Our
View: Coalition wise to challenge Sadr
Last
week in Iraq the United States announced
plans to arrest a Shia cleric, Muqtada Sadr,
on charges of involvement in last year's
assassination of a moderate Shia cleric.
The arrest warrant, combined with a new
coalition offensive following the killing
and mutilation of four American civilian
contractors, has provoked ferocious uprisings
throughout the country by previously peaceful
Shias. Scores of coalition soldiers have
died since in the fighting.
An
impulse arises that America should not have
sought to arrest Sadr in the first place.
His following was relatively minor to begin
with, and the warrant only seems to have
galvanized support for him. The insurgency
has in the process gained a more diverse
makeup, since it previously consisted mainly
of the minority Sunni Muslim population.
A
necessary decision
Nonetheless,
it was correct to issue the warrant for
several reasons. For one, the coalition
simply wants to bring the cleric in for
questioning. His refusal to submit to interrogation
is a direct affront the coalition's temporary
authority.
Second,
attempting to placate a violent movement
sets a dangerous precedent. It suggests
that the coalition is not willing to make
unpopular decisions. It says that if a person
commands a sizable following, that person
is above the law. Clearly such a situation
would not be amenable to the coalition's
goal of liberal democracy in Iraq.
Similarly,
Sadr had assembled a standing militia. No
aspiring democracy can allow such forces
to exist. A standing militia not sponsored
by the government, ready to exercise force
if events should arise with which it disagrees,
is an idea inimically opposed to the creation
of a stable society that honors the rule
of law.
We
currently are seeing the consequences of
appeasing such militias in Afghanistan.
Numerous warlords exercise virtual autonomy
over various portions of the country, and
they, like Sadr, have loyal followings and
standing militias. Attempting to arrest
any of these warlords would almost certainly
result in unrest and bloodshed.
But
the alternative -- letting warlords roam
free -- is to accept stagnation and even
regression. In Afghanistan, the status quo
impedes the development of the central government.
Many of the warlords do not funnel any tax
revenue to the central government nor do
they concede that the central government
has any jurisdiction over them or the people
of their region. As a consequence, Afghanistan
at present is little more than a collection
of fiefdoms. Unfortunately, there is not
currently a military presence in Afghanistan
capable of taking on the warlords.
In
Iraq, however, such a force does exist.
The coalition realized it would likely face
a far greater challenge if it had tolerated
Sadr's violent rhetoric for fear of upsetting
the populace. As Sadr's power grew, the
coalition would have appeared ever meeker.
Insurgents would have been emboldened and
any eventual response by the coalition would
have been seen as an act of desperation.
Similarly,
allowing the cleric to further empower himself
while the government stabilized would amount
to delaying an inevitable confrontation
with the coalition or passing the buck to
the future Iraqi government. It would force
the coalition or this government to one
day deal with an even stronger Sadr-led
movement that might seriously and violently
oppose the new government. The coalition's
generals in Iraq rightly saw that to not
pay some price now might mean paying everything
later.
A
delicate position
With
Sadr now holed up in a holy Shia mosque
in Najaf, the coalition must tread lightly
and remember its priorities. Sadr must be
brought in for questioning with respect
to last year's killing of the moderate cleric
and must also be convinced to disband his
militia. But his capture does not warrant
a pell-mell rush into the third holiest
Muslim city in the world and the accompanying
potential damage to hallowed shrines. The
coalition has demonstrated its resolve and
now must prove that it is also willing to
negotiate in good faith.
In the end, the Sadr situation is a microcosm
of the dilemma facing the coalition in Iraq.
The coalition must provide security for
itself and the Iraqi people without stirring
up the type of resistance that will make
security impossible. And so as the iron
fist of troop levels increases over the
coming months, the coalition had better
invest in a lot more velvet gloves.
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