PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF DANCE CRITICISM

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

by Julie Charlotte Van Camp

Copyright Julie Charlotte Van Camp 1981

All Rights Reserved

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Much of the recent public fascination with dance seems to result from its involvement of so many different artforms. That complexity also poses the major challenge for philosophical understanding of dance. Aestheticians are most experienced with the pure, single medium artforms, both in theory and in appreciation, yet a fundamental test of the adequacy of any such theory is its capacity for explaining and understanding the artform as it is actually practiced.

The bedrock principle applied throughout in this dissertation is that philosophical problems must be addressed in terms of the artform as it is actually practiced, appreciated, and evaluated. Thus, in considering definitions of dance, it is essential to recognize the considerable range of phenomena within the artform, over an historical period of several centuries and also with regard to current diversity in dance. The essential roles for music and also drama, expression of emotion, costumes, scenery, and lighting must be recognized in addition to the obvious role of movement. The emergence of dance in the twentieth-century as an autonomous artform, distinct from the theater, is also significant.

Analysis of proposed definitions which merely list

components or types of phenomena (movement, music, etc.) shows that they fail to meet minimal tests of adequacy for definitions, whether approached as specifications of necessary and sufficient conditions, distinction between dance and other human phenomena, or distinction between dance and other artforms. However, it should not be overlooked that definitions for a limited purpose and context may be quite useful for these purposes.

In addition to specifying components, adequacy for understanding the artform requires additional analysis in terms of the context of appreciation and evaluation, including (1) the types of criteria used to evaluate phenomena, (2) the relative importance in determining goodness of more mental, intellectual, or abstract aspects (e.g., story, expression of emotion), as opposed to more purely physical sensual aspects (e.g., movement design), and (3) the relative importance in assessment of goodness of movement and music as opposed to other elements often present in dance (e.g., costumes, scenery, mime). Philosophers usually attempt descriptive definitions, while the definitions developed by other theorists, historians, and critics are commonly prescriptive. The latter offer a definition in the form of "X would be a good example of dance if it adhered to certain evaluative principles." It is proposed here that an adequate philosophical definition would take the form, "X would be an example of dance if it consisted of some or all of a certain set of phenomena, and those phenomena are

evaluated according to certain types of principles."

In reviewing the ontological status of the artform, recognition of the complex characteristics of the artform itself is essential. Theories resting solely on human movement do not account for the important roles of music, and other components of the multi-media artform. Problems of evaluation do not make sense if dance is considered to consist solely of movement. If all other media are merely accompaniments, like the frame of a picture, then the long and substantial debate about the relative importance of those other components in determining the goodness of the work is nonsensical. Theories that the medium of dance is solely movement, a virtual image, or a fusion of several media are thus unacceptable. Dance is more adequately understood as consisting of primary media of movement and non-movement by human bodies capable of movement, and music or other auditory accompaniment, plus secondary media of costumes, scenery, and the like. The standard of "appropriateness" between the media, and the use of different standards resulting in different overall judgments thus also has a special importance in view of the multi-media character of dance.

Unusual identity standards in dance are explainable by analyzing carefully the character of the artform, including uses of identity theory, the unique and quite variable human body as instrument, which necessitates wide tolerance for variation, and varying relative importance of different

media in different dance genres. Notation alone is inadequate to fully explain identity. Even if it is agreed that notation can capture all important aspects of movement needed in establishing identity, an adequate theory of identity must also explain how acceptable compliance with notation is established, given that absolute compliance is neither possible nor demanded in practice. The establishment of identity of works should be kept distinct from means for production of a work, for evaluation of the interpretation of performers, and for the training of dancers. A model for the determination of necessary compliance is derived from the practice in copyright infringement standards of using both a notation (or other fixation) as an absolute standard in combination with a set of principles for substantial similarity as determined by lay observers. Both philosophy and the law could benefit from continued careful scrutiny of the nature of similarity in dance in developing this test in the context of dance.

Finally, the character of dance as a performing art, with special dependence on unique human bodies, has resulted in a legitimate interest by critics in determining the creative and interpretive aspects of a performance, an interest which is more properly understood as an interest in evaluating the continuing skills of performers and choreographers, as opposed to the proper object of criticism, the directly perceivable aspects of performances. Similarly, the interest of critics and philosophers in production factors not

perceivable on stage can be explained as an interest in the continuing skills of performers, distinct from perceivable performances.

Numerous questions have not been addressed here. Hopefully, however, the need has been demonstrated for a re-orientation of philosophical work on dance to accurately reflect and explain the character of the artform itself, first and foremost.

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Comments and questions are welcome: jvancamp@csulb.edu

Last updated: August 17, 1997