal bias related to his ethnic identity motivates his repeated lengthy attacks on me.

Lieberman says I do not examine my own 'ideologically tainted sources'; 'He shrugs off the significance of his uncritical citations of Richard Lynn, former associate editor of the 'race science' journal Mankind Quarterly, as so much 'guilt by association.'' How does Lieberman know that I was uncritical in assessing whether to cite Richard Lynn? In fact I read his articles very closely, as I do those of other people, and I try not to judge them on the basis of what I know about the author's political orientation. In the case of the citation that Ortega thought was pivotal in my argument, I cited a paper by Lynn showing that there were very different correlates for verbal IQ than for performance IQ. This paper was highly relevant because Ashkenazi Jews in fact seem to excel in verbal IQ. I thought the paper met acceptable standards of social science research and fit with other information on IQ and Jewish occupational and social status patterns, so I cited it. Nor is it clear to me how Lynn's attitudes on race, etc. would color his judgments on that particular point. On the other hand, I was indeed very critical of the intellectual movements discussed in The Culture of Critique, but I stand by my criticisms. I do indeed contextualize Deborah Lipstadt by noting her role as an ethnic activist and her connections to Jewish activist organizations, but remember my stated motive for testifying for Irving was that I thought Irving's right to freely state his views was being constrained by Jewish ethnic activism, not by the intellectual worth of his writings. Again, at no point have I approved of Irving's controversial ideas about the Holocaust or Hitler's culpability.

Regarding my testimony, it is true that I said that Irving was not an anti-Semite. This was based on my knowledge of Irving's attitudes at the time and on my definition in Separation and Its Discontents that anti-Semitism was 'negative attitudes or behavior directed at Jews because of their group membership'; as my testimony indicated, I was interpreting this in the sense of generalized negative attitudes toward Jews and saying I didn't have any evidence that Irving was an anti-Semite in that sense. Since then I thought about it a bit more and gave a long reply to a post by Gordon Fisher on this list (Feb. 24, 2000). The gist of the reply is that people like Irving may have rational grievances against Jewish organizations and that this is reasonably termed anti-Semitism whether or not they are tinged with irrational stereotyping (as they often are). (I did not reverse myself 'yet again' but only once; in any case I think it is a mark of an open mind to have changes of opinion at least once in awhile.)

Lieberman states 'If Irving is an antisemite, then it is difficult to see how calling him one is libelous.' I agree. When the judge stated that Irving was an anti-Semite he meant it not in the sense of someone who falls into this category primarily because he has rational grievances. Having read the relevant section of his opinion, I agree with Judge Gray that Irving's 'words are directed against Jews, either individually or collectively, in the sense that they are by turns hostile, critical, offensive and derisory in their references to semitic people, their characteristics and appearances.' It is noteworthy that Judge Gray stated in his opinion that "I have more sympathy for Irving's argument that Jews are not immune from his criticism. He said that he was simply expressing legitimate criticisms of them. Irving gave as an example what he claimed was his justified criticism of the Jews for suppressing his freedom of expression. [KM: and obviously this was a major concern for me.] Another legitimate ground of criticism might be the manner in which Jews in certain parts of the world appear to exploit the Holocaust. I agree that Jews are as open to criticism as anyone else. But it appears to me that Irving has repeatedly crossed the divide between legitimate criticism and prejudiced vilification of the Jewish race and people. I can well understand too that, because of his perceived views, Irving and his family have from time to time been subjected to extreme pressure, for example when his flat house was besieged by rioters in 1994.... In the heat of the moment ill-considered remarks are often made. But it is in just such circumstances that racial prejudice manifests itself. In my view that is what occurred in 1994.' In other words, Irving's attitude toward Jews was a mixture of legitimate grievances and illegitimate generalizations about Jews as a group. (I was not aware of the latter when I made my statement.) Perhaps he is a textbook case of the social identity theory of anti-Semitism presented in Separation and Its Discontents: a complex interplay between fantasy and reality in which real aspects of actual conflict become exaggerated and over-generalized as a result of evolved psychological mechanisms.

And remember that the main issue that motivated me (besides the free speech issue) was that Lipstadt had said that Irving was not a historian and was not taken seriously by legitimate historians. In fact the judge seems to agree with me on this. The judge describes Irving as a historian and not merely someone who uncovers documents and has an effective writing style as suggested by Lieberman: "As a military historian, Irving has much to commend him. For his works of military history Irving has undertaken thorough and painstaking research into the archives. He has discovered and disclosed to historians and others many documents which, but for his efforts, might have remained unnoticed for years. It was plain from the way in which he conducted his case and dealt with a sustained and penetrating cross-examination that his knowledge of World War 2 is unparalleled. His mastery of the detail of the historical documents is remarkable. He is beyond question able and intelligent. He was invariably quick to spot the significance of documents which he had not previously seen. Moreover he writes his military history in a clear and vivid style. I accept the favourable assessment by Professor Watt and Sir John Keegan of the calibre of Irving's military history ... and reject as too sweeping the negative assessment of Evans .... [Evans had stated that Irving has had "a generally low reputation amongst professional historians since the end of the 1980s and at all times amongst those who have direct experience of researching in the areas with which he concerns himself".] But the questions to which this action has given rise do not relate to the quality of Irving's military history but rather to the manner in which he has written about the attitude adopted by Hitler towards the Jews and in particular his responsibility for the fate which befell them under the Nazi regime.' The judge is implicitly agreeing with me that Lipstadt libeled Irving by writing he was not a historian and writing that 'no legitimate historian takes David Irving's work seriously." I suppose that in the judge's view this was far less serious than the accusation that he had manipulated data in order to exculpate Hitler, etc., and I have no objection to that judgment. As indicated in my statement on why I testified for Irving (tooby.html ), I was very troubled by Evans's detailed charges against Irving on his use of sources etc., but I became convinced that Irving would be able to rebut at least some of the charges and I felt that Evans went way too far in his condemnation of Irving (and the judge agrees with the latter point).

In my statement about why I testified for Irving I mentioned a double standard in which Jewish historians who are widely viewed as biased have access to 'prestigious academic and commercial presses.' Lieberman states 'Putting aside the almost comic 'they started it' logic of this line of reasoning, it is worth noting MacDonald's implication that the work of such people as Lucy Dawidowicz and Daniel Goldhagen has been given a free pass in the Jewish community, presumably because it appeals to the interests of the evolutionary strategy, an implication any moderately well-informed reader would know is inaccurate.'

What counts, and what I referred to, was the relatively unobstructed pass these writers have enjoyed in prestigious universities and among prestigious publishers. It escapes me how a question of double standards can be construed as a charge that 'they started it.'

Lieberman quotes me as saying that 'even were it to be proved that David Irving does indeed bring a certain set of biases to his work, even the most biased researchers may well contribute invaluable scholarship. Science emerges when the work of all investigators becomes part of the marketplace of ideas and when scholars are not vilified and their scholarship censored simply because their conclusions fly in the face of contemporary orthodoxy.' Lieberman comments that 'This concluding peroration would suggest that MacDonald finds some 'biases' less repellant than others.' Again, the point is missed by a mile. At no point do I call for the suppression of Gould's writings or the writings of the others discussed in my book. I do not deny that Gould has made genuine contributions to evolutionary biology. My critical tone is directed at some of his ideas and the lack of scientific spirit that characterize some of his writing. The same could be said for the other movements I discuss in Culture of Critique. Irving is also an appropriate target of legitimate scholarly criticism, but it is not appropriate to silence him. That is my problem with Lipstadt and the general campaign conducted against Irving by Jewish organizations.

Finally, Lieberman objects to my interpretation of Ortega's statement that 'MacDonald cited his experience [as a 1960's radical at the University of Wisconsin] as proof ....' I still think this clearly suggests that I used my personal experience as a major part of the argument despite the fact that it appeared in a footnote. I don't see how Lieberman can say that 'Ortega suggests nothing of the kind.'