VOL. LIV, NO. 116
California State University, Long Beach May 11, 2004
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Our View: Mission in Iraq must survive

The recent revelations of prisoner abuses and outright war crimes in Iraq have led all observers to wonder how and when, if ever, America can be viewed as a benevolent power in the Middle East. Commentators and lawmakers have speculated despondently that we can only hope that by imposing a fitting punishment on those responsible and by making a thousand gestures of goodwill we will be forgiven in the eyes of the region’s people.

It is true that such measures are necessary to disinfect the poisoned atmosphere created by the images. And inarguably, the situation and its resolution have major implications for the future success of U.S. policy in the area.

But ultimately, America’s reputation is a long-term issue that will be only marginally affected by the atrocities committed by a few Americans. For as bad as America must now appear to the region’s people, this anger will probably seem paltry if compared with the fury that will proliferate should America’s mission in Iraq fail, leaving a savage and unsustainable state behind.

A comparison of the consequences of the Abu Ghraib depravities with the consequences of leaving behind a fractured Iraq bears out this point. For example, it seems to be a foregone conclusion that the atrocities will inspire many more Iraqis to take up arms against coalition forces. Obviously, this translates to more coalition casualties and a slower pace of reconstruction. It does not, however, translate directly to the failure of the mission.

Similarly, the tortures, rapes and murders at Abu Ghraib will probably cause Iraqis to be somewhat less willing to cooperate with the coalition’s security and reconstruction efforts. But it will not result in a wholesale loss of partners in the country. Jobs with the nascent Iraqi police and military forces are abundantly available, and a satisfactory number of people will still be willing to fill them in order to feed their families.

There are less tangible effects as well. America has lost the moral high ground on insurgents such as those who desecrated the bodies of four civilian contractors in Fallouja last month. Any trend toward heightened regional backing from such nearby states as Iran, Syria and Jordan, both with respect to Iraq and to the worldwide war on terror, has likely been stifled.

But with a few limited exceptions, the fallout only affects the mission itself. The repercussions of a failed mission in Iraq, however, would be far reaching. Obviously, failure would create a power vacuum that would be a prime breeding ground for terrorists.

Democracy would be almost impossible to achieve in a climate of fear and destruction, so eventually a prominent figure would manage to consolidate enough popular and armed support to take power. It is almost certain that such a leader would be hostile to U.S. interests — otherwise, this leader would not have support in the first place. Also, this leader would likely represent Shia aspirations. Discontent with such representation would follow, along with terrorism, civil war and a literal division of the country into Shia, Sunni and Kurdish sectors.

Iraq’s economy would probably atrophy horrifically, leading to archaic living conditions reminiscent, and probably far worse, than those experienced during 13 years of U.N. and U.S. sanctions.

Continued support for the mission does not mean ignoring the fact that success in Iraq faces many hurdles. Troop levels are insufficient, as is the equipment given to the forces already in the theater. Screening of ex-Baathists and even insurgents in the effort to recruit independent Iraqi security force members is proving quite difficult, and could backfire tremendously if not done right. And the occupation has become enormously expensive, with another $25 billion appropriation request now on the table.

But all of these problems existed prior to the disclosure of the prison crimes. The coalition must not succumb to the specter of defeatism; it must remain focused on its overarching objective, that being the stability of Iraq. While it is true that prison atrocities have caused a great deal of harm to American prestige, failing in Iraq would be the greatest atrocity of all, one that might never be forgiven.

 

 

 


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