Aristotle was the pre-eminent theorist on
rhetoric in his time and he still is in our own. Students of rhetoric should
understand the following based on a reading of the course text:
1. What are the uses of rhetoric?
2. What is the definition of rhetoric?
3. What is the difference between an artistic and an
in-artistic proof?
4. What are the parts of ethos?
5. What is the difference between inductive and deductive
logic?
6. What is an argument from sign?
7. What are the three kinds of deductive syllogisms?
8. What is the difference between a syllogism and an
enthymeme?
9. In terms of organization, what are the major divisions
of a speech?
10. What are the constituents of epideictic, deliberative,
and forensic form?
11. What does Aristotle believe good style to be?
12. What does he say about delivery?
You will realize
by now that I have not posted a question on pathos, which I believe to
be Aristotle's most complicated proof (or strategy). Instead the following
essay examines pathos in depth.
Understanding
the Pathe' of Aristotle A Sample from Communication
Criticism by Craig Smith
On Monday, September 5,1983, President Ronald Reagan delivered an address from the Oval Office of the White House over national television and radio beginning at 8 p.m. Eastern Standard Time. The twenty minute speech was a response to the Soviet attack on an "unarmed Korean passenger plane." 269 lives were lost, among them were Americans, including a conservative Democratic Congressman from Georgia.
Like many other Presidential speeches, this one could be analyzed from several perspectives. It has epideictic, forensic, and deliberative elements.59 Its use of evidence, argument, and style is judicious. Its positive effect in terms the President's poll ratings could be explained.60
But our aim here is to focus on criticism of the pathe' to discover if our earlier analysis is useful in understanding the strategies used in the speech. While the judgments we make in this study might prove useful to other critical studies of the address, particularly Burkean or situational analyses, our goal is exclusively to explore the hermeneutic interpretation of Aristotle's pathe' as deepened by Heidegger.
Before examining the text of the address, Aristotle instructs the critic to determine the state of mind of the audience. Reagan's speech is complicated by the fact that it was addressed to several audiences; the Soviet leadership, the community of nations, and the American public. Due to space limitations, we will only apply the lessons of part one of this article to the American audience.
Functioning as jury of the alleged Soviet crime, the American public had been deluged with news stories and editorials from the moment of the discovery of the atrocity to the moment the President began his address. All through the week proceeding the speech news media ran lead stories revealing more details about the tragedy. Transcripts of the Soviet pilot's description of his missile launch, and the Korean pilot's response, put readers into the cockpits of the plane; pieces of the 747 and clothing from the passengers recovered by the Japanese rescue crews were highlighted on the evening news. Kathryn McDonald, the wife of the Congressman killed on the plane, gave an angry denunciation of the Soviets while reinforcing her husband's position on foreign policy. He had headed the John Birch Society.
The Russian intransigence, particularly their refusal to admit that the event even occurred, wrankled the American public. Jean Kirkpatrick, American Ambassador to the United Nations, deplored the Soviet Union in a speech that contained the transcript of Russian air-to-ground communications during the shooting. By confronting the stolid Soviet Ambassador on television from the Security Council, Kirkpatrick succeeded in heightening indignation by creating a dramatic setting in which to concentrate attention on the alleged crime.
The critic's next task is to determine toward whom these states of mind are directed. The tragic event and the rhetoric surrounding it had moved the public not only into a heightened sense of awareness about the incident, but likely, had made them angry at the Soviets, sorrowful for the victims, and to some extent, fearful that the Soviets could strike again.
This assessment is supported when the critic tries to discover what the intensity of the public mood was. In terms of temporality, the media worked to keep the crisis fresh in the public consciousness, as did Kirkpatrick at the UN. In terms of distance, the media was able to bring an event that occurred half way around the world into American living rooms. Not only did the public see the wreckage and recovery operation via instantaneous satellite transmission, they also saw cartoon graphics representing the shooting itself. Add to that the fact that Americans were on board the 747, including an elected official of the American government, and the distance involved is greatly reduced.
In terms of presence-absence, the event was made ever-present by the media and the release of the transcripts. The public saw the relatives of the victims and empathized with them. They heard the voices of the participating pilots and the Soviet ground station. And they saw once again their country's most serious adversary, acting as a "powerful rival"; that is to say, becoming again that which is most likely to cause anger and fear in the human soul. (See Part I.) Furthermore, the Soviets intensified this mood with an apparent slight; they did not even acknowledge the event, let alone any guilt for the action taken. ThF41 GIF
A close analysis of the text, reveals that among the options he chooses to exercise, playing on the public mood is a major one. His recitation of the facts, his attribution of motives, and even his diction work to call up the states of mind present in the audiences at the time of the speech.
Let us begin with pity, or more precisely in this case, sympathy. In the first sentence of the address, Reagan refers to the "massacre" of innocent men, women, and children."61 In his second sentence, he labels the central event a "crime against humanity." In his third sentence, he calls for "prayers" for the "victims and their families in their time of terrible grief." In the fourth sentence, he singles out "brave people like Kathryn McDonald," who "moved us all." The fifth sentence talks about those who will be missed, and the sixth about parents losing their daughter and son-in-law. Clearly, the opening of this address intensifies the feeling of sorrow that the public holds for the victims of the tragedy and for their relatives. Reagan's sincere and personal references make the loss fresh in the public mind.
Having established this mood, Reagan calls it up again and again in the address, evidently to support the argumentative structure of the speech. Paragraphs 9, 30, 36, 49, and 63 contain explicit references to the foundation of sympathy built in the opening of the address.
Furthermore, the examination this particular pathe' reveals two other strategies. First, Reagan uses inartistic proofs extensively for support in creating the pathe'. This pattern repeats it self with each pathe' employed. Second, Reagan seeks to reinforce the emotional state with carefully chosen words which are easily identified with the given emotion; "sorrow, innocent babies, families of the killed," to name but three.
The second pathe' invoked in the address is anger. Reagan elicits, directs, and heightens it by describing Soviet actions as arrogant and dishonest. First, he reveals to the audience that the Soviets have killed innocent people before in a similar incident in 1978. Then he attributes hubris to the Soviets. "They have persistently refused to admit that their pilot fired on the Korean aircraft. Indeed, they have not even told their own people that a plane was shot down." He claims the Soviets are spinning a "confused tale," as if they were purposely taunting the world community with their arrogance.
To clarify this situation, Reagan tells the story of what "actually" happened. The narrative is remarkably free of emotional language and that conveys a sense of objectivity. This tactic works neatly to set the stage for the now familiar transcript of the Soviet pilots describing the missile launch. "Those were the voices of the Soviet pilots," Reagan concludes, and returns to the narrative. Thus, where the tale itself and the inartistic proof will sustain audience interest, Reagan does little to interfere.
After he has finished the narrative, he intensifies the indignation by telling the audience that "Soviet military planes are not so equipped [with certain detection devices] because that would make it easier for pilots who might want to defect." He then goes on to reveal that the Soviets are refusing to let search ships into Russian waters, and are harassing the "bereaved families of the Japanese victims," as they sail out to mourn their losses. This description of Soviet hubris is reinforced by an accounting of their worldwide crimes ranging from Polish suppression to "gassing of villages in Afghanistan."
To this midway point in the speech, Reagan has followed Aristotle's formulation for the use of anger closely. But at paragraph 36, out of a total of 76, Reagan stops the development of the pathe'. Ignoring Aristotle's advise concerning revenge, Reagan elevates the motives of his audience: "With our horror and our sorrow, there is a righteous and terrible anger. It would be easy to think in terms of vengeance, but that is not a proper answer. We want justice and action to see that this never happens again."
The intensification of anger in this address is accomplished by the immediacy of the event supported with raw transcripts and by Reagan's ability to recreate the event before the public consciousness. This strategy removes distance from the event while making it timely and present again in the public mind. But Reagan refused to relieve the pain and heighten the pleasure that accompanies thoughts of revenge. Reagan proposes a number of steps none of which in isolation satisfy the rather large problem being addressed nor do they relieve the anger Reagan called up in the first half of the speech.
Whether it was his intention or not, midway through the speech, Reagan leaves his audience in a state of anticipation for what is to follow.
The third major mood in the text is fear. Aristotle claims that we fear the powerful, those that threaten our survival. The Soviets fit the Aristotelian model well given Reagan's portrayal. As early as the sixth paragraph, he describes their wanton actions as a threat to every citizen of the world. He refers to their "inhuman brutality" and malicious nature near the middle of the address. And in the last third, he asks the Congress to "ponder long and hard the Soviets' aggression as they consider the . . . safety of our people."
Reagan uses this pathe' to support his call for a stronger defense posture, particularly the building of an MX missile system. Again, inartistic proof is employed when Reagan quotes Senator Henry Jackson and President John Kennedy. Both were Democrats, both supported strong defense budgets, and with Jackson's recent death, both were venerated by the public.62
Reagan's emphasis on defense in the later paragraph of the speech, turns the audience away from concern for immediate revenge and redirects their sentiments toward a long-range solution, namely a defense build-up. That turn is reinforced by the mid-speech shift away from the alleged crimes and the mood of anger. The long range solution may have been intended to relieve the anticipation created at the juncture.
The use of fear and the leitmotive of sympathy work to move the audience toward Reagan's solution to the problem. The strategic use of these pathe' also reinforces Reagan's conclusion, which, like the midway point, rises above emotions to values:
"Let us have faith in Abraham Lincoln's words, that `right makes might, and in that faith, let us, to the end, dare to do our duty as we understand it.' If we do, if we stand together and move forward with courage, then history will record that some good did come from this monstrous wrong that we will carry with us and remember for the rest of our lives."
The conclusion calls up again the states of mind elicited earlier in the address. The "monstrous wrong" refers not only to the alleged crime committed but to the monster the public is to fear. What "we will carry with us and remember" is the sorrow for those who lost their lives. But the conclusion also links the key claims of the speech: particularly that "right makes might." This and the previous paragraph on the purity of America's motives work to move the audience to a noble vision contrasting with the Soviet vision. Reagan chooses not to seek revenge, but instead uses the emotions he has evoked to support his policy of armament.
END