Some recent commentators have acquiesced in the efforts of some religious groups to co-opt concepts of morality, thus leading many – inappropriately, I believe – to think we must keep all morality out of our civic life and especially out of the reasoning in our legal system. I review examples of the confusion in characterizing the 2003 Lawrence v. Texas decision as a conflict between constitutional rights and religious moral precepts. I argue that this approach capitulates to particular views of morality as religious morality.  I consider the appeals to morality in the dissent and the ensuing confusion among commentators about the significance of this opinion. I review alternate readings of the Lawrence majority opinion, including proposals that it be considered from the perspectives of the ethical frameworks of Locke, Mill, or Kant. Finally, I will compare the language at issue in Lawrence with the Massachusetts Goodridge decision later that year providing for gay marriage, two decisions often linked in the public dialogue.