Psychology 346IC

Study Guide for Buss, Evolutionary Psychology, 2nd edition.

Chapter 1

p. 2: What are the key questions of evolutionary psychology?

p. 3: How is evolutionary psych as a synthetic theory?

p. 3: What are the basics of Lamarck's theory?

p. 4: Notice he emphasizes purpose and functionality as central to evolution. These ideas are repeated throughout.

p. 5: What is the importance of Darwin's finches?

p. 5-6: What is Darwin's argument for evolution? (Where does Malthus fit in?)

p. 7: Define sexual selection. What two types of sexual selection are there?

p. 8: Notice that sexual selection is not really a separate process from natural selection.

p. 8: Natural selection is the primary cause of evolutionary change. What is genetic drift? Why do you think that genetic drift would be less important than natural selection in designing functional characters (i.e., adaptations)? (An adaptation is a trait or mechanism designed by natural selection to perform a certain function. Eagles' eyes, bones, beaks, feathers, etc. are adaptations. THIS IS A VERY IMPORTANT CONCEPT.)

p. 9: Notice evolution is gradual and is not forward looking or intentional. Animals or plants can get into evolutionary dead ends because they necessarily respond to current selection pressures without being able to prepare for future, unrealized selection pressures. Perhaps humans are the exception here.

p. 9: Notice that we share most of our genes with other organisms. Genes critical for basic life functions become fixed.

p. 10: The partial wing argument against the theory of evolution. This is still a mainstay for anti-evolutionary arguments.

p. 10: What is the particulate theory of inheritance? How was it supported by Mendel's work? (This last part is from the lecture notes.)

p. 11-12: Define: Gene; genotype; imprinting; ethology; fixed action pattern.

p. 12: The four 'whys' of behavior are also in Lecture Notes III.

p. 13: Buss criticizes ethology

p. 14: We will go over Hamilton's idea of inclusive fitness in class. Classical fitness refers to direct reproductive success. If person A has more direct descendants than person B, then he has higher classical fitness. Inclusive fitness includes effects of helping relatives who share your genes: If I help my brother have more children, then it's just like having more of my own children except that his children count only half as much as my own children to my fitness because my brother and I have only 50% of our genes identical. My child has half my genes, but my nephew has only 1/4 of my genes. Still, helping my brother produce more nephews for me adds to my inclusive fitness. This is the evolutionary explanation for the power of family and kinship relationships.

p. 15: Notice the centrality of group selection and altruism. Let's not worry about this issue right now.

p. 16: Material on Trivers is opaque at this point. Skip it.

p. 18: By far the most influential critics of sociobiology and evolutionary psychologists have been leftists.

p. 19: How does Buss rebut the charge that evolutionary psychology proposes that behavior is genetically determined? Do you think an environmentalist would be much comforted by the answer?

pp. 18-19: Buss says that evolutionary tendencies can be changed by knowledge of our adaptations. He seems to suppose that 'educability' can override evolutionary tendencies. As I said in class, this needs some kind of evolutionary analysis to make it convincing. Is educability an adaptation? To answer the question, you must be clear on what adaptations are; see pp. 39-40. Is educability designed to solve a specific problem in our Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness? The Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA) is the environment humans evolved in. The EEA presented a set of problems that were solved by the set of human adaptations. Each animal and plant has its own EEA.

p. 20: Realize that adaptations don't require conscious calculation; in fact, adaptations (e.g., seeing objects) tend to work at an unconscious level.

p. 20: Be able to give examples of adaptations that are poorly designed for modern environments.

pp. 20-26: Human origins. Focus on the shift at 50,000 years ago on p. 26. Notice that the Out of Africa theory is supported by findings on genetic diversity of African populations.

p. 29: Notice that behaviorism proposes that human nature is nothing more than a general ability to learn. The word 'general' is important here. Big contrast with evolutionary psychology. See below.

p. 29-30: What was Margaret Mead's approach and why would it present problems for evolutionary psychology? Be able to summarize Derek Freeman's findings.

pp. 30-31: Be able to describe Harlow's and Garcia's research. How did Garcia's research violate the two central ideas of behaviorism that are rejected by evolutionary psychologists: The contiguity assumption (reinforcements are most effective if they immediately follow the reinforced behavior) and the equipotentiality assumption (there are no differences in how difficult it is to learn particular things; buzzers and lights should be as effective as eating food)?

p. 32: According to evolutionary psychologists like John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, how were the information processing theories similar to the old behaviorism? I.e., what was the general mistake made by cognitive psychologists?

What is combinatorial explosion and why does it pose a problem for domain general cognitive mechanisms?

Chapter 2

Psychology 346I: Study Guide for Buss, Chapter 2

pp. 38: Most biologists view evolution not as a theory but as fact.

pp. 38-42: Be able to define an adaptation and byproduct of adaptation, and give examples. Be able to define species-typical, mutation, environment of evolutionary adaptedness.

pp. 42-49: Understand the basic idea that there are different levels of analysis and what they are. Know Trivers's theory of parental investment as a mid-level theory that makes specific predictions about female mate selection. The real point of this chapter is to show that evolutionary psychology is a science; i.e., it make predictions and it's hypotheses can be confirmed or disconfirmed empirically.

pp. 47-48: Know what top-down and bottom-up strategies are. It's easy to see why top-down strategies would be based on evolutionary theory, but not so easy for bottom-up.

pp. 50-52: IMPORTANT: Know the six criteria for an evolved psychological mechanism. This material overlaps with LECTURE NOTES III. The most important are 1, 2, 3 and 4. For future reference, a critical feature is #4: The input of an evolved psychological mechanism is transformed through decision rules into behavior. The question is: to what extent are the decisions we make determined by the evolved mechanism. Take Buss's example of sexual jealousy: The man sees his girlfriend flirting with another man and he feels jealous; so far so good: the mechanism is informing him by an emotional signal (jealousy) that he has a problem. But what to do? The various decision that the man could make described on p. 52 are not at all determined by the mechanism. He could kill the guy (and/or his girlfriend), or walk away and try to find a new girlfriend, or a whole lot of other things. The decision is not determined by the mechanism but is complexly determined by a host of personality variables (how aggressive is the man? how impulsive?) and context (will I get caught and go to jail? Is the other man stronger than I am? Does he have a gun or a knife?). An important aspect of the decision involves conscious weighing of various alternatives and involves general purpose mechanisms related to general intelligence. General intelligence is not the sort of domain-specific mechanism defined here by Buss: It is not designed to solve a specific problem (criterion #1) and it does not take in only a narrow slice of information (criterion #2). In general I will argue that evolved psychological mechanisms typically result in psychological signals which are then available to general-purpose decision making mechanisms, a critical ingredient of which is general intelligence.

Think of this example: Research on fear by LeDoux shows that there are two fear mechanisms in the brain. One is reflexive and not conscious. The stimulus (say a sudden noise or movement, the sudden appearance of a coiled, hissing snake) goes directly to the amygdala without going to the cortex, and the result is a fear response and reflexive defensive action (jumping back). But the stimulus also goes to the cortex and the person can then think about what to do: Is the stimulus really potentially harmful is the noise just a car backfiring? Should I call 911? Plan some elaborate escape? Reach for my gun?

Both types of circuits are in the brain--the reflexive and unconscious, and the reflective and conscious. There are evolved decision rules for the former, but not the latter.

p. 53: What non-arbitrary criterion do evolutionary psychologists use to 'carve nature at her joints'?

p. 54: Notice that evolved psychological mechanisms tend to be problem specific. Buss denies there are general adaptive problems.

p. 56: According to Buss we have a large number of Evolved Psychological Mechanisms (EPM's). This relates to the discussion of decision rules on pp. 50-52. On p. 56 he says that when we see a snake we have several different response options, all of which are seen as EPM's. He sees all of these as 'if-then' rules that are part of an EPM. Obviously, I don't see it this way.

p. 57: Buss does discuss domain general mechanisms but is not very favorably inclined. I will lecture about this, but for now: What is the main argument of the existence of domain general mechanisms? (This is on the bottom of p. 56-top of p. 57). Notice on p. 57 Buss says that whatever model we end up with has to propose that the mechanisms interact together, they can't be isolated so that the

pp. 58ff: This covers methodological issues. Interesting, but not required here. The point is to convince you that we have a science here.

Chapter 3

Early on, Buss divides human problems into problems of survival and reproduction. This chapter is on survival problems. For each of these problems, you should ask yourself if you are persuaded by the data he provides. For example, in the discussion of pregnancy sickness, he notes that women who show pregnancy sickness are more likely to carry their babies to term. However, aren't adaptations supposed to be universals? I.e., if pregnancy sickness was an adaptation (like, e.g., our visual apparatus), wouldn't all women show it?

Be able to describe the evidence for the hunting hypothesis of human origins. What is the gathering hypothesis, and what are the problems with this hypothesis.

P. 90ff: Re fear: I think Buss does a good job of showing some fears are domain-specific adaptations to solve recurrent evolutionary problems (Table 3.1). What is his evidence that these fears (or at least some of them) are in fact evolved mechanisms? (There are three types of evidence.) Are you convinced that fear is always a domain-specific adaptation? Can you only fear things that were recurrent events in our evolutionary past or is it just easier to develop fears of things that were dangerous in the human EEA? Could you develop a fear of a hot stove? Or electrical sockets? The freeway after you've had an accident?

p. 95: What is the adaptive conservation hypothesis, and what evidence supports it?

pp. 97ff: What is the evolutionary theory of senescence? Be able to define pleiotropy. Why are men theorized to die earlier than women?

Chapter 4

pp. 105–106: What are the costs of asexual reproduction? What are the costs of sexual reproduction? There are two theories for why sexual reproduction evolved (i. e., for why sexual reproduction had enormous benefits, the multiple niche theory and the parasite theory. Buss doesn’t note this, but some asexual species become sexual when they are about to disperse, suggesting that there is a benefit in genetic diversity in being able to colonize new niches. Know how sexual reproduction results in increased genetic variation. What is the “arms race” between parasites and hosts.

pp. 106–107: Know the evolutionary theory of sex. This is VERY important. I will present this in class also.

p. 109: Looking at Table 4.1, notice that men (and women—but that’s the subject of the next chapter) vary along a large number of individual differences dimensions relevant to mate choice. Individuals can be high on some of these and low on others. This makes choosing very difficult and probably means that no one is ideal on all dimensions. Also, as he notes later, we can’t always, or even very often, get everything we want because the other person is also choosing and we may be far from perfect. The large number of relevant dimensions means that natural selection will have a hard time removing variation from the population. We are not evolving toward an ideal type. Understand the concept that assessing the resource value of phenotypic variation in others is of critical importance for humans. We will talk about this in the personality lecture.

p. 109–126: Be able to summarize the main traits women prefer in long term relationships and be able to give an evolutionary rationale for why this makes adaptive sense. Try to be critical in this section. In general he tries to show mean sex differences and that a strong majority of cultures exhibit a certain trait. For example, on p. 111 he notes that women rate economic prospects of men almost twice as important as the reverse, and on p. 124, he notes that 89% of American women say that they would not marry without love. p. 117: Note that women prefer older men but not that much older even though resource accumulation continues as men get older. Were you convinced by his suggestions for why this is so?

p. 110: What three conditions would have to be met for there to be evolution of female preference for male resources?

Some of these female preferences are obviously related to personality systems that we discussed. Which ones? These preferences illustrate the idea from the personality lectures that individual differences in personality are a resource environment.

p. 123: What is the proposed adaptive function of love? p. 124: Note that he does not order his list of preferences from most preferred to least preferred. Here he notes that love is actually the most preferred characteristic (love is next to last on his list), followed by dependability and stability. Why do you think he starts off with women’s preference for men with money and status?

p. 126–127: What is the structural powerlessness hypothesis? What reasons does Buss give to reject it?

pp. 128: Notice the differences between preferences in long- and short-term mates. How does this make evolutionary sense? What do you think women are looking for in short-term mates?

pp. 128–129: what are the effects of menstrual cycle on mate preferences and how does this make evolutionary sense?

pp. 130–132: Buss tries to show that women’s actual behavior mirrors their stated preferences. What is his evidence?

Last page: Notice in the discussin of lesbianism that butch lesbians have a lower waist to hip ratio. And they have a male pattern of sexual preferences. (Explain this.) The reverse is the case for the femme lesbians. (Explain.) This suggests that there is a biological basis, presumably hormonal, for sexual preferences. (Why?)


Chapter 5

pp. 135–136: Know the benefits of male commitment. Notice that the importance of investment for producing high quality children is critical. This is explicitly stated in the discussion of offspring survival, but realize that females would not seek paternal investment if it did not improve offspring success. Given that male investment is important, males become discriminating maters too, and males able to provide high investment are sought by females.

p. 137: Be able to define reproductive value and fertility.

p. 138ff: Re the preference for youth: male teenagers prefer older females. Buss uses this to argue that the general preference for youth is not based on the fact that younger females are more submissive and it’s not simply a learned preference. Write out the logic of his argument, including a description of the data presented in Figure 5.3

p. 142–144: What does Symons mean when he says “Beauty is in the adaptations of the beholder”? What arguments does Buss give that standards of beauty are an adaptation as opposed to being the result of learning or “culture”?

pp. 144, 146: What specific facial features are judged attractive? (Include Box 5.1 on p. 146.) What considerations have led researchers to suppose that preference for symmetry is adaptive?

pp. 145–148: What WHR do men prefer? Buss argues that this preference is universal. Why might it be adaptive?

p. 148: Note that men’s preference for physical attractiveness has increased. How does Buss explain this? Do you buy it? That is, do we need to invoke domain general mechanisms like social learning to understand the impact of “cultural evolution and impact from the social environment”? I worry that Buss hasn’t really analyzed this type of explanation.

pp. 149–150: Buss provides evidence that males may be able to detect female ovulation or that ovulating females are sending out more sexual signals. Where do the data point? He argues that concealed ovulation has an important role to play in the evolution of paternal investment. However, concealed ovulation would only work to keep the male around until there were obvious signs of pregnancy. I don’t think it can explain marriage and long-term male commitment; maybe it helps cement a close, bonded relationship. What signals do men look for in women to overcome the risk of paternity uncertainty? (Answer: cues of  pre-marital chastity and post-marital fidelity. Notice he does not mention cues of affection and pair bonding.) p. 152: Notice that all the countries where virginity is irrelevant are Western European. p. 152–4: There are contextual effects on the importance of female chastity. Probably the most important is whether or not males are in a position to demand it. Greater female power and less need for male investment (as suggested by the Swedish data) means less male ability to demand chastity. I worry that “incidence of premarital sex” is the sort of variable that is completely unexplained; i.e., there is no theory of the shift in incidence of premarital sex based exclusively on domain specific mechanisms that can explain why rates of premarital sex soared since the 1960s.

pp. 156: wealthy, powerful men tend to have better quality mates. Are there examples of wealthy, powerful men who stay with their aging wives? How would the perspective I presented in lecture on personality contribute to an explanation of that sort of thing?

pp. 157: men exposed to attractive women are less satisfied with their mates. This is another example of how modern environments may result in maladaptive behavior: “mechanisms are artificially activated”; super large breasts are like super-normal stimuli that seem to be more effective for triggering responses like courtship and aggression in animals. Does this mean there should be controls on advertising, etc.?

p. 160: What are the sex differences in deception in mating tactics. Also, which sex is more likely to derogate competitors as promiscuous? Why does that make evolutionary sense?

Chapter 6
p. 163: The intuitive lead-in: Men and women differ greatly in agreeing to sex with a stranger. Could there be other factors than just sex working here?

p. 164: Know how Trivers’ theory of parental investment predicts males will be more prone to indiscriminate casual sex. Notice there are some possible costs for short-term sexual strategies for men (what are they?); Buss is proposing men consciously or unconsciously do a cost/benefit calculation.

p. 165, Box 6.1: Interesting discussion of functions versus side-effects. What conditions must be met in order to qualify as having an evolved function?

p. 167: Note that the short-term strategy must have been successful at least some of the time; otherwise we would have obligate rather than facultative monogamy; i.e., all women would demand high investment.  Obligate means that there are no conditions under which the organism would be anything else. Facultative means that the behavior is context dependent: Under some conditions one response is adaptive, under other conditions a different response is adaptive. This implies the evolution of “if p, then q” rules: If in condition p, then perform q. Later in the chapter, several facultative hypotheses are explored.

pp. 166–167: What two types of physiological evidence are there for short term sexual strategies.

p. 167: Why is testicle size of a species a marker of short-term mating strategy involving multiple matings? Where do humans fall compared to other Primates?

pp. 166–167: Men ejaculate more when separated from their wives, controlled for time since last ejaculation. Keeping sperm level inside woman constant. Is this evidence men can’t tell when women ovulate?

p. 169: Notice that sexual desire is the motivator for short term sex—linked with the Go system (behavioral approach) in personality; men looking for short-term sex must note which women are accessible and not looking for commitment. I suppose that sexually unrestricted women both advertise availability and do not seek commitment—probably also linked to the same system in women, but context effects are also important for women’s seeking of short-term mating (see pp. 181–182).

pp. 169–174: Be able to summarize two data sets constituting evidence for the existence of short-term sexual strategies.

p. 175: The surveys cited here indicate that more men than women engage in extramarital affairs. Notice the big differences in the findings, probably due to some non-representative samples.  Buss interprets the data as a whole as showing males do more of this, but the results for some studies are so close that I think the hypothesis that men are more prone to this than women is supported only if we suppose that studies such as Hunt (1974) are more representative. But that study is 30 years old. Nevertheless, the data on prostitution indicate that males desire sort term, uncommitted sex far more than females. Kinsey’s comments seem justified.
On p. 176 Buss says that the number of short-term matings for men must equal that for women. That’s true, of course, but it could be that the numbers for females are highly skewed: some of them are doing a whole lot of mating. Perhaps prostitution is a good paradigm for the evolution of short-term mating strategies: relatively few women servicing a whole lot of men. The data on extramarital affairs do suggest that it occurs everywhere, but that far less than all women do it. This would be compatible with a facultative strategy.

p. 176: What do the data on orgasm suggest about women’s short term mating strategies?

p. 179–180: Be able to name two costs to women of short term mating.
p. 180: Notice that some women who engage in short-term relationships want investment up-front, while others are seeking love. How would the theory of competing systems that I presented deal with such data? Could it be that women who seek love are really seeking a long-term relationship? This would be compatible with either the mate switching or the mate expulsion hypotheses, both of which receive empirical support (p. 181).
pp. 181–182: The problem with these data, as Buss notes, is that they are based on women’s self-reports. What types of bias might creep into these data?
Which hypotheses of benefits to women of short term mating have been supported? Notice that women who use short-term sex to get rid of a mate may be seeking a long-term mate, at least in the long run after they get rid of the jerk. What types of men are women likely to try to get rid of?
Which hypotheses are promising?

p. 184: How does sex ratio influence mating strategies?
p. 184: Notice that high-mate value people of both sexes get what they want, but they tend to want different things in line with the evolutionary theory of sex. This suggests that one aspect of short-term mating in women is that these are women with relatively low mate value (despite the findings that there are no differences in self-perceived mate value), or that their low self-esteem is a true pathology preventing them from acting in accordance with their actual or self-perceived mate value.


Chapter 7

p. 188: Notice the inertia in parenting behavior in the face of a utopian socialist dream.

p. 189: Parenting as a cost; parenting is not for the good of the species but for the individual. Still, 83% seems to imply a lot of mistakes.

p. 189: Love for children as an evolved motivational system resulting in nurturance of genetic vehicles (= children).

p. 191: Be able to summarize Buss’s argument for why paternity uncertainty does not preclude the evolution of paternal investment but does tip the scales so that males are less likely to invest in offspring.

pp. 191–192: What is the abandonability hypothesis? What two reasons does Buss give for doubting it?

p. 192–193: Why are mating opportunity costs generally higher for males? How does the fish example on p. 193 support the idea that male parental care will evolve in situations where parental care does not lower the opportunity costs of mating for males? How does this hypothesis square with the finding that men are more willing to invest in parenting in conditions of a surplus of men?

Discriminative parental solicitude:
1.) GENETIC RELATEDNESS
Fairy tales of wicked step-mothers turn out to be based on reality. In the study of comments on resemblance of the baby, what is the evolutionary reason for supposing mother and mother’s relatives will note resemblance of baby to father? Why should the effect be stronger for first-born children or when the couple has not been together long?

Be able to describe at least some of Anderson et al.’s findings. P. 198: data suggest that men who are uncertain of paternity invest less in children. Presumably this is controlled for social class. Men give more to children of present wife than previous wife; why does Buss say that this represents mating effort rather than parental effort?

p. 199 and Fig. 7.1: Note child abuse 40 times more likely in step-parenting situations; however, abuse is still only a small minority of total step-children. (The same also occurs with child homicide; p. 200) The biological parent in the relationship may be expected to oppose this lack of investment by the step-parent. This may explain the relatively low percentages, at least partly. Why do you think children in the youngest age category in Figure 7.1 are more likely to be abused?

2.) OFFSPRING’S ABILITY TO CONVERT PARENTAL CARE INTO RS
Two variables considered, abnormalities and age of child. P. 203: Note higher rates of abuse of children with abnormalities. What were the findings of the twin study by Mann on p. 204? What is the point of the contrast between Figures 7-3 and 7-4?

p. 202: Note Geary’s data that paternal investment has real effects on child mortality in many parts of the world. This effect is presumably muted in societies with a large safety net. But the data do strongly suggest past selection for paternal investment.

p. 204: What is reproductive value and why does this concept predict that natural parents will kill young children more than older children?

p. 206: What is discriminative parental solicitude? Notice that Buss says that child homicide is not an adaptation but he does say that “selection has favored psychological mechanisms in parents sensitive to the reproductive value of their children.” But it’s pretty hazy how this works. Much of the phenomena he discusses here (child abuse, child homicide) are rather rare. Many parents with children who have abnormalities do love and take care of them. So some of the variation may be in psychological bonding mechanisms—people higher on the affectional system would be less likely to do these things. And some of this activity is illegal—child abuse and homicide. Therefore, people may restrain themselves for fear of the consequences. This would imply the importance of domain general mechanisms of conscious awareness and rational thought: Some people, if left to their own devices, might abuse or kill their children or step-children, but do not do so because they don’t want to go to jail. Or they are concerned about their social reputation—yet another evolved system. The general point is that Buss tends to try to explain things with an adaptation that causes only a small minority of people to commit these acts. It’s probably a lot more complicated. In general, behavior is influenced by several evolved mechanisms reacting to a particular context, and we don’t see much power when we try to explain it with just one mechanism. Buss convinces me that we do discriminate in the ways he says, but what we actually do is complexly determined by several systems (affectional system, discriminative parental solicitude systems) and the external context (e.g., legal penalties for child abuse).

3.) ALTERNATIVE USES OF RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR INVESTMENT IN CHILDREN

p. 207: Why would an evolutionist suppose that young women would be more likely to commit infanticide than older women?

p. 208: Why would an evolutionist suppose that being unwed would be a risk factor for infanticide?

p. 210ff: Note the universality of women’s greater involvement in childcare. On P. 212, Buss links it with basic evolutionary theory of sex: Women benefit less from additional matings. On p. 214 Buss says that men, freed from childcare, are looking for additional mates. This seems like a stretch as a general rule. Could it also be that men invest in other ways? Buss doesn’t take account of the universal importance of the sexual division of labor. Note that women seem to have adaptations related to childcare (p. 211). Be able to name some. P. 212: Note that showing interest in a woman’s children is a good way to being able to marry her.

p. 213: Be able to describe parent-offspring conflict with the example of diminishing returns and 8 units of food. The general conclusion is that your interest is different from your sibling and your parents. Should the sibling in the example want all of the food if that means his brother starves to death? Why?

p. 214: Mother-offspring conflict in utero: What is the trade-off of interests here? I.e., what different interests do mothers and fetuses have?

p. 215: What different predictions do Freud’s and Trivers’s theory make? Which theory receives more support?


Chapter 8

p. 220: The common sense intro: We do not live in a world of altruists. (Anyone who thinks he or she is an altruist please see me after class. I have some work I would like you to do.)

p. 220: Know the coefficient of relatedness (= the percentage of genes identical by descent) for the most common relationships.

p. 221–222: Know Hamilton’s rule: c < rb; b > c/r, where c is cost to you; b is benefit to recipient; r is coefficient of relatedness.  Note that it is not that organisms will necessarily help their relatives, but that genes that violate the law will be selected against (= evolvability constraint). Kin favoritism need not evolve, but if it does, it will conform to Hamilton’s law.

p. 223: What is Sulloway’s theory of birth order effects? How do the data of Salmon and Daly support it?

pp. 225-226: Most of the predictions about kinship are straightforward. Know why sex (#2) and age (#6) are expected to be important; p. 226: Notice that genetic kinship seems to be important even when groups do not have words that make the distinctions. Note also that kinship terms are commonly used in attempts to ingratiate oneself; besides the examples in the text, this is typical of political rhetoric (fatherland, motherland).

pp227-228: Know what happened in the ground squirrel example. How do we know that inclusive fitness was involved rather than concern about offspring or reciprocity?

p. 229–230: Bernstein’s work: Did the results for age fit the evolutionary hypothesis in the life-or-death condition? (Understand why the age hypothesis makes evolutionary sense.)

p. 231: Kochmaros and Kenny: Emotional closeness tracks genetic closeness. This may be true within families (although I am sure there are lots of exceptions), but is certainly not generally true since we fall in love and marry people who aren’t related to us. However, K&K’s results point up the need to consider more than one system in explaining results for helping. In this case, the affectional system discussed in the personality lectures is an important proximal mechanism for helping relatives. (What is a proximal mechanism?) Being high on  the affectional system in general makes one more prone to nurturance, empathy, sympathy, and altruism, and having a close relationship with a particular person makes one more inclined to help them.

p. 234: Results for wills are pretty straightforward, but note that women don’t trust their husbands while men seem to trust their wives. How does Buss interpret these findings? How do the results of Bossong (2001) support the interpretation Buss suggested.

p. 238-239: What is the evolutionary prediction for grandparental investment depending on type of grandparent (FaFa, FaMo, MoFa, MoMo)? What did DeKay (1995) find? A theme of this chapter is that paternity uncertainty has effects on kin directed behavior (note also Box 8.1 on p. 240–241; this study has the same logic and outcome as the one on grandparents).

p. 241–242: Note women are more likely to recall kinship relationships and describe themselves in terms of kinship. What is Buss’s speculation for this? How do Chagnon’s data contradict this speculation?