conflicting Japanese interpretations of the outcaste problem *(buraku mondai)*

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In the preface to his classic *Argonauts of the Western Pacific,* Malinowski urges ethnographers to "grasp the native's point of view, his relation to life, to realize his vision of *his* world" (1961:25).[1] In the sorts of societies that anthropologists have traditionally studied, this goal is simple enough, in theoretical if not methodological terms. In the complex, urban societies that are increasingly coming under anthropological scrutiny, however, there is an important question that must be answered: *which* natives? Modern societies are characterized by a variety of different life-styles and different points of view. In addition to various folk perspectives, there are also full-time ideological specialists with intellectual heritages that rival the anthropologist's own in subtlety and complexity. Islam, Hinduism, Confucianism, and Buddhism all not only are embedded in the "little traditions" of Asian peasantries but also exhibit "great traditions" with rich literatures to which dedicated scholars have devoted their lives. These traditional ideologies, however, are everywhere being challenged by a new ideology, Marxism. Marxism also has a rich literature to which equally dedicated scholars have devoted their lives. Throughout the world, Marxian socialism has become the dominant ideology of resistance to the status quo (except, of course, in those nations where Marxian socialism *is* ideology of the status quo).

The modern world, then, is characterized by ideological conflict, a conflict that grows out of the complex class struggles of the modern epoch. The problem of adopting the "native's point of view," then, becomes increasingly complex.

This complexity is compounded by the fact that Marxian socialism is important not only in the anthropological hinterland, but also in the anthropologist's own homeland. In spite of this, or perhaps because of it, American anthropologists—like American social scientists in general—have tended to reject Marxian socialism as a product of a fanatical and totalitarian mentality.[2] Such treatment, it should be clear, is as specious and ethnocentric as the earlier treatment of magic and witchcraft as the products of a "primitive mentality." Anthropologists who have corrected this earlier fallacy now have an obligation to bring anthropological perspectives to bear on the understanding of the spread of Marxian socialism and of the resulting ideological conflict in the modern world. This is important from the emic, Malinowskian perspective of desiring to see things from the "native's point of view." Anthropologists have traditionally studied ideologies, and we should not ignore some because we may disagree with them.

Everywhere in the modern world, traditional ideologies are being challenged by a new one, Marxian socialism. This paper seeks to understand the nature and significance of this ideological conflict by examining two opposing Japanese views on a major Japanese social problem, the social discrimination against outcastes (burakumin). The conflicting views of the Japanese government and the Marxist-oriented Outcaste Problem Research Institute (Buraku Mondai Kenkyūjo) are presented and related to the class structure of contemporary Japan. The implications of the analysis for contemporary anthropology are discussed.

The anthropological study of Marxian socialism is important in another sense as well, for it may significantly alter our own scientific perception of actual social situations. Our own analyses will probably be strengthened by drawing on the insights of native Marxists who analyze and criticize their own societies. This has been my experience in trying to understand the phenomenon of outcastism in Japanese society, and I suspect that others have had or will have a similar experience in trying to understand other modern or modernizing societies.

The purpose of this essay is to present an example of ideological conflict in modern Japan, that between Japanese Marxists and the Japanese government on what is an increasingly important social problem in Japan, outcastism.[3] These two interpretations, I will argue, have different class bases, and their proponents prescribe different policies for dealing with the outcaste problem. Accordingly, they view the problem differently and stress different aspects of social reality in order to legitimate their different policies.

There was little concern on the part of governmental policymakers with the social problem of outcastism until outcastism was made a visible social problem through the efforts of the outcastes themselves in the Rice Riots of 1918 and the political organization of the Suiheisha, an outcaste liberation movement. In a similar fashion, there was little scientific concern with the problem of explaining outcastism in Japanese culture until Marxist intellectuals associated with the Suiheisha began examining the question. Therefore, just as present governmental policies are in a very real sense responses to popular movements from below, so the government position on the outcaste problem is a reaction to Marxism. Nonetheless, because the more complex Marxian position incorporates a criticism of the government's position, I shall examine the latter first.

the government position

For the government, the essence of the outcaste problem—or *dōwa* (assimilation) problem, in their terminology—is that one part of the Japanese people is set in an inferior condition economically, socially, and culturally, by discrimination founded on the status system that was formed in the historical development of Japanese society. The characteristic of this problem is that the descendents of feudal outcastes are concentrated in districts known as *dōwa chiku,* or "integration districts"; however, even if they leave, they are subject to both public and private discrimination. The Japanese government sees the solution of this most serious social problem as its responsibility.

The government acknowledges that there are various theories—racial, religious, occupational, and political—concerning the origin of the status system but is not concerned with investigating this academic problem. The government emphasizes, however, that the people of the *dōwa chiku* are completely Japanese and are neither an alien race nor a different people.

The formation of the *dōwa chiku* developed from the setting of outcastes in certain places, as regulated by the political, economic, and social conditions of feudal society at the beginning of the early modern period (sixteenth and seventeenth centuries). Under the status system of feudal society, the outcastes were treated in an inhuman manner and were the objects of discrimination in every field of social life, such as occupation, housing, association, and clothing. The Emancipation Proclamation (*kaihōrei*) of 1871 gave them legal freedom from status discrimination, but this was only a formal emancipation because there was no policy of guaranteeing actual emancipation in terms of improved social and economic conditions. Nevertheless, according to the government, the *dowa* problem is in a state of dissolution from its former pattern during feudal times.

The main obstacles for the emancipation of the inhabitants of the *dōwa chiku* is the "dual structure" of Japanese capitalism.[4] In this dual structure there is an advanced sector,

similar to developed countries, and a backward sector, similar to underdeveloped countries.

The advanced sector is based on large, modern industries that give rise to a modern social structure, which, in turn, is reflected in modern forms of social consciousness. The backward sector is based on small-scale agriculture and small industries with traditional productive techniques. Here the premodern, status-bound social structure remains strong, and semifeudal survivals, such as the *oyabun-kobun* system and the patriarchal extended family system, perpetuate superstitution and irrational prejudice and other forms of premodern social consciousness. These, in turn, reinforce status discrimination.

Yet status discrimination is not a purely mentalistic phenomenon. The government distinguishes between psychological discrimination, existing in the minds of people and reflected in discriminatory words and gestures, and discrimination of actual conditions, which is seen in the substandard living conditions, the low level of occupation, and the low level of education and culture in the *dōwa chiku.* Between these two kinds of discrimination there is a mutually reinforcing cause-and-effect relationship that reproduces them both.

The government does not agree with those who feel that the *dōwa* problem can never be solved—it argues that it is a historical phenomenon that appeared at a certain stage of the historical development of Japanese society and will eventually disappear, just like other historical phenomena. On the other hand, the "don't wake up sleeping children" (*neta ko o okosuna*) philosophy that holds the problem will disappear by itself is also correct in the government's view, because it is necessary to have some policy for improving conditions within the *dōwa chiku.*

The early programs for improving conditions within the *dōwa chiku,* which developed in response to the Rice Riots of 1918 and the demands of the Suiheisha (the "levelers' league," a prewar liberation organization—see Devos and Wagatsuma 1966), were limited in scope and hence ineffective. More recently, the significance of the *dōwa* problem has begun to be appreciated, and the government has begun to support programs for improvement of conditions in the *dōwa chiku.* Because the root of the *dōwa* problem lies in the dual structure of Japanese society, in addition to environmental and educational reforms, an effort must be made to bring the *dōwa chiku* into the modern sector of the economy. This should be done by giving encouragement and support to those enterprises that are potentially able to exist as modern enterprises and by assisting workers and owners of enterprises that have no potential of modernizing to transfer to the modern sector of the economy.

The policy implications of the government position, then, are essentially liberal, in that the government accepts responsibility for integrating the outcastes into majority society and insists upon the necessity for definite programs to improve conditions for the outcastes. The solution to the outcaste problem, however, must ultimately lie in the development of Japanese capitalism. This is because, in the government's view, modern capitalism and modern Japanese society are incompatible with status discrimination. The government, then, sees the outcaste problem as essentially a feudal survival that will be claimed by capitalism.

the Marxist position

In the Marxist view, by contrast, the essence (*honshitsu*) of the outcaste problem lies precisely in the political and economic role of outcastes in the Japanese system of capitalist exploitation. The policies of the ruling class are seen, at all periods, as the primary determinant of class, caste, and status systems. The different forms that outcastism assumes in various periods are determined by the changing systems of social exploitation that support the changing ruling class.

As essential aspect of the theoretical framework of Marxism is the division of society into two classes, rulers and ruled. These classes take different forms and have different graduations in different historical periods. Between rulers and ruled there is unending class struggle, in which rulers attempt to maintain the system of exploitation that supports them and the ruled seek to escape or destroy it. It is this class struggle that, in the Marxist view, accounts for changes in the social structure of historical societies.

The Marxist discussion of the outcaste problem does not confine itself to the outcastes and indeed does not even focus particularly on the outcastes. This fact flows naturally from the Marxist view that the essence of the outcaste problem lies in capitalist exploitation. The dialectical perspective of Marxism precludes viewing the outcaste in isolation from other social problems in Japan. In the Marxist view, one cannot simply look at status discrimination itself, one must penetrate beneath the surface and examine the entire social structure that generates status discrimination. The outcaste problem, in short, must be viewed as part of a total system of exploitation and oppression that generates war, poverty, urban decay, and environmental pollution, as well as discrimination based on age, sex, and status. Western scholars may tend to regard this as a weakness, in keeping with the Marxist preference for polemics rather than substance. It may equally well be regarded as a strength, in keeping with the modern anthropological emphasis on holistic and systemic perspectives. However one wishes to view it, the fact remains that Japanese Marxist discussions of the *buraku modai* tend to focus on capitalist exploitation in general and on the consequences of the capitalist system, rather than focusing simply on outcastes. In the Marxian view, to focus exclusively on outcastes, rather than on the cause of outcastism, would be to misunderstand the problem.

According to the Marxist view, inequality could not exist in the earliest period of Japanese prehistory because of the undeveloped state of the productive forces of society. But as these productive forces developed after the introduction of rice agriculture from the Asian mainland, strong men emerged who led the people into war, captured slaves, and appropriated the best land as their private property. These strong men created the distinction between upper and lower ranks and developed the primitive status system (*mibun seido*) that simultaneously expressed and legitimized the emerging differentials of wealth, power, and life-style.

As the forces of production developed and as the system of exploitation expanded, the status system that was based on them became more complex. At the time of the Taika Reforms (A.D. 645) the distinction between "good people" (*ryōmin*) and "base people" (*senmin*) was legally promulgated. This distinction has persisted throughout Japanese history. At the bottom of the status system of the ancient period were the so-called "five kinds of base people" (*goshiki no senmin*): tomb guards (*ryōko*), government cultivators (*kanko*), temple and private servants (*genin*), government slaves (*kunuhi*), and private slaves (*shinuhi*).[5] The *senmin* of the ancient period were, for the most part, attached to the various bureaus of the imperial bureaucracy. As this bureaucracy weakened with the rise of the manor (*shōen*) system in the ninth and tenth centuries, the *senmin* attached to the various bureaus were liberated as the bureaus themselves were closed. But this liberation resembled the later liberation of the Emancipation Proclamation of 1871 because the outcastes still lacked access to the basic means of production—land. Consequently, they had to seek the protection of the lords of the manor and had to continue to perform their old jobs. The most conspicuous example of this process is the bow-and-arrow makers of the Bureau of Ordnance. When the bureau was abolished, they sought the protection of the Gion Shrine, which was itself subordinate to the Enrakuji Temple on Mt. Hiei. The duties of the *tsurumeso,* as they came to be called, included making weapons for the fighting monks of the shrine and temple and sweeping the streets of Kyoto. The *tsurumeso* were also used to attack villages that had refused to pay their taxes.

The *senmin* of the medieval period (*chūsei,* twelfth through the sixteenth centuries) were

essentially of two sorts. The first was the *sanjo-no-mono* or "people of the scattered districts," who were frequently descended from earlier *senmin* in the manner described above. From the beginning the *sanjo* were composed of unfree persons completely subservient to the lords of the manors, who freely exchanged them as gifts. The *sanjo* paid no taxes but instead performed various duties for their lords, such as guard duty, sweeping, and miscellaneous manual labor. It was at this time that outcaste status, outcaste occupation, and outcaste locality were first united in the *sanjo*.

The second category of *semin* during the medieval period was *kawaramono*, or "river-bed people." Due to the social upheavals of the time, with oppressive taxation, wars, and famines, many ordinary peasants lost their land and became vagabonds, either drifting into the *sanjo* or settling on wasteland along rivers where they led free but impoverished lives.

These early *senmin* not only performed such lowly tasks as leatherworking, sweeping, and manual labor, they also carried on the greater part of the artistic tradition of Japan as painters, sculptors, musicians, gardeners, and artisans. Many of the classic art forms of later Japan developed from *sarugaku*, the "monkey music" of the medieval *senmin*.

With the rise of the warrior class and the decline of the manor system, the *senmin* system of the medieval period crumbled. Many of the outcaste communities began to develop economic and military power in their own right. The *tsurumeso* mentioned above, for example, profited greatly after acquiring monopoly rights in the sweeping and the disposal of dead in Kyoto, and, in 1353, threatened a strike against the Gion Shrine. Other outcaste groups armed and engaged in combat against their former overlords. Increasingly, inherited status meant less and less, and only actual economic and military power was important. This period is known to Japanese historians as *gekokujo*, "inferiors overcoming superiors." Many outcastes were able to escape their status, and some rose to considerable heights, even to the head of provinces. There is even a claim, although generally disbelieved, that the great Tokugawa Ieyasu was himself of base ancestry.

Although some outcastes were able to rise in the social turmoil of the time, many more did not, and their ranks were swelled by impoverished peasants. It is these groups of outcastes and déclassé persons that formed the raw material out of which the *senmin* system of the early modern period was formed.

As the rising *daimyō* consolidated their power in new territorial units known as *han*, they found it useful to assemble the scattered leatherworkers into one place in order to guarantee the production (and probably also to control prices) of these essential war materials. Leatherworkers were forbidden to engage in other occupations, and the trade was made hereditary. Thus, the constellation of hereditary outcaste status, outcaste occupation, and outcaste locality was reestablished in order to fill the needs of the feudal ruling class. The ubiquitous presence of outcaste communities on the outskirts of the old caste towns reflects this phase of the formation of outcaste communities.

As feudal order was established by the Tokugawa Shogunate (1600–1868), outcaste communities were established along the major highways to provide traffic laborers and underlings for the police. The presence of outcaste communities along traditional roadways of Japan reflects this phase of the formation of outcaste communities (Ryōke 1965:96).

In order to provide greater social control, the feudal rulers modified the Chinese status system into the *shi–nō–kō–shō–eta-hinin* system. Society was divided into warriors (*shi*), peasants (*nō*), artisans (*kō*), merchants (*shō*), and outcastes (*eta-hinin*), with major divisions between warriors and commoners (peasants, artisans, and merchants) and between commoners and outcastes, but with innumerable gradations in each class. Intermarriage was forbidden and occupation and status were made hereditary, and so, "like a tadpole becoming a frog and croaking in the mud," the son of an outcaste could aspire to nothing more than his father had.

The outcaste status and the outcaste communities, then, were created and maintained by the feudal rulers for purposes of social control. As one writer put it,

> The existence of such a lowly class served, as in many societies, to strengthen the feudal lords' control over the other classes. The outcastes were located in semi-developed areas on the outskirts of town, often by a river or other waterway. They were used mainly in unpopular leathercraft work, for cultivation of lands, or for carrying out executions of those condemned to death—all jobs thoroughly disliked by ordinary citizens. Separated as they were, ordinary people harbored feelings of fear and even horror with regard to the segregated *eta* communities. Such feelings were utilized by the rulers in the placing of the outcastes' block of dwellings near the town entrance, a psychological impediment to free entry and exit. In this position the *eta* could be used also as a first line of defense against rebellious peasants. At times they were even moved to battle fronts as supplementary troops [Fukuyama 1786; Kishū 1823; and Chōshū 1831] (Yazaki 1968: 157–158).

By having the outcastes perform the most despised tasks of ruling—executions and the suppression of rebellions—the feudal rulers were able to direct the anger of the commoners away from themselves and onto the despised outcastes. Further, the peasantry, suffering from the weight of oppressive feudal exploitation, would have found their existence even less bearable were it not for the existence beneath them of an even more degraded group considered to be below the level of humanity.

The outcastes, then, in addition to performing various specific tasks for the feudal rulers, served, by their very existence, as the foundation stone for the ideology that legitimized and justified the entire system of feudal exploitation and oppression. It is this function that came to play an increasingly important role in the development of the outcastes. With the establishment of peace, the growth of cities and towns, and the growth of trade, commodity production and capitalist productive relations developed in the countryside and led to increasing differentials of wealth between rich and poor peasants. As peasants became wealthy, even employing members of the samurai class as retainers and artisans, the status system that supported the feudal order was severely shaken. In an attempt to strengthen this status order, the feudal rulers issued increasingly severe sumptuary laws regulating the behavior of merchants and peasants. In order to make these sumptuary laws bearable, the restrictions placed upon outcastes were made even more severe. And, as peasant uprisings spread in the countryside, groups of impoverished peasants were made into outcastes in order to divide the peasant masses and strengthen feudal control. As the finances of the *han* weakened, and as many outcaste communities were swelled with the influx of impoverished peasants, new colonies of outcastes were placed on marginal land to bring it under cultivation. The concentration of outcastes in the Kansai region can be attributed to these developments in the later Tokugawa period , for it was in this area that the growth of commodity production and capitalism was greatest.

The origin and development of the outcastes in premodern Japan, then, is seen as a result of the conscious policies of the ruling class, which utilized the outcastes as a means of strengthening its control over the exploited and oppressed peasantry. Intensification of status discrimination and the numerical growth of outcaste communities and outcastes in the late Tokugawa period was a product of the weakening of feudal order against the onslaughts of emergent capitalism.

The Marxist explanation of the origin and development of the outcaste in premodern Japan lies in the role of the outcaste as an essential element in precapitalist systems of exploitation and oppression. This role lies, first, in the status system, which prevents the rise of effective, unified resistance by dividing the exploited classes into small, separate units and legitimizes the system of differentials in wealth, power, and life-style that result from exploitation. By assigning a status beneath humanity to those who have been totally crushed by the class struggle, such as war captives, criminals, and impoverished peasants, the ruling class is able to offset its own elevated status above humanity. The second aspect of the role of outcastes lies in their instrumental function in performing despised economic and political tasks for the ruling class. These two aspects merge as the outcastes are used as scapegoats and the objects of the anger and scorn of the oppressed and exploited.

These functions persist, in a modified form, under capitalism. In the modern period, outcastism has been rearranged, strengthened, and utilized to facilitate the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Japan. But capitalist exploitation of the outcastes themselves, although it definitely exists, is less important than the role of outcastes in the total system of exploitation and domination. This dialectical, or holistic, perspective precludes seeing outcastism in isolation from this total system, for it is the system causing outcastism that must be analyzed. Because capitalist exploitation is more subtle and complex than feudal exploitation, a brief statement of the Marxian theory of capitalist exploitation is necessary.

The process of production and exploitation in capitalism may be discussed with reference to the following formula:

$$M - C_1 + C_2 \ldots C' - M'$$

in which the capitalist begins with money (M), exchanges this for two kinds of commodities, the means of production (C_1), and labor power (C_2), and brings these together in the labor process (. . .) to produce other commodities (C'), which are then sold for more money (M'). This formula, which expresses the general form of capitalist production in a highly abstract way, may be used to illustrate several essential features of capitalism.

First, the motive force of capitalist production is profit. Unless the second sum of money is larger than the first ($M' = M + M$), the entire process makes no sense for the capitalist, who will simply hold his money rather than invest it, and capitalist production will not occur.

Second, the source of profit is the worker who sells his labor power to the capitalist. The worker's labor power not only is capable of reproducing the worker's wages (C_2), but also goes on and produces surplus value, which belongs to the capitalist and constitutes his profit. The working day, in other words, is divided into two parts, the first being the time that the worker is reproducing his wages (v), and the second being the time that he is producing unpaid surplus value (s). The ratio between the two (s/v) is a measure of the degree of capitalist exploitation.

Third, it follows from the formulas that the aim of the capitalist is to maximize his rate of profit, and in order to do this it is essential that wages be as low as possible. In order to keep them low, a pool of unemployed workers, or the "industrial reserve army," is necessary. This industrial reserve army performs essential economic, political, and psychological functions in capitalism in keeping wages low, enforcing labor discipline, and creating feelings of dependence and gratitude among the workers toward the capitalists. Unemployment, then, is an essential, not an accidental, part of the capitalist system. Although the unemployed are not exploited in the Marxian sense, they play an essential role in the system of capitalist exploitation.

Fourth, capitalist production produces its own objective status structure because the different forms of labor have different marketplaces. Because capitalist production also involves the reproduction of the means of production, including labor power, the objective status structure of wage labor is itself reproduced by capitalism.

Finally, this entire process is unique to capitalism, and before it can develop, it is necessary (1) for the capitalist to accumulate money to buy the means of production and labor power, and (2) for the worker to lose direct access to the means of production so that his labor power becomes a commodity. These are the twin aspects of the "primitive accumulation of capital," which, in Marx's analysis of the classic case, Great Britain, were carried out through naked violence, terror, and forcible expropriation, the first through colonial conquest and plunder, the second through the enclosure movement, which drove peasants off the land and into cities, where they formed the beginnings of the industrial proletariat.

The class structure of capitalism, then, is marked by a fundamental opposition between

the ruling capitalist class and the exploited working class, which is further divided into employed workers and unemployed workers. Between these two classes there is an inherent and incessant class struggle, as the capitalist seeks to maintain and extend his domination and the worker seeks to escape it, to overthrow the system of capitalist exploitation and build a nonexploitative, classless society, socialism. The capitalist class seeks in turn to prevent the organization of the working class and the spread of socialist, or communist, ideas.

Such is the nature of capitalism in the abstract. But capitalism nowhere appears in the abstract, only embedded in and modified by actual historical conditions, and this is especially true in late-developing nations. Because of the lateness of Japanese capitalist development, the bourgeoisie were unable to effect a bourgeois revolution that would have swept away the old feudal productive relations and feudal forms of consciousness. Instead, they had to ally themselves with elements of the old feudal ruling class in order to industrialize in the face of the Western threat. As a result, the Meiji Restoration was not a true bourgeois revolution. As a "revolution from above," it preserved numerous feudal survivals, which were used to speed capitalist development.[6]

As a late-developing nation, Japan could not finance its industrialization through colonial plunder, as did Great Britain, at least not initially. Instead, the Japanese ruling class had to use its own peasantry as an "internal colony" to be exploited for purposes of industrialization. The outcastes played an important role in this process, for the existence of a land-hungry group of outcastes played an important role in keeping rents high. In cases in which the rent was generally 50 or 60 percent, for outcastes it would be 70 or 80 percent. In extreme cases the entire rice crop was taken as rent, leaving the outcaste tenant with only a second crop and straw for making sandals. In this role, the outcastes were an essential element in the primitive accumulation of capital in Japan because (1) the high rents flowing into the hands of the landlords were transformed into capital, and (2) the high rent system in the countryside drove the surplus population—younger sons and impoverished peasantry—into the cities to form an urban proletariat.

In the Marxist view, the "emancipation" of the outcastes in 1871 was not a true emancipation but was merely a means of creating a class of "free" laborers, essential to capitalist development. Although status discrimination was legally abolished, it persisted in objective conditions. Further, the semifeudalistic status system, which replaced the *shi-nō-kō-shō-eta-hinin* system, comprised the nobility (*kizoku*), descendants of samurai (*shizoku*), and commoners (*heimin*), the outcastes remaining as a sub rosa category of "new commoners" (*shinheimin*).

For purposes of Marxist analysis, the subsequent development of Japanese capitalism must be divided into two periods—the pre-World War II period and the postwar period. The basic structure of prewar capitalism in Japan is diagramed in Figure 1.

The weak resource and capital base conditioned the development of light industries, such as textiles, with a need to export. The "semicolonial wages" and the high rate of exploitation of the peasantry by the parasitic landlords meant a narrow market at home, reinforcing the need to export. These factors led to the increasing scale of imperialist aggression in Taiwan, Korea, South Manchuria, and China. The ideological superstructure of the absolutist emperor system, the semifeudalistic status system, and the patriarchal family system served to strengthen and legitimize imperialist aggression abroad and suppression, oppression, and exploitation at home.

Within the emerging system of Japanese imperialism, status discrimination among workers in general and against outcastes in particular persisted, as discussed above. This status discrimination must be analyzed along with sexual, racial, and ideological discrimination. The first three served primarily economic functions, that is, in providing cheap labor; ideological discrimination serves the political function of suppressing resistance to capitalist exploitation.



Figure 1. The structure of prewar Japanese capitalism.

Sexual discrimination played a key role in industrialization. By paying subsistence wages to young, unmarried girls, the textile industry in particular was able to penetrate foreign markets and help provide Japan with badly needed foreign exchange.

Racial discrimination had its origin in the conquest of Korea and the promulgation by the ruling class of the idea that the Japanese were a superior race. As the Koreans immigrated to Japan, they joined the outcastes at the bottom of the industrial reserve army.

As workers' movements began, the mechanisms for ideological discrimination and ideological supression were developed. To combat the rising working-class consciousness after the Rice Riots of 1918 and the October Revolution in Russia, the Public Security Law was passed in 1925 to provide the legal framework for the suppression of "communistic" ideas.

In the Marxist view, then, the structure of prewar Japanese capitalism supported status discrimination in both its objective and its subjective aspects.

In the postwar period, with the Fascist movement defeated and discredited, Japanese society underwent first a revolutionary and then a counterrevolutionary development. The key forces underlying change in the revolutionary phase were (1) pressures from below from the progressive social forces of Japanese society, and (2) the American Occupation operating under the principles of the Potsdam Declaration.

The revolutionary period was marked by various reforms. Politically, there were first, the renunciation of war and the abolition of the Army and Navy; second, the abolition of the secret police; third, the trial of Fascist war criminals; and fourth, the ideological weakening of the absolutist emperor system.

Socially and economically, the *zaibatsu* were attacked and the parasitic landlord system was destroyed by the land reform. This was essentially a bourgeois reform because it did not abolish private property but merely redistributed it. Further, owner-cultivators who owned less than three *chō* (one *chō* equals 2.45 acres) were not affected by the land reform. Because many outcastes rented land from such owner-cultivators, they were not affected by the land reform. Also, mountain and forest holdings were exempt from the land reform.

The educational system, which had been directed toward the production of loyal subjects of the emperor, was democratized both in structure and in content. The struggle of labor was encouraged with laws setting working standards and guaranteeing the right to organize and bargain collectively. Discrimination against women weakened, differentials between men's and women's wages reaching their lowest point in 1947. Finally, freedom of thought was guaranteed and progressive political parties—the Socialist Party and the Communist Party—were organized and participated in elections.

By 1950, counterrevolution had set in, initiated by American imperialism, which feared both the too vigorous growth of the progressive forces of Japanese society and the spread of the Chinese revolution of 1949. The counterrevolution is not seen as abrupt, in the Marx-

ist view, but instead is viewed as a change in policy and direction at the top resulting in long-term structural changes at every level of society as the control of monopoly capital was reestablished and strengthened. These structural changes included the establishment of the "self-defense" forces, which are becoming the nucleus of the modern Japanese army, navy, and air force; the abandonment of the *zaibatsu* reform; the transfer of leadership in the labor movement from the left wing to the right wing; the reestablishment of authoritarian content and structure in the educational system; and the development of the status system within large enterprises and of the subsidiary company system (*shitauke-sei*). These structural features of the economic system are seen as directly related to the persistence of outcaste communities.

With the growth of Japanese industry based on the "special demand boom" created by the Korean War, the status structure of Japanese industry, already present before the war, was further developed and systematized. This status structure—which involved the separation of permanent employees (*honkō*) from temporary employees (*rinjikō*) and day laborers (*hiyatoi*) within the firm, and the use of subsidiary companies to make parts and fill special functions—may be concretely described with the example of Matsushita Electric.

At the top of the Matsushita pyramid is Matsushita Electric itself, where approximately forty thousand permanent employees enjoy the benefits of union membership, guaranteed raises and promotions, medical insurance, pensions, and, frequently, company housing. The privileged position of Matsushita's permanent employees creates an extraordinary degree of company loyalty. The main company is the general headquarters for the direction of production and marketing. Below the main company are approximately sixty branch companies, and below this a first subsidiary (*shitauke*) level of approximately sixteen hundred subsidiary companies that make parts for Matsushita. These are not under the direct control of Matsushita, and Matsushita has no obligation to them. Below this are a second subsidiary level and countless home workers (*naishoku*). In addition, outside companies are contracted for special jobs, such as guards, janitor service, telephone operators, and so forth. In all, there are approximately 300,000 workers in Matsushita's productive network; Matsushita exploits them all but has paternalistic obligations to only a few. As one descends the scale, working conditions, wages, and job security worsen.

In this way, by exploiting the members of the working class in different ways, by granting privileges to some and withholding them from others, Matsushita and other capitalists create a discriminatory system designed to maximize profit and minimize the risk of loss. The features that permit the construction of this system are the basic features of capitalism itself: the ability of the capitalist class to restrict access to the means of production and the existence of a surplus laboring population, which ensures that the bargaining position of labor will be weak. At the core of this surplus population are the outcastes, who thus are not only the worst victims of the exploitative system but also form one of the tools for its construction.

The educational system is intimately tied into this status structure. The tendency of change in the content of education during the counterrevolutionary postwar period has been away from the sort of education that creates independent, critically thinking individuals and toward the sort of education that creates loyal workers for capitalist enterprise. The educational system also sorts out the youth, assigning each his future status in the employment structure. This is done as early as elementary school, when the students are assigned to one of five grades. Only the highest two will receive, in middle school, the sort of education that will enable them to progress to high school, to the university, and then on to the better jobs. The education of the lower three grades will stop with middle school, and they will thereby be confined to the lower levels of the employment structure. The relationship of the educational system and the discriminatory wage system is diagramed in Figure 2. Children from the ghetto typically are in the lowest grades in school



Figure 2. Japanese educational system and employment structure. (Source: Tokita 1969:296).

and are thereby confined, even without considering the discriminatory barriers in employment, to the lower levels of the employment structure.

Summing up the Marxist position, we may say that Japanese capitalism, far from being viewed as incompatible with the existence of outcastes, is instead viewed as indissolubly bound up with the ghetto. In the prewar period, the absolutist emperor system, the semifeudal status system, and the authoritarian educational system are all seen as serving to reinforce status discrimination, that in turn is seen as the foundation upon which the exploitation of peasant and worker alike was based. In the postwar period, although the ideological superstructure seems rational and not conducive to status discrimination, in fact the capitalist system itself produced and reproduced the objective conditions upon which status discrimination is based, while at the same time utilizing status discrimination to strengthen its own system of exploitation.

Because, in the Marxist analysis, capitalism itself is responsible for the ghetto, the recent (post-1959) high economic growth of the Japanese economy is viewed as only rearranging the form of discrimination. Since about 1959, the so-called labor shortage has developed. This in fact is merely a shortage of certain forms of labor, most important, young and therefore cheap labor. Faced with the prospect of the drying up of the pool of surplus labor, the capitalist class, through its executive agent the state, has embarked upon policies designed to recreate this surplus population. The most important of these policies are the modernization (*kindaika*) policies. There are two aspects to the modernization policies.

The first is the reformulation of agrarian policy. In 1960 the provisions of the postwar land reform law were changed to permit the emergence of larger agricultural units. The smaller farmers, unable to compete, were forced to sell their farms and enter the industrial reserve army.

The second aspect is the encouragement of the collapse of smaller enterprises. Whereas those enterprises allied with the larger enterprises are given government assistance to modernize their equiment, the rest are allowed to go bankrupt. The owners and workers of the bankrupt enterprises are unable to enter the large companies as permanent employees and so they must join the ranks of the industrial reserve army.

The significance of these modernization policies for the maintenance of the outcaste communities is twofold. On the one hand, a portion of the surplus laboring population moves into the ghettos and slums, thereby perpetuating and enlarging them. On the other hand, outcaste enterprises and farms are typically very small scale, and outcastes are usually employed in the smaller enterprises. They are therefore hardest hit by the modernization policies of the ruling class.

When the effect of these modernization policies is added to the increased differentials of wealth resulting from economic growth (the rich get richer and the poor stay poor), the result is a widening of the objective discrimination against the outcastes.

The policy implication of the Marxist view, briefly, is that a socialist revolution is an essential precondition for the solution of the outcaste problem. Although determined political struggle by the liberation movement may force concessions from the government that may ameliorate conditions somewhat, the problem itself cannot be solved as long as its cause, class rule, remains. For this reason, the liberation struggle must be waged in unity and solidarity with the other struggles of the Japanese working class.

The Marxists are severely critical of the government interpretation. The Marxist argument is that the government errs when it relates the persistence of status discrimination to the dual structure and the undeveloped state of Japanese capitalism because it is in capitalist exploitation itself that the explanation of social discrimination must be sought.

The government is further criticized for saying that the outcaste problem is the problem of a part of the Japanese people because in fact status discrimination, by supporting capitalist exploitation, is the problem of all Japanese. The existence of underpaid and underemployed outcastes acts to lower wage levels and living standards for the entire Japanese working class. By contrasting outcastes with the rest of Japanese society, the government ignores the problem of poverty and discrimination outside the ghetto.

In the realm of policy, the government's integration policy is criticized as an effort to twist the liberation struggle for the benefit of monopoly capital. The modernization policies of the government are destroying ghetto industries, except for one favored part, which is supported in order to corrupt and coopt the outcaste leadership. The government says it will help the employees of ruined businesses transfer to the modern sector, but because the ghetto people are still confined to the lowest level of the modern industrial occupational structure, such a policy merely benefits and provides cheap labor for big business. In the field of education, the government's integration education (*dōwa kyōiku*) is confined to producing capable and loyal workers.[7] By demanding that education be kept "neutral," integration education excludes the development of critically thinking individuals.

class basis of the conflicting interpretations

The conflicting interpretations of the government and the Marxists with reference to this pressing social problem are neither accidental nor purely academic and theoretical. These opposing views have very direct political and social significance because they reflect the conflicting interests of the two opposing classes of modern society, bourgeoisie and proletariat.

This assertion may strike the reader as odd, or even naive, for, although it may be readily conceded that the government view reflects the interests of Japanese monopoly capital, the link between the Marxist view and the working class is less obvious. It is necessary, therefore, to examine more carefully the relationship between economic class and political ideology. We may discuss this relationship by examining three things: the degree to which a given ideology is in fact held by members of a class, the degree to which the specialists developing an ideology are drawn from a particular class, and, finally, the manner in which

the perception of social reality is structured in such a way as to further the interests of a class, that is, the objective correspondence between ideology and class interest.

Looking first at the relationship between the government view and the bourgeoisie, it is clear, I think, that to the extent that capitalists hold either of these views (rather than various "folk" views), it is the government view, not the Marxist view, that is held. It is not claimed, however, that the authors of the government position are themselves bourgeois in their class background, or that they are consciously attempting to further the interests of monopoly capital. What makes the government ideologues the "representatives" of the bourgeoisie is neither affection nor background, but rather the objective link between ideology and class interest. Taking the existing status quo as a given, the government solutions to social problems cannot challenge this status quo but instead must reinforce it. As Marx pointed out:

> The peculiar character of Social-Democracy is epitomised in the fact that democratic-republican institutions are demanded not as a means of doing away with both the extremes, capital and wage labour, but of weakening their antagonism and transforming it into harmony. However different the means proposed for the attainment of this end may be, however much it may be trimmed with more or less revolutionary notions, the content remains the same. This content is the transformation of society in a democratic way, but a transformation within the bounds of the petty bourgeoisie. Only one must not form the narrow-minded notion that the petty bourgeoisie, on principle, wishes to enforce an egoistic class interest. Rather, it believes that the *special* conditions of its emancipation are the *general* conditions under which modern society can alone be saved and the class struggle avoided. Just as little must one imagine that the democratic representatives are all shopkeepers or enthusiastic champions of shopkeepers. According to their education and their individual position they may be separated from them as widely as heaven from earth. What makes them representatives of the petty bourgeoisie is the fact that in their minds they do not go beyond the limits which the latter do not go beyond in life, that they are consequently driven theoretically to the same tasks and solutions to which material interest and social position practically drive the latter. This is in general the relationship of the *political and literary representatives* of a class to the class that they represent (from The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in Tucker 1972: 461–462).

The link between the bourgeoisie as a class and bourgeois ideology, then, rests upon a demonstration that the latter furthers the interests of the former. Such a demonstration is simple enough. First, the government does not challenge the existing system or pose alternatives to it. Second, the government sees the outcaste problem as a problem for the outcastes. The victims of status discrimination are seen as the outcastes, rather than the Japanese working class as a whole. Third, the government position sees the cause of the problem as external to the existing social order, capitalism. Because outcastism is seen as a feudal remnant, capitalism need bear no responsibility for it. The status quo is thereby legitimated. Finally, the government analysis legitimizes the economic policies favored by the Japanese bourgeoisie because the outcaste problem is to be solved by high economic growth. In all of this, the position articulated by the government fulfills the function of a *theodicy,* as described by Weber (1963), in providing an explanation of the inequities of life, an explanation, moreover, that serves to legitimate rather than challenge the status quo.

The Marxist position, by contrast, meets this problem of theodicy in the opposite way. The inequities of this life are explained in such a way as to place the blame for them squarely on the existing social order, which is thereby delegitimized as an unjust order. Status discrimination and impoverished living conditions result from the conscious policies of specific human agencies, the Japanese ruling class. Resistance, revolution, and the attempt to build a socialist society are thereby legitimated. Clearly, the Marxist position is antibourgeois. But does this mean, ipso facto, that it represents the class interests of the proletariat? Obviously, one cannot take at face value the claims of Marxists to "represent" the working class, any more than we would take at face value government denials of acting in the interests of monopoly capital. What, then, is the relationship between the working class and its political and ideological representatives?

The situation here is subtle and complex, more so, in fact, than the relationship between

the bourgeoisie and its representatives. For while it is clear that the interests of the bourgeoisie lie in preserving the existing system, the interests of the proletariat in overthrowing the system are less clear. This, of course, is the crux of the matter, and unfortunately there is no easy way of resolving this problem. As Marx recognized as early as 1844, one cannot simply ask the workers what their interests are:

> It is not a matter of what this or that proletarian or even the proletariat as a whole *picture* at present as its goal. It is a matter of *what the proletariat is in actuality* and what, in accordance with this *being,* it will historically be compelled to do. Its goal and its historical action are prefigured in the most clear and ineluctable way in its own life-situation as well as in the whole organization of contemporary bourgeois society. There is no need to harp on the fact that a large part of the English and French proletariat is already *conscious* of its historic task and is continually working to bring this consciousness to full clarity (from The Holy Family, in Tucker 1972:105–106).

But while it may not be absolutely essential to the resolution of the problem, it is nevertheless worthwhile to examine the extent to which the Marxist position is held by workers and outcastes and to look at the social background of the Marxist scholars.

As stressed earlier, these are both elite views, held by opposing groups of ideological specialists and not necessarily by the masses, who tend either to be unconcerned with the problem or to hold one or another of the folk views on the nature of outcastism. However, it is clear that a general Marxian, or socialist, world view has considerable support within the working class, more, in fact, than the conservative, procapitalist position. Thus, for example, while a 1968 survey showed more support among voters in general for the ruling (and conservative) Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (48.2 percent) than for the various socialist parties (29.79—22.1 percent for the Japan Socialist Party [JSP], 4.1 percent for the Democratic Socialist Party [DSP], and 3.5 percent for the Japan Communist Party [JCP]), it also showed that among workers the socialist parties enjoy more support than the LDP. This varies with the category of worker: for blue-collar workers, 25.5 percent support the LDP, whereas 45.9 percent support the socialist parties (34.7 percent—JSP, 6.6 percent—DSP, and 4.6 percent—JCP), for sales and service workers, 36.0 percent support the LDP whereas 43.0 percent support the socialist parties (31.6 percent—JSP, 5.3 percent—DSP, 6.1 percent—JCP), and for white-collar workers, 30.8 percent support the LDP, whereas 50.0 percent support the socialist parties (39.1 percent—JSP, 4.5 percent—DSP, 6.4 percent—JCP; Watanuki 1973:124). Although these figures do not, of course, refer to ideas on the outcaste problem, they do indicate widespread support of socialist ideas among the Japanese working class.

This also holds true for the outcaste population. The greater number of outcastes simply do not want to think about the problem and wish that it would go away. Among those who do think about the problem and who are politically active, the Marxist position is widespread. But here there is an intense political and ideological struggle. Firm evidence here is lacking, but it does appear that the pro-Marxist faction is more deeply rooted in the outcaste working class, whereas a progovernment position appears to be rooted in the outcaste middle class of small businessmen and landlords.

Concerning the social background of the Marxian specialists, my data are unfortunately fragmentary and impressionistic, but I think it is safe to say that the leadership of the Kenkyujō includes people of middle class background as well as outcastes and people of working class origin.

Thus, although the data are by no means as firm as one would like, there does appear to be a link between Marxian ideology and the Japanese working class. The link indicated by electoral support and social backgrounds of the Marxian ideological specialists is insufficient in itself to justify the assertion that Marxism reflects the interests of the working class. This assertion must ultimately rest on other grounds.

The central consideration must involve an evaluation of Marxian ideology itself. Does Marxism provide a "true" picture of the direction of social change in the modern world and

of the role of the working class in that change? If so, the assertion that Marxism represents the interests of the working class makes sense; otherwise, it does not. We may note three possibilities.

The first is that Marxism is false, but that it nevertheless is a working-class ideology in the same sense that Sōka Gakkai or any "other worldly" world view is. Marxism, in other words, represents "utopian" thinking in Mannheim's (1936:40) sense: precisely because it misunderstands the present and pictures an impossible future, Marxism is able to function as an opiate for the workers. Marxism, in short, is simply the latest variant of a long series of essentially false world views that have risen among the intelligentsia and spread among the lower classes.

The second possibility is that Marxism is false and that it represents not merely a harmless utopia of an oppressed group, but rather the ideology of a new group aspiring to rule. Marxists, or Communists, in this view, are a new group of exploiters who use Marxism as an ideology in Mannheim's (1936:40) sense, to legitimize their rise to power and their exercise of power. Marxism therefore represents the interests not of the workers, but of a new elite of exploiters. This view, it may be noted, does not depend on a demonstration that Marxists are themselves consciously trying to deceive the workers. They may be well-meaning people who honestly believe what they are saying. What is important, however, is not their motives or consciousness but the objective consequences of their actions.

The third possibility, which I feel is the correct one, is that Marxism does indeed provide a generally correct picture of the nature of modern society and of the probable future course of social change. The working class, in this view, is indeed exploited and oppressed under capitalism but does have the potential, under the leadership of a Marxist party, to overthrow capitalism and build a socialist society from which the evils of capitalism will have been eliminated. If such is the case, then Marxism must be said to represent the interests of the working class, quite irrespective of whether or not workers in fact hold this political ideology, irrespective of the social background of the ideological specialists espousing Marxism, and irrespective of the motives of individual Marxists.

A judgment about the class basis of these opposing interpretations of the outcaste problem, then, must ultimately rest upon one's judgment of the validity of the Marxian world view itself. This question is central, but it is also a question that cannot be resolved in any simple way. My concern here is less to convince others of the correctness of the Marxian world view (which is obviously unlikely in a short paper) than to convince other anthropologists of the necessity to investigate the issues raised by Marxian socialism in an open, scientific manner. As Einstein (1949) has observed, "clarity about the aims and problems of socialism is of greatest significance in our age of transition."

concluding remarks

Traditionally, anthropologists have studied dead, dying, or doomed cultures. Such study has grown out of our distinct anthropological perspective, which seeks to understand the full variety of the human experience as it has been lived in various ways in various societies. Anthropological research played a key role in overcoming misconceptions about the nature of "primitive" or "savage" society and in developing an appreciation of the validity of diverse life-styles.

We must ask, however, whether it is not time for anthropologists to shift their primary concern from the dissection of a dying world to the understanding of the birth pangs of a new world struggling to be born. Fully one-third of our species now lives in societies that are consciously attempting to build socialism. Further, many of the peoples who were formerly objects of anthropological inquiry are now in rebellion against Western imperialism, and these rebellions are legitimated in terms of Marxian socialism.

All this adds up to an anthropological problem of the first order. Just as the earlier systematic misunderstanding and denigration of "primitive" and "savage" life-styles stimulated anthropological research into alien cultures, so the systematic misunderstanding and denigration of communist and revolutionary movements throughout the world should stimulate anthropological research to clarify the issues presently faced by our species. These are global issues of world historic importance. They are also issues that penetrate into the microcosm of daily life and social interaction in the smallest contemporary human community. This consideration makes the task of the modern urban ethnographer somewhat more complex than that of traditional practitioners of the craft. Because the natives are confronting the issues posed by the struggle between capitalism and socialism, the ethnographer must also attempt to do so. One would expect, therefore, that ethnographers would have carefully considered this issue, so central to the lives of the natives. But one does not find, anywhere in the literature of our discipline, any serious consideration of Marxian ideas on socialism. One must conclude, therefore, that the rejection of the socialist vision of the future by contemporary anthropology is the result of enculturation, not of sober scientific inquiry. In a word, it is ethnocentric.

To conclude, I reiterate Malinowski's dictum, the necessity to "grasp the native's point of view." The fact that our "natives" have become "communists" does not relieve us of this responsibility. As we attempt to fulfill our responsibility, more and more of us may find what I found in Kyoto: that our rebellious "natives" possess a social science more powerful and more profound than what we learned in graduate school.

notes

[1] This is a revised version of a paper prepared for the symposium "Social, Cultural, and Political Groups and Categories in Industrialized Societies" at the 75th Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association, Washington, D.C., November 19, 1976 and represents an expansion of Chapter Nine of my doctoral dissertation, "The Political Economy of the Japanese Ghetto" (Columbia University, 1971). I would like to thank the following: (1) the National Institute of Mental Health, which supported the field research in Japan through a Graduate Fellowship (#5 FO1 MH 29, 319-02 CUAN) and Training Grant (MH-11480-01) from June 1968 through November 1969; (2) my dissertation sponsor, Morton H. Fried, and the members of my dissertation committee, Conrad Arensberg, Koya Azumi, Myron Cohen, and James Nakamura, for their advice and encouragement; (3) Professor Kazukimi Ebuchi of Fukuoka Kyōiku Daigaku, for his hospitality and guidance during my stay in Japan; (4) the staff of the Buraku Mondai Kenkyujō, especially Dr. Takashi Tōjō and Messrs. Tetsuo Okuyama, Ryōhei Kajimoto, and Mineo Okuyama; (5) Mr. Hidekazu Nakajima, who introduced me to Nanajō Buraku; (6) Mr. Teruyuki Takashima, who clarified my understanding of the Marxist interpretation of Japanese society; (7) the Editor of the *American Ethnologist,* Richard G. Fox, for his encouragement and advise in the development of this paper in its present form; and (8) our Departmental Secretary, Mrs. Laurie Simms, for the speed, accuracy, and cheerfulness with which she typed the manuscript of this and other papers.

[2] In the most influential American book on Japanese outcastes, the Marxian interpretation is simply dismissed as "a somewhat dogmatic political theory," "of questionable validity," "heavily biased by an interpretation of history in terms of a political variant of the Marxian dialectics of class struggle" (DeVos and Wagatsuma 1966:10–11). Although this book contains no systematic discussion of Marxism, its authors have allowed it to be advertised as "a challenging critique of Marxian class theory" (DeVos and Wagatsuma 1966: book jacket). DeVos and Wagatsuma's own interpretation of outcastism in Japan focuses on psychocultural factors and asserts that the "concept of caste remains a social force because it exists in the emotional structure of individual Japanese" (1966:xxi). The policy implications of this view are dismal: "The answer to the outcaste problem in society . . . depends ultimately on moral maturation" (DeVos and Wagatsuma 1966:383).

[3] Modern Japanese outcastes (*burakumin*) are descended from the untouchable *eta* caste of the Tokugawa period. The caste has grown, both numerically and proportionately, in the modern period, and today there are nearly three million outcastes living in over five thousand outcaste ghettos (*buraku*) scattered throughout Japan. These range in size from a few households in the rural areas to several thousand in the larger urban ghettos. These ghettos are characterized by slumlike conditions, overcrowding, substandard sanitation, unemployment, underemployment, marginal occupations, low income, and high rates of welfare. The outcastes are viewed with fear and reprehension by majority Japanese and are subject to discriminatory barriers in education, employment, marriage, and socioeconomic mobility. Decades of militant struggle by the outcaste liberation movement (the prewar

Suiheisha and the postwar Buraku Kaihō Dōmei) have called worldwide attention to the outcaste problem. The Japanese government has responded by initiating integration policies (*dōwa taisaku*) that have provided modest but real benefits to the outcastes, in the form of improved public sanitation, urban renewal projects, and improved education and job training.

There are a variety of folk beliefs about the outcastes, and the outcaste themselves have a variety of vsiews about their position in Japanese society. Such views have been discussed elsewhere (DeVos and Wagatsuma 1966; Ninomiya 1933) and will not be considered in this paper.

The discussion of the government's view is based upon the Report of the Deliberative Council (Dōwa Taisaku Shingikai 1965). The presentation of the Marxist view is based upon interviews and various published material (Inoue 1959; Buraku Mondai Kenkyūjo 1968, 1969; Mahara 1969a, 1969b; Tokita 1969).

Although it is valid to speak of the Marxist perspective of the Buraku Mondai Kenkyūjo in opposition to the perspective of the Japanese government, it must be noted that there is considerable ideological diversity within Marxism and that there are opposing Marxist points of view. This is a true in Japan as in the international arena. The Marxist point of view that I am presenting is that of the Buraku Mondai Kenkyūjo in 1968–1969, when I did my fieldwork. Already at that time, however, there were divisions within the Buraku Kaihō Dōmei, the outcaste liberation league, and in the liberation struggle generally, chiefly between factions associated with the Japan Communist Party (JCP) and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). The Buraku Mondai Kenkyūjo was linked to the JCP faction. Shortly before my departure, a rival Kenkyūjo was established in Osaka, and I am told that the situation has become more complex and difficult since 1969. For a discussion of recent developments in the liberation struggle, see Wagatsuma (1976).

It has been suggested that I am biased in favor of the Marxist position. Perhaps this is true, for a discussion of any topic necessarily involves the author's judgment and emphases, but in the present case, I have tried to present the essentials of the two views as faithfully as possible. More space is devoted to the Marxist position because it is more complex and requires more space. Further, the Marxian view of the origin and development of caste systems in Japan in relation to changing systems of class rule has, I believe, considerable comparative significance for understanding caste systems elsewhere, as in India. Most scholars agree, I think, that the Marxian analysis is the stronger of the two. For my own views of the outcaste problem, see Ruyle 1978. For Marxist interpretations of Japanese society, see Halliday (1975) and Halliday and McCormack (1973).

[4] This "dual structure" theory appears to have been taken from Western economic thought. It was originally developed by Boeke (1953) to apply to underdeveloped nations but has since been applied to Japan by a variety of writers (for example, Levine 1965; Watanabe 1965).

[5] These romanizations follow the *furigana* in *Simplified Ghetto History* (Buraku Mondai Kenkyūjo 1968:25) and indicate contemporary pronunciation of the characters. The terms were pronounced differently during the Nara period.

[6] There is considerable diversity of opinion on the nature of the Meiji Restoration, both within Marxism and between Marxists and non-Marxists. For fuller discussions, see Craig (1961), Dower (1975), Halliday (1975), Norman (1940), and Yasuba (1975).

[7] The following illustration of the different interpretations of the government and the Marxists of the same event may be useful. When an outcaste youth recently graduated from high school was refused employment by a major firm because of his outcaste background, the youth found another equally good job elsewhere. In the assimilation view of the government, this indicated a success, because the youth had sufficient skills that he did not need to work where he was not wanted. In the Marxist view, this indicates a failure, for the youth was afraid to oppose the discriminatory company and fight the system of discrimination; instead he found a purely individualistic solution to a social problem. For a fuller discussion of *dōwa kyoikū,* see DeVos and Wagatsuma (1966:99–109), Ruyle (1973).

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