The evacuation efforts of the fire were conducted primarily by Oakland and Berkeley police officers. The areas that were identified for evacuation were expansive and large because there was no assurance that the fire could be stopped or that the wind would continue to push it in the same direction.  In fact, the evacuation effort ended up moving 20,000 to 30,000 people out of the Oakland hills. Unfortunately, 25 people perished in the fire because of its rapid speed and strength.
    
    The fire efforts in this event were mostly in disarray because of the many communication problems that resulted from the main fire command center. The fire company officers did report that their efforts were most successful when they could group several companies together and make a coordinated effort to save homes. The problem with this scenario was that there were so many flare-ups it was hard getting companies together to make a coordinated effort to save homes, in conjunction with the many communication problems.

    The most significant factor that should be recognized from this incident is that the fire was beyond the capability of fire suppression forces to control. Even if the Oakland Fire Department did not have communication problems or bottlenecks, the situation still would have been dangerous. The conditions on October 20, 1991 were so prime for a nasty wildfire that virtually no measures would have helped in mitigating the extent of this fire.
   
    The biggest lesson that was learned in this fire is that mitigation factors should be enacted well before an event like this happens. Things like clearing of dead wood, cutting of tall grass and brush and regular controlled burns should be a regular occurrence in areas that are susceptible to raging wildfires. The second biggest lesson that was learned is that there should be an efficient fire communications center, where different elements are instructing different agencies to their job and helping those agencies communicate information with one another. There should also be adequate access to roadways for emergency vehicles and exit roadways for residents. Transportation out of the Oakland hills contributed to traffic jams and roadblocks that inhibited the fire fighting effort.  The fire departments in Oakland, Berkeley and all surrounding areas provided a valuable lesson by demonstrating the need for risk assessment and planning for disasters that overwhelm emergency response systems.
   
    There were many other elements that the Oakland fire department has learned as a result of the 1991 Oakland hills fire. An especially important element was the provision for adequate water storage and distribution systems for fire protection services. There were water issues in the 1991 fires that resulted in complications for many of the engine companies in fighting the fire to its full potential. There must also be modern communication equipment in place in order for there to be a sufficient attempt at fighting the fire.
   
    The Oakland fires of 1991 taught the firefighting community a lot about mitigating hazards to the public. The main issue of mitigating wildfire danger deals with building dense settlements in wildfire prone areas. The denser the settlements in these areas, the more powerful and fast moving these fires will become as the houses act as fuel for the fire.  Clearing dry brush, dead wood and using controlled burns are also methods of mitigating against wildfire disaster. An efficient communication system must also be in place in order to handle the vast responsibilities of directing different agencies to their respective locations in the event of another major wildfire. The firefighting community has learned many lessons since the Oakland 1991 fires.
 

    Numerous professional and journalistic assessments were conducted after the East Bay Hills fire, as were those by governmental agencies. A Task Force on Emergency Preparedness and Community Restoration, made up of city and county officials, utilities, university faculty, local businesses, and representatives of the fire victims, was established by the mayors of Oakland and Berkeley a week after the fire. “This group was given eight weeks to prepare a detailed report that would guide recovery of the burned area and would protect other parts of the East Bay Hills” (Mitchell, 1999).

Source: Task Force on Emergency Preparedness (1992) as summarized in Blakely (1991). Status based on estimates by Mitchell, 1999.

   In 1993, Oakland voters approved an Oakland Hills Fire Prevention and Suppression Benefit Assessment District.  The district includes all of the hill areas in the city of Oakland.  Each of the 20,000 real estate parcels included in the district will be assessed initially at US$75 per year, with a potential increase to a maximum of US$300 per year.  "This revenue will be used primarily for reducing the amounts of hazardous fuels on public and private lands; among other means, they will continue to employ herds goats to graze public lands within the district.  The program will fund inspections of private lands to ascertain violations of the Uniform Fire Code and will generally strengthen the capability of Oakland to combat urban/wildland fires" (Topping, 1992) as cited in (Mitchell, 1999).