

## MODE OF PRODUCTION AND MODE OF EXPLOITATION: THE MECHANICAL AND THE DIALECTICAL<sup>1</sup>

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In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.<sup>2</sup>

The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus labor is pumped out of the direct producers, determines the relation of rulers and ruled, as it grows immediately out of production itself and in turn reacts upon it as a determining agent. . . . It is always the direct relation of the owners of the means of production to the direct producers which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden foundation of the entire social structure.<sup>3</sup>

In the first of these two passages, Marx appears to be arguing for the sort of techno-economic determinism which has become increasingly fashionable in bourgeois social science. The second, however, suggests that this is not enough, and points to a dialectical interplay between the mode of production and, as Marx says elsewhere, “the mode . . . in which surplus-labor is . . . extracted from the actual producer, the laborer,”<sup>4</sup> in short, the mode of exploitation. The purpose of this paper is to explore more fully the implications of the second approach, first by critically discussing the “mode of production” concept as it has developed in Marxist social science and

in crypto-Marxist bourgeois social science, and then by exploring the possibilities of supplementing the “mode of production” approach with a “mode of exploitation” analysis.

### THE MODE OF PRODUCTION CONCEPT IN MARXIST SOCIAL SCIENCE

A literal interpretation of the first Marx passage quoted has led to a causal schema in which the progressive development of mankind’s social productive forces is the moving force behind the evolution of new social formations: the forces of production change and the rest of the social order is brought into line with them. As Marx notes, “In broad outlines Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern

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bourgeois modes of production can be designated as progressive epochs in the economic formation of society.”<sup>5</sup>

Such an interpretation is illustrated by the following passage from a recent Soviet textbook:

The nature of production relations determines the economic system of a given society. This economic system is the basis on which the various social relations, ideas and institutions arise, for the mode of production eventually determines all aspects of life in a given society. . . .

Since the basis determines the superstructure, it follows that every change of basis entails a change in superstructure, i.e., in the existing political institutions and ideology. However, the superstructure, though dependent upon the basis, can in turn influence production relations and can either accelerate or delay their replacement.

Every society is thus an integral organism, a socio-economic formation, a definite historical type of society with its own distinctive mode of production, basis and superstructure.<sup>6</sup>

This conceptual schema is open to a variety of criticisms, among the most important of which are the following:

1. Perhaps the most prevalent criticism of the Marxist model by bourgeois social scientists is that it is mechanistic in that it makes little allowance for a reciprocal causation from the superstructure or from consciousness to the economic foundation, and fails to specify the mechanism through which change in one part of the social structure is translated into change in the other parts. This is clearly the case in some variants of Marxism, but it equally clearly was not Marx’s intention, as anyone who has bothered to read the relevant Marxist texts, such as Engels’ 1890 letter to Joseph Bloch, will know.<sup>7</sup>

2. It fails to take into account human volition as an active agent in sociocultural causation and historical change. It is essential to realize that it is not the “mode of production” that determines anything. It is an abstraction that social scientists make in trying to understand the real world. It is not the “mode of production,” “productive forces,” “relations of production,” and “legal and political super-

structures” that are the real actors in history, but men and women — real, live human beings. As Marx and Engels noted in a different context,

*History does nothing*, it “possesses no immense wealth,” it “wages no battles.” It is *man*, real living man, that does all that, that possesses and fights; “history” is not a person apart, using man as a means for its *own* particular aims; history is *nothing but* the activity of man pursuing his aims.<sup>8</sup>

Much the same can be said for the “mode of production.”

3. In 1848, Marx and Engels wrote that:

The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.<sup>9</sup>

To my knowledge, neither Marx nor Engels nor any subsequent Marxist has ever declared this statement “inoperative.” Yet the class struggle as an independent generator of historical change is simply ignored in this interpretation of the mode of production concept. If it is incorporated by stating that class struggles are generated by the relations of production, so that each mode of production has distinctive forms of class struggle associated with it, this simply reduces the class struggle to derivative and epiphenomenal status. The transition from one mode of production to another is seen in the narrow interpretation as resulting from the development of the productive forces, not from the class struggle. This, of course, directly contradicts the *Communist Manifesto*, which sees the class struggle as resulting in “a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.”<sup>10</sup>

4. Finally, the evolutionary typology espoused by this Soviet brand of “Marxism” is clearly inadequate. The unilineal, Eurocentric

model (primitive clan society – slave-owning society – feudal society – capitalist society) simply forces Asian, African, and aboriginal American societies into preconceived slots with little regard for their characteristics and development potential. What are we to make, for example, of a “slave system” which lumps together ancient Sumer, Egypt, and China with the Aztecs, Incas, and the Roman Empire? Or a feudalism that includes the T’ang dynasty in China, the Islamic caliphates, pre-Taika Japan, and medieval Europe?<sup>11</sup> How are we to understand East Asiatic history without understanding the major social changes that occurred during the late T’ang and early Sung dynasties, both “feudal” societies?<sup>12</sup> Surely concepts that can be applied to such diverse societies have lost their specific usefulness for understanding the societies themselves. The addition of an Asiatic mode of production as a parallel evolutionary trajectory may improve the typology, but it too is overly general. Perhaps the incorporation of Trotsky’s “law of uneven and combined development” would transform the typology into a more dialectical and useful one, but it has as yet had no systematic and comprehensive treatment.<sup>13</sup>

There is another, broader interpretation of the mode of production concept, found primarily in the writings of French Marxists. According to Terray, “a mode of production is a three-part system: an economic base, a juridico-political superstructure, and an ideological superstructure. In the final analysis the economic base is the determining factor within this system.”<sup>14</sup> Here the legal, political, and ideological superstructures are included within the mode of production (rather than standing outside of and being determined by it), which becomes a more holistic concept referring to a social formation in its totality. The French Marxists have not proposed any new universal evolutionary typologies, but have directed their work to the intensive analysis of particular modes of production, such as the Asiatic Mode of Production and

the Lineage Mode of Production. Although they appear to put greater stress on the role of ideological features in the maintenance and operation of a particular mode of production, the basic conception of sociocultural causation is the same as in the more mechanistic interpretations, and the criticisms offered above still apply, although in somewhat muted terms.

#### THE MODE OF PRODUCTION CONCEPT IN BOURGEOIS SOCIAL SCIENCE: CULTURAL MATERIALISM

Most schools of bourgeois social science continue to be idealist or eclectic, but there is emerging a “cultural materialist” school within anthropology which draws heavily on the mode of production model given above.<sup>15</sup> The terminology differs, but the basic idea is the same: “Social systems are . . . determined by technological systems, and philosophies and the arts express experience as it is defined by technology and refracted by social systems.”<sup>16</sup>

Although the aims of cultural materialism reflect bourgeois values, its practitioners are usually viewed by other bourgeois social scientists as crypto-Marxists, or worse.<sup>17</sup> For instance, when Betty Meggers attempted to apply this approach to the analysis of some American Indian material, she was castigated by Morris Opler as attempting to peddle “a somewhat shopworn hammer and sickle.”<sup>18</sup>

Perhaps the most systematic and comprehensive work to be written from the cultural materialist perspective is a recent textbook by Gerhard Lenski entitled *Human Societies*.<sup>19</sup> Because it illustrates both the strengths and the weaknesses of the mode of production approach, I will use it as the basis of my criticism.

Although it is more sophisticated, Lenski’s basic model differs little from those cited above:

From an evolutionary perspective, the relationship between technology, social organization, and ideology resembles

the movement of traffic on a two-way street where the flow is heavier in one direction than the other . . . the dominant flow of influence is from technology to social organization and ideology; the flow in the opposite direction is not only less frequent, it is also less important.<sup>20</sup>

Lenski's two-way flow adds a probabilistic, perhaps even dialectical, component,<sup>21</sup> but it is merely dialectical frosting on an essentially mechanistic cake. The criticisms offered above apply equally well here. Further, the triadic reification of sociocultural phenomena makes this model, like the others, idealist as well as mechanistic.<sup>22</sup> It may be true that, on an everyday level, it is easy to distinguish between technology, social relations, and ideology, but the distinction very quickly breaks down. Take, for example, an idea about the best way to cooperate in hunting. Is this technological, social organizational, or ideological?

Lenski proposes an evolutionary typology in which each type is characterized by a single technological criterion:

1. *Simple hunting and gathering societies* are those which lack the bow and arrow and the spear thrower.
2. *Advanced hunting and gathering societies* are those which possess the bow and arrow or the spear thrower.
3. *Simple horticultural societies* are those which lack metallurgy and the plow.
4. *Advanced horticultural societies* are those which possess metallurgy but lack the plow.
5. *Simple agrarian societies* are those which possess plow agriculture but lack iron metallurgy.
6. *Advanced agrarian societies* are those which possess both plow agriculture and iron metallurgy.
7. *Industrial societies* are those which are based upon the harnessing of inanimate energy resources such as coal and oil.

In addition, there are several important environmentally specialized types: fishing, maritime, simple herding, and advanced herding societies. Finally, there are transitional and hybrid types: India, for example, is an

industrializing advanced agrarian society; the African nations are industrializing advanced horticultural societies; etc.

After establishing this typology, Lenski assigns various archeological, historical, and ethnographic societies to their appropriate categories and examines, both statistically and in particular cases, the extent to which other aspects of culture are related to technological type.

Lenski's work is important in that it combines material from the entire range of societies, from hunting and gathering to industrial, within a unified conceptual framework and systematically demonstrates how the progressive development of mankind's social productive forces (technology) is accompanied by changes in other aspects of culture. His weakness lies in his failure to consider that as productive systems develop and become capable of supporting large sedentary populations and of producing a social surplus, ruling classes develop which live by appropriating this surplus, and that the mode of appropriating the social surplus then becomes a primary determinant in the sociocultural configuration of a complex society.

By way of summary, the mode of production concept, taken by itself, has two major shortcomings. First, it neglects the role of the individual as an active agent in history, and second, it neglects the role of class struggle in historical change.

The concepts of history as human activity, of class struggle, and of the primacy of the techno-economic sphere in sociocultural causation form the foundations of historical materialism. If we are to develop a materialist anthropology, we must incorporate them into our thinking. Elsewhere, I have proposed a model of sociocultural causation which attempts to show how the individual, in seeking to satisfy his or her own needs, generates cultural stability and change in a process akin to natural selection.<sup>23</sup> In the remainder of this paper, I shall elaborate on

the mode of exploitation concept and attempt to demonstrate its utility for a proletarian anthropology.<sup>24</sup>

### THE MODE OF EXPLOITATION

It is undeniable that all human beings are totally dependent upon systems of production and it is precisely this dependence which distinguishes them from other animals. As Marx and Engels put it, "Man can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to *produce* their means of subsistence."<sup>25</sup> Direct and individual appropriation of naturally occurring use-values among nonhuman primate populations differs from the social production of use-values through the expenditure of human labor energy among human populations. As recent paleontological discoveries have shown, certain pongid populations, perhaps as early as *Ramapithecus* in the Miocene, began to produce their own means of subsistence and thereby placed themselves on an evolutionary trajectory leading directly to *homo sapiens*.<sup>26</sup>

Given this human dependence upon production, it does not require deep intuition to comprehend "that man's ideas, views and conceptions, in one word, man's consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions of his material existence, in his social relations and in his social life . . . that intellectual production changes in character in proportion as material production is changed."<sup>27</sup> Yet even as we realize that the manner in which human beings make their living exerts a tremendous influence on the rest of their lives, we must also realize that although all human beings are dependent upon production, not all human beings produce. The last five thousand years of human evolution have been characterized by the existence of classes which, although they do not directly participate in a productive system through the expenditure of their own

labor power, are nevertheless abundantly provided with the good things of life. In all class-structured societies, we know that those classes (slaves, serfs, peasants, workers) that contribute the greatest amount of labor to the productive system receive the least, while those (slavemasters, nobles, landlords, capitalists) that contribute the least amount of labor receive the most. How do we account for this peculiar situation?

Nearly the entire corpus of contemporary bourgeois social thought on this point would have us believe that "society" rewards certain people because of their invaluable contributions, especially in maintaining law and order and in providing meaning to social life.<sup>28</sup> Yet we are not told how "society" does this. "Society," of course, is merely a concept whose real referent is an ensemble of individuals and relations between individuals. To endow this concept with independent needs, an independent power of action, and an independent life is to create anew the sort of supernatural being from whose grip science has sought so valiantly to escape.

From a historical materialist standpoint, then, it is essential that we regard the wealth and privileges of certain classes as resulting from the activity of individuals, most logically those who enjoy them. When we observe that the emergence of classes that do not directly participate in production is simultaneous with the emergence of special instruments of violence and thought control that are staffed and/or controlled by those who enjoy the newly emerging special privileges and wealth, we are inescapably led to the conclusion that the differentials in wealth and privileges of certain classes are a result of the efforts of those classes. These efforts take the form of expenditures of energy in exploitative systems that pump economic surplus out of the direct producers and into the exploiting classes and that protect their resulting wealth and privileges.

An exploitative system has three sets of components. There are, first, the *exploitative*

*techniques*, the precise instrumentalities through which economic surplus is pumped out of the direct producers: slavery, plunder, tribute, rent, taxation, usury, and various forms of unequal exchange. Second, there is the *state*, an organization which monopolizes violence and is thereby able to physically coerce the exploited population. Third, there is the *church*, an organization which controls access to the sacred and supernatural and is thereby able to control the minds of the exploited population.<sup>29</sup> These elements of the exploitative system may be institutionalized separately, as in industrial societies such as the United States and the Soviet Union, or they may be integrated into a single unitary institution, as in the early Bronze Age. The precise ensemble of exploitative techniques, together with the manner in which state-church elements are institutionalized, constitutes a historical *mode of exploitation*.<sup>30</sup>

The existence of a mode of exploitation is both necessary and sufficient to explain the existence of differential wealth and privilege in class-structured societies. This being the case, scientific principles of parsimony may be invoked to reject "functionalist" interpretations of social stratification. Further, this model is, for devotees of Karl Popper, falsifiable: its opponents need only point to any historical society which has gross differentials in access to the social product and is not also characterized by a definite mode of exploitation.

The exploitative system is the instrumentality through which a predator-prey relationship is established within the human species, only here the stakes are human labor energy rather than energy locked up in animal flesh. The differentials of wealth and prestige which emerge from this predatory relationship simultaneously reflect and legitimize the differential consumption of labor energy by predator and prey. Once the predatory relationship is established, the system of exploitation supporting it becomes larger and more complex, with a complex division of labor devel-

oping in both the sphere of production (between agricultural workers and workers in the industrial arts, metallurgy, textiles, pottery, and so forth) and in the sphere of exploitation (warriors, priests, scribes, etc.). The result is an elaboration of occupations and statuses among different kinds of producers, exploiters, parasitic groups, and so on. This predatory relationship generates a division of the population into classes, which are defined by their relationship to the underlying flow of labor energy through the population.

An *economic class* is simply an aggregate of individuals who stand in a similar relationship to this underlying energy flow, that is, who obtain the labor energy they consume in a similar manner. Economic classes may be defined broadly or narrowly, depending upon the purposes of the study. In a narrow sense, men and women, for example, may be seen as separate classes, since they typically obtain the labor energy they consume in different manners. Economic classes may or may not be organized and may or may not share a common world view or consciousness which sets them apart from other classes; however, the fact that they share a certain relationship to the flow of social labor energy is likely to subject their ideologies to similar selective pressures.

To the extent this relationship leads to a similarity in life-style, a tendency to regard each other as equals, and a tendency to intermarry, economic classes are likely to congeal into *social classes*, which may be defined as groups of intermarrying families that stand in a roughly similar relationship to the flow of social productive energy and that transmit this relationship to their offspring. Thus, social classes are also populations in the biological sense. To be sure, they exhibit varying degrees of interclass mobility (migration between biological populations), of intermarriage between classes, and of extramarital reproduction (gene flow between populations), but this in no way negates the reality of social class. In situations where interclass mobility and

marriage are extremely low, we may speak of castes; in situations where they are high, we may speak of "open" social classes. Naturally, each situation generates its own ideology.

It may be difficult or impossible to draw sharp lines between all the classes in any particular society; nevertheless, the diagnostic feature of any class society is the existence of a predacious ruling class that is based upon a definite mode of exploitation. This mode of exploitation is, in a very real sense, the "mode of production" of the ruling class and is to the ruling class what the mode of production is to any "primitive" (that is, unstratified) population. Thus, just as any "primitive" population has a variety of productive techniques that it consciously manipulates for its own ends, and just as we customarily categorize these "primitive" populations according to the dominant productive strategy, so any ruling class has a variety of exploitative strategies that it consciously manipulates for its own ends, and we may characterize ruling populations and hence entire caste- or class-structured societies by the dominant exploitative strategy. Many of the social formations usually characterized as modes of production may equally well be characterized as modes of exploitation — for example, the agro-managerial bureaucratic Asiatic mode, the decentralized feudal mode, the slave mode, and the capitalist mode. Just as the mode of production exerts a tremendous influence on the rest of social life, so the mode of exploitation exerts a tremendous influence on the ideas of the ruling class, and, since the "ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class,"<sup>31</sup> on the entire ideological structure of society.

There is more to it than this, however. In production, human beings act upon natural forces that do not consciously and intelligently resist human control, but ruling classes must deal with beings who are intelligent, conscious, and who actively resist exploitation. One of the primary functional requisites of any exploitative system is to overcome this resistance.

Thus, although the ultimate logico-physical priority of production in any sociocultural system is undeniable, from the standpoint of the determination of the precise form of any specific sociocultural complex, the mode of exploitation not only can but must predominate. If the ruling class is unable to manipulate the mode of exploitation to overcome or deflect any countervailing tendencies from anywhere else in the system, it will be replaced by another class — as, indeed, has occurred again and again in history.

It must be emphasized, then, that the mode of exploitation model has a dialectical aspect lacking in the mode of production model discussed above.<sup>32</sup> Each mode of exploitation generates its own characteristic forms of class struggle, and hence its own dialectic of social change. This is so because exploitation acts on people, not on nature. By its very nature, exploitation generates resistance, and the resulting class struggle between exploiter and exploited in turn leads to the transformation of class structures. Thus the model for social change in bourgeois society has, as its mainspring, the struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat.<sup>33</sup> This model, in which the struggle between exploiter and exploited leads to the destruction of the old social order and the establishment of a new, is not necessarily the model which fits all forms of class struggle in all societies. The struggles between the feudal nobility and the rising bourgeoisie, for example, were not struggles between exploiter and producer, but were rather competitive struggles between two exploiting classes for control of the social surplus. The victory of the bourgeoisie was the victory of the capitalist mode of exploitation over the feudal mode. Again, in the so-called Asiatic mode, the struggles of the exploited classes (arising as much from the decay of the established mode of exploitation as from the fact of exploitation itself) against the decaying social order did not lead to the establishment of a new social order, but to the rejuvenation of the old, in what Wittfogel has

called "cathartic revolutions."<sup>34</sup>

The mode of production model discussed earlier, by contrast, is essentially mechanical. Production acts upon nature, and the forces of nature do not enter in any active way into sociocultural causation. Attempts to make the model dialectical by introducing conflict and antagonism between the "forces of production" and the "relations of production" (as Marx does in the *Preface*) merely transforms a mechanical materialism into a poetic idealism.<sup>35</sup>

It might be argued that what I am calling the mode of exploitation could and should be included in the relations of production. My entire argument would then become, in essence, a terminological quibble.<sup>36</sup> But there are good reasons, I believe, for separating out the sphere of exploitation as distinct from the sphere of production.

1. In the first place, it is not a matter of what is correct, but of emphasis. Both the mode of production concept and the combined mode of production/mode of exploitation concepts can be used to describe and analyze the phenomena in question – Terray's discussion of exploitation within the lineage mode of production is a case in point,<sup>37</sup> although I would suggest that a mode of exploitation perspective might have suggested additional avenues of inquiry – but to subsume the sphere of exploitation, and by extension the class struggle, under the rubric of relations of production is essentially to give it derivative and epiphenomenal status and to place it in a secondary position. Further, not only is exploitation and class struggle minimized but, by being included within the necessary relations of production, it is *legitimized*. Witness, for example, the following passage in Terray:

Forms of cooperation are necessarily allied to managerial and supervisory structures which arise from the technical constraints of the process and of the relations of production within which the process is carried out. . . . Particular superstructural relations are, in fact, a necessary condition for the operation of particular relations of production. . . . to the extent that the social division of labor acts on the level of the economic infrastructure to

create a hierarchy between producers and organizers of production, this hierarchy will require a political and/or ideological sanction, the nature of which will be determined by the nature of the relations of production which gave rise to it. In certain circumstances political or ideological manifestations may play a part in the actual establishment of the relations of production, as can be seen in the case of the feudal mode of production.<sup>38</sup>

However, to the extent that managerial and supervisory functions are necessary, the time spent in such activity is necessary labor and can be measured in the same terms as any other necessary labor, and no special sanctions are required to enforce it or to provide an equivalent return on this category of labor. The special sanctions become necessary only when managerial labor demands a greater than proportional return. In other words, managerial and supervisory workers may (and, of course, may not) fulfill a socially necessary function, but they turn this social function to their own private benefit, and it is this exploitative aspect, not the productive aspect, which requires special sanctions.

Elsewhere, Bukharin argues that productive relations include "all kinds of relations between persons" that play a part in the distribution of the social product. Therefore, "A broker in Paris, who buys shares of a New York trust, is thus assuming a certain productive relation to the workers and owners, the superintendents and engineers, of the factories belonging to this trust."<sup>39</sup> If we are to include brokerage and banking in productive relations, we must also include bank robbing, along with every other kind of thievery, brigandage, and plunder, for these too play a role in determining the final distribution of the social product. The form of economic transaction in the two cases is the same: both invest capital (the broker in stock ownership, the bank robber in guns and a get-away car), both take a risk, both provide a service (the broker-owner does not fire his worker, the bank robber does not kill his victim), both realize a profit, a form of surplus value. The difference between the two is simply this: banking is a form of exploitation



practiced by members of a ruling class which is able to control the content of ideology and is therefore legitimate; bank robbing, by contrast, is a form of exploitation practiced by disaffected members of the nonruling classes and is therefore illegitimate (movies like *Bonnie and Clyde* notwithstanding).

Significantly, Bukharin, in the rest of his discussion, arrives at precisely this kind of distinction. He asks, "What is the species of production relations in which a conflict would lead to revolution?" And, after quoting the very passage from *Capital* with which I opened this essay, he answers:

Among all the varied production relations, one type stands foremost, namely, the type that is expressive of the relations between the classes which hold the principal means of production in their hands, and the other classes which hold either subsidiary means or no such means at all. The class which is dominant in economy will also be dominant in politics and will *politically fortify* the specific type of production relations which will give security to the process of exploitation operating in favor of this class.<sup>40</sup>

But if these relations are to be singled out as those leading to revolution (and, presumably, to class struggle), it seems to make good heuristic sense to schematically separate them from the others, for two reasons: first, because there are forms of exploitation which do not involve differential access to the means of production, such as plunder, slavery, and control over redistribution; and second, because ownership and the differential access to the means of production is not, in and of itself, productive, however much of it may be enmeshed in actual production relations.

Production benefits the entire society and therefore production relations are essential to society. Exploitation merely transfers part of the social product from producer to exploiter and therefore benefits only the exploiting class. Social relations, such as ownership pure and simple — as, for example, in absentee landownership or stock ownership — do not add to the social product and are therefore not productive. Ownership, in other words,

is of several sorts. There is ownership for use, such as the ownership of consumers' articles — houses, cars, food, clothing, etc. There is the ownership of the means of production by those who operate them, such as landownership by the farmer and the ownership of tools by the artisan. The second sort of ownership does indeed contribute to production since production is facilitated if the producers own their own means of production and product, and ownership in this sense may properly be called a relation of production. But there is another form of ownership, exploitative ownership or exploitative property — for example, absentee landownership or stock ownership — which does not contribute to or facilitate production, and should therefore not be regarded as a relation of production. Just because kinds of social relationships are given the same name, ownership, does not mean that they fulfill the same function in society.

The fact that a specific social relationship between concrete individuals may simultaneously be a relation of production and a relation of exploitation in no way diminishes the force of these arguments. Production and exploitation are *analytically* distinct, however much they may be intertwined and intermeshed in reality. This intertwining helps conceal the reality of exploitation and is therefore of considerable benefit to the exploiting class, so that those relations which are both productive and exploitative will tend to endure longer and therefore preponderate over those that are purely exploitative.

2. A second reason for distinguishing the sphere of production from the sphere of exploitation is that the progressive development of social productive forces does not *necessarily* lead to the emergence of class-structured societies; it merely provides the conditions under which such societies may emerge. This is seen, for example, in Robert Carneiro's comparative study of aboriginal agricultural systems in lowland and highland South America.<sup>41</sup> The more productive lowland

system was associated with an unstratified population, while the less productive highland system was associated with a stratified population. The difference in social stratification, in other words, was not associated with differentials in productivity but rather with the differential immobility of the two populations. The more immobile population of the environmentally circumscribed highland valleys permitted the emergence of a predatory ruling class, whereas the formation of such a class in the lowland regions was inhibited by the fact that the exploited segment of the population could simply move away from any kind of exploitation to equally productive, but uninhabited, land elsewhere.

3. Again, Robert Adams's study of state formation in Mesopotamia and Mesoamerica has shown that state structures, and by extension class structures, preceded certain important transformations in the productive sphere, namely those associated with irrigation agriculture.<sup>42</sup> Thus, in contradistinction to the hydraulic theory, the emergence of class society and the state preceded and led to the emergence of the Asiatic mode of production by building large-scale works of water control.

4. Further, although there is obviously a relationship between particular modes of production and particular modes of exploitation, the relationship is neither direct, nor strictly speaking determinant. Take, for example, the feudal mode of production. As Bukharin, among others, has noted, political factors (that is, factors in what I would call the mode of exploitation) played a predominant role in determining the emergence of this social formation. Further, if we regard the distinctive feature of feudalism as the lord/vassal tie, a social relationship existing primarily between members of the ruling class, we see that this distinctive feature is associated with a wide variety of productive systems: medieval Europe, with plow agriculture based on rainfall; medieval Japan, with plow agriculture based on wet-rice irrigation; Chou China, a Bronze Age

civilization; African feudalism, with a different kind of horticultural base; and "nomadic" feudalism, based on pastoral nomadism.<sup>43</sup> In short, there is no direct and necessary causal relationship between the mode of production and the mode of exploitation; either may "cause" the other, and differing forms of one may be found in association with the same form of the other.

5. Finally, the development of the forces of production is not an independent variable, but instead is conditioned by forces emanating from the mode of exploitation. V. Gordon Childe has noted a slowdown in the rate of technological innovation after the urban revolution and the emergence of the earliest true ruling classes. This resulted from the fact that the exploited producers had no incentive to innovate.<sup>44</sup> By contrast, the rapid development of technology in capitalist society results from the exploitative nature of the system. As Marx noted, "The aim of the capitalistic application of machinery [like] every other increase in the productiveness of labour . . . is a means for producing surplus-value."<sup>45</sup>

It may be asked why Marx did not give greater emphasis to the mode of exploitation in his theoretical expressions. The answer, I think, lies in the fact that he was primarily concerned with the analysis of capitalism, and his interest in precapitalist societies was at best secondary. In capitalism, the mode of production and the mode of exploitation are virtually the same. Capitalist production is both the production of use values and the production of surplus value; in fact, it is the latter exploitative aspect that predominates. Nothing is produced in the bourgeois mode of production unless it is profitable, that is, unless it is also a means of pumping surplus value out of the direct producers. Indeed, the Marxian analysis of such cultural phenomena as capitalist crises and depressions shows that these are not crises of production but are rather crises of the realization of surplus value, of exploitation. Capitalists will not produce unless they can

exploit. The productive aspects of capitalism are therefore subordinate to the exploitative aspects.

Clearly, the many criticisms I have made of the mode of production concept and the evolutionary typologies derived from it will not be corrected by mechanically adding a mode of exploitation concept, although this is what the sociologists would call a "necessary but not sufficient" step. Nonetheless, since I have criticized the evolutionary typologies of others, I feel I should offer an alternative, one that incorporates the mode of exploitation concept and Trotsky's law of uneven and combined development. I would include the following types:

1. *Primitive communism*. This is the original social order of mankind, appearing simultaneously with social production. It was in this primitive communal social order that mankind evolved its present physical and mental nature. Primitive communism is characterized by the absence of social classes and the related institutions of coercion and thought control, by equal access to the social product and to the means of violence, and by the equal obligation of all to participate in social production. Primitive communism survives in most hunting and gathering societies, but it began to dissolve about ten thousand years ago whenever populations became large and sedentary.

2. *Bronze Age feudalism*. As civilizations began to emerge in the "nuclear areas" of Mesopotamia, Egypt, China, and the Indus Valley, the earliest fully class-structured societies were organized into relatively weakly integrated "feudal" structures. Unlike the later Iron Age feudalism of Europe, these Bronze Age feudalisms evolved into centralized empires following the development of irrigation, iron technology, and improved techniques of statecraft. A good example is the transition from the feudalism of Chou China to the centralized Han dynasty following the introduction of iron and the development of hydraulic tech-

nology.<sup>46</sup> Bronze Age feudalism, in other words, is a phase in the evolutionary trajectory leading to a more centralized social formation.

3. *Agro-managerial bureaucratic empires*. These are the classic "hydraulic" societies, in which a central authority controls the key economic resource, the irrigation system, and, through a bureaucracy, controls and exploits the underlying population. Such bureaucratic empires exhibited a cyclical pattern of rise and fall, but also exhibited a progressive development of the productive and exploitative systems, resulting in improved agriculture, larger populations, improved bureaucratic techniques, etc. The historic civilizations of the Near East, China, and India fall into this category.

4. *Nomadic feudalism*. On the periphery of the hydraulic world, where agriculture is impossible, pastoral nomadism develops. Such nomads, because of their mobility and warlike character, are periodically able to conquer the bureaucratic empires.

5. *American civilizations*. The New World, peopled by primitive communal hunters and gatherers by 15,000 B.C., underwent a parallel evolutionary development to that seen in the Old World, but somewhat later and with certain distinctive characteristics.

6. *Maritime slave capitalism*. In the Mediterranean, maritime trading nations emerged which traded with the advanced empires. Slavery became economically important as these nations began to engage in precapitalistic commodity production for trading purposes.

7. *Feudalism*. In Europe, a decentralized feudal system developed in which competition between feudal rulers conditioned an extremely rapid development of the forces of production and of trade and warfare (in large part borrowed from the more advanced Asiatic empires).

8. *Capitalism*. The decentralized social structure of European feudalism permitted the rise of the bourgeoisie, which performed the task of integrating the entire world into a single economic system.

9. *Protosocialist states*. As the international working class attained state power on the periphery of the advanced capitalist nations, it attempted to establish socialism. The development of socialism was deformed by the material conditions under which the working-class revolution was undertaken: the underdeveloped character of the productive plant and the threat of capitalist reconquest. The result was what Trotsky called “degenerated workers’ states,”<sup>47</sup> characterized on the one hand by the re-emergence of a ruling class, and on the other hand by the ideology of a new society.

10. *World socialist industrial society*. When the working class completes its revolution and becomes a world ruling class, it will abolish class antagonisms and exploitation and establish a world socialist order. As Morgan foresaw it, this will be a “revival, in a higher form, of the liberty, equality and fraternity” of primitive communism.<sup>48</sup>

More important than the listing of types, however, are the spatial, temporal, and causal relationships between them, for this is neither a “unilineal” nor a “multilineal” typology, but rather a dialectical one, based on the law of uneven and combined development. There are a variety of different evolutionary trajectories, but these are not independent: they combine and otherwise influence each other. Thus, out of a base of primitive communism (1), Bronze Age feudalism (2), the earliest system of class rule, emerged in the Near East and elsewhere, beginning an evolutionary trajectory continued by the agro-managerial bureaucratic empires (3) of Asia, which formed the vanguard of cultural evolution until a few hundred years ago. Nomadic feudalism (4) formed on the periphery of these empires and was able to periodically conquer and dominate them, and much the same is true of the maritime slave capitalism (6) of the classical world. The American civilizations (5) developed in evolutionary trajectories in many ways parallel to those of the Old World, but

with certain distinctive characteristics, until these were cut short by being incorporated into the emerging world capitalist system (8). The Iron Age feudalism (7) of Europe also developed on the periphery of the agrarian empires and benefited from the diffusion of technology from these more advanced societies. At the same time, the decentralized feudal structure permitted the rise of an independent, class-conscious bourgeoisie. Significantly, although the agrarian empires might not have made the transition to industrial capitalism by themselves, neither would European feudal societies, for the Asiatic empires played an important role in this transition. The diffusion of technology and organizational techniques in the areas of bureaucracy and banking helped lay the base for industrial capitalism, while the plunder of these Asiatic empires, together with the plunder of the American civilizations, provided the capital for the Industrial Revolution. Finally, the protosocialist states (9), harbingers of the coming world socialist industrial society (10), are developing within the womb of world capitalist society and exhibit consequent deformations.

It should be emphasized that this evolutionary typology is a tentative one which will be modified with further research. It takes account, however, of the progressive development of mankind’s productive forces and of the rise and transformations of class structures, as well as their eventual disappearance.

The mode of exploitation concept does more than provide a basis for an evolutionary typology: it also sheds light on the nature of the contemporary world, and is therefore of practical political significance. It directs our attention to the fact that the problem socialists face is not simply a disembodied capitalist “system” which operates according to mysterious laws, but rather a self-conscious bourgeoisie, a social class of intelligent, capable human beings who are determined to manipulate the system as required and to use the vast resources at their disposal to preserve their own wealth

and privilege. The political task of socialists is not simply to overthrow a "system" but to overthrow a class, and to devise organizational techniques to prevent the re-emergence of a "new class" of exploiters based upon new "post-capitalist" exploitative techniques. In this connection I would like to make three interconnected points concerning the nature of the advanced capitalist nations, the nature of Soviet society, and the nature of the new society which is struggling to be born.

1. There is a widespread tendency to view the alleged affluence and apparent political quietism of the contemporary working class as inevitable concomitants of a mature system of industrial capitalism, that is, as essentially flowing from the functional requisites of production and from the tremendous productivity of the industrial mode of production. Thus, Marvin Harris, in dismissing dialectics as an "Hegelian monkey," writes:

If we grant the relevance of Marx's analysis of the "inner contradictions" of nineteenth-century capitalism, there remains considerable doubt concerning the relevance of the same analysis with respect to the modified capitalism of the modern industrially advanced Euro-American nations. In some cases at least — as in the mixed economies of the Scandinavian democracies — capitalism's "internal contradictions" seem to have been solved by multiple compromises, by the dreaded "revisionism," rather than by the "negation of the negation."<sup>49</sup>

In a similar vein, Lenski argues that the age-old trend toward increasing differentials of wealth and privilege has been reversed in mature industrial societies.<sup>50</sup> The reasons for this reversal, he believes, lie in the increasing productivity and functional requisites of industrial production, although "more important" than these has been the "rise and spread of the new democratic ideology" with its origin in the political, religious, and philosophical developments of the seventeenth century.<sup>51</sup>

Such a view simply ignores the history of class struggle in the advanced industrial nations. This history, in the United States as elsewhere, clearly reveals that the instrumentality through

which industrial workers attained their "affluence" was their own struggle; strikes, sit-downs, the general strike, and political action. Even though the bourgeoisie bitterly resisted this struggle, they at the same time took steps to ensure that it remained within the system rather than being turned against it. Here we may note the role of the National Civil Federation and the Catholic Church in turning the AFL away from class struggle and socialism and toward class collaboration and "trade unionism, pure and simple."<sup>52</sup> In short, the ruling class has intervened in the revolutionary process in order to keep the struggle of the working class within acceptable limits. This may have prolonged the struggle, but cannot change its outcome.

If we adopt this class-struggle approach, the very features that are seen as sources of stability in the mode of production approach become merely the surface manifestations of an armed truce in the deeper conflict between irreconcilable class forces, a conflict which must continually re-emerge and can only result "either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes."<sup>53</sup>

2. There is also a widespread tendency to view the imperfections of socialism in the Soviet Union as resulting from the functional requisites of industrial production. Thus, for example, a noted sociologist writes: "In a somewhat paradoxical way, the Marxian theory that the forms of production determine the other elements of a social system is partly confirmed by the persistence of political, bureaucratic, and moral problems in industrial societies without capitalists."<sup>54</sup> A related theme underlies the view that Soviet society is retrogressing from socialism by re-introducing capitalism. Take, for example, the recent debate between Paul Sweezy and Charles Bettelheim concerning the transition to socialism,<sup>55</sup> which has centered on such issues as the restoration of material incentives, "market socialism," production for a world market, etc. However, to call the Soviet elite a "bour-

geoisie" seeking to "restore capitalism" is to miss the point. Once it is recognized that there are modes of exploitation other than capitalism, and that there are ruling classes other than the bourgeoisie, one begins to ask different kinds of questions. Are there marked differentials of wealth and privilege? Do the beneficiaries of the system tend to intermingle and intermarry? Are these privileges passed on cross-generationally? If the answers are yes — and few deny this for the Soviet Union — then we must acknowledge that there is a ruling class and look for the components of an exploitative system: definite exploitative techniques, the state, the church.

The distinctive mode of exploitation in the self-styled "socialist" nations is comprised of the following elements:

*Exploitative techniques.* The dominant exploitative techniques in the "socialist" bloc are differential pay and privilege. The statutory minimum annual wage in the Soviet Union is \$360; a state-farm worker makes \$586, an office typist \$588, a textile worker \$679, a machine-tool operator \$746, but a factory director makes \$6,240 and a cabinet minister of a republic government makes \$9,125 (these figures do not include bonuses).<sup>56</sup> If we assume that factory directors and cabinet ministers perform socially necessary tasks, the time they spend performing these counts as abstract labor, the same as any other socially necessary labor.<sup>57</sup> Their energy contribution to the system, in other words, is the same as that of any other worker, in spite of the fact that they withdraw energy at a rate ten to twenty times that of some other categories of workers. Since these differential energy flows are enforced by political power, this is exploitation. It is perhaps a subtle form of exploitation, veiled, as are other forms of exploitation, by ideological justifications, but it is nevertheless exploitation.

*The state.* The Soviet Union, of course, has the full panoply of organized violence: police, both open and secret, prisons, labor camps, etc.

*The church.* The functional equivalent of

the religious church in other stratified societies is the Communist Party, which monopolizes access to ultimate Truth in the form of a new dogma, Marxism-Leninism. The infamous purge trials of the 1930s are simply the functional equivalents of the Spanish Inquisition, designed to ensure a Stalinist monopoly on the interpretation of Marxism-Leninism (there are of course a wide variety of more subtle forms of thought control practiced by the Party, too familiar to point out here).

As a mode of exploitation, this is far less efficient than the capitalist mode of exploitation, whatever its advantages in promoting economic growth and whatever its real advantages for the people in the USSR. After all, if workers are guaranteed employment, health services, education, and security, it becomes rather difficult to pump the last drop of surplus labor out of them. And this is the real significance of the postwar reforms in the socialist camp. As the *Communist Manifesto* noted a hundred years ago, "Capitalism compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In a word, it creates a world after its own image."<sup>58</sup> While the fact that the Soviet ruling class is adopting bourgeois techniques of exploitation is a matter of considerable interest, it is secondary to the already existing exploitative system perfected by the predatory rulers of the USSR.

3. If the struggle for a socialist society is to be successful, it is essential to have a sharper vision of that future society. In this connection, I would argue that the features usually proclaimed as indicating socialism, such as planning and social ownership of the means of production, are inadequate, for, as the Soviet example indicates, exploitation can re-emerge even in such a system. Rather, the diagnostic feature is the *elimination of exploitation*, in any form. When this basis of class society is removed, the attendant evils will also be

removed, and not until. It is essential that Marxists remain aware of this problem and create ways and means to block the re-emergence of exploitation during revolutionary periods, and following them.<sup>59</sup>

## NOTES

- 1 I would like to thank the University of Virginia for a small grant to cover the costs of manuscript preparation. I would also like to thank Professor Gerhard Lenski, who made a number of helpful comments on the original draft; any errors of fact or opinion, however, remain entirely my own. I would also like to thank Professor Gerhard Lenski, who made a number of helpful comments on the original draft; any errors of fact or opinion, however, remain entirely my own.
- 2 Karl Marx, "Preface" to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859), in Howard Selsam, David Goldway, and Harry Martel, eds., *Dynamics of Social Change: A Reader in Marxist Social Science* (New York: International Publishers, 1970), pp. 52–53.
- 3 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. III (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966), p. 791; quoted and retranslated by Paul A. Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957), p. 44.
- 4 Marx, *Capital*, vol. I, p. 217.
- 5 Marx, "Preface," p. 53.
- 6 D.K. Mitropolsky, Y.A. Zubritsky, and V.L. Kerov, *An Outline of Social Development*, vol. I (Moscow: Progress Publishers, n.d.), pp. 65–66.
- 7 Frederick Engels, "Letter to Joseph Bloch," in Selsam et al., *Dynamics of Social Change*, pp. 76–79.
- 8 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Holy Family*, quoted in Selsam, et. al., *Dynamics of Social Change*, p. 25; emphasis in the original.
- 9 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968), p. 2.
- 10 It has been suggested that Marx himself eliminated the more radical and revolutionary aspects of his ideas in the "Preface" in order to get the book past the Prussian censors. See Arthur M. Prinz, "Background and Ulterior Motive of Marx's Preface of 1859," *Journal of the History of Ideas* (July-September 1969), pp. 437–451. This emasculation of the materialist conception of history may have been comforting to the Prussian censors, but has had unfortunate consequences for the development of Marxist theory.
- 11 Mitropolsky, et. al., *An Outline of Social Development*.
- 12 See Edwin O. Reischauer and John K. Fairbank, *East Asia: The Great Tradition* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), Chapter 6.
- 13 For a discussion of this law, see William F. Warde [George Novack], *Uneven and Combined Development in History* (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1963). Also, see Marshall D. Sahlins and Elman R. Service, *Evolution and Culture* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), especially Chapter 5, where the law is reformulated as the "law of evolutionary potential."
- 14 Emmanuel Terray, *Marxism and "Primitive" Societies* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), pp. 97–98. See also p. 179, where Terray quotes an unpublished paper by Louis Althusser to the same effect. Elsewhere, however, Althusser describes the mode of production in quite different terms; see Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, *Reading Capital* (New York: Pantheon, 1970), p. 317.
- 15 For a discussion of the roots of "cultural materialism" in anthropology, see Marvin Harris, *The Rise of Anthropological Theory* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1968).
- 16 Leslie White, *The Science of Culture* (New York: Grove Press, 1949), p. 391.
- 17 Harris in particular is viewed as a Marxist, even though his Introduction clearly states that "one of the central purposes of the present volume is to decontaminate, so to speak, the materialist approach to history" by separating the mode of production concept from the "dialectical and revolutionary components of Marxism." See Harris, *Rise of Anthropological Theory*, pp. 4–5.
- 18 Morris Opler, "Cultural Evolution, Southern Athabaskans, and Chronology in Theory," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* (1961), p. 13, quoted in Harris, *ibid.*, p. 637.
- 19 Gerhard Lenski, *Human Societies* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970).
- 20 *Ibid.*, p. 102. Lenski adds in a footnote, "From a more limited perspective, the picture would not necessarily be the same. For a single nation at a certain point in history, or even for a group of nations over a rather extended period, the impact of organizational and ideological change on technology might be greater than the reverse."
- 21 *Ibid.*, pp. 139–142.
- 22 It should be emphasized again that these criticisms are on a theoretical level. As it is actually applied in the analysis of specific sociocultural phenomena, the model has considerable explanatory strength.
- 23 Eugene E. Ruyle, "Genetic and Cultural Pools: Some Suggestions for a Unified Theory of Biocultural Evolution," *Human Ecology* (March 1973), pp. 201–215.
- 24 I have discussed these concepts in different contexts elsewhere. See "Slavery, Surplus, and Stratification on the Northwest Coast: The Ethnoenergetics of an Incipient Stratification System," *Current Anthropology* (December 1973), pp. 603–631; "Energy and Culture," *World Anthropology*, Proceedings of the IXth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, Chicago, September 1–8, 1973; "Capitalism and Caste in Japan," paper presented at the symposium, "Marx I: Critiques of Theory," 71st Annual Meeting of the

- American Anthropological Association, Toronto, December 2, 1972.
- 25 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology* (New York: International Publishers, 1957), p. 7.
- 26 See Ruyle, "Energy and Culture"; Evelyn Reed, "New Light on the Origins of Man," *International Socialist Review*, vol. 24, no. 3 pp. 81–83; Bruce G. Trigger, "Engels on the Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man: An Anticipation of Contemporary Anthropological Theory," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* (1965), pp. 168–176; James C. Faris, "Social Evolution, Population, and Production," *World Anthropology*, Proceedings of the IXth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, Chicago, September 1973.
- 27 Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 37.
- 28 This is the thrust of the so-called functional theory of social stratification. See the articles by Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore, and by Melvin M. Tumin, in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Class, Status, and Power: Social Stratification in Comparative Perspective* (New York: The Free Press, 1966).
- 29 On the role of the church, see Leslie White, *The Evolution of Culture* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), pp. 303–328. White provides (p. 325) the following illuminating quote from Pope Benedict XV: "Only too well does experience show that when religion is banished, human authority totters to its fall . . . when the rulers of the people disdain the authority of God, the people in turn despise the authority of men. There remains, it is true, the usual expedient of suppressing rebellion by force but to what effect? Force subdues the bodies of men, not their souls." White provides abundant documentation of the role of the church in subduing the souls of humans, and in serving the ruling class by supporting the state in offensive-defensive actions against adjacent polities and by "keeping the subordinate class at home obedient and docile."
- 30 This, of course, is a very abstract analysis. But exploitative systems do not exist in the abstract, only in reality and only as conditioned by a particular set of material, historical, and social circumstances. In advanced bourgeois cultures, for example, many of the thought-control functions of the church are taken over by other institutions, such as the education system and the mass media. Further, individuals are socialized for particular places within the class structure so that the family, as well as the schools, constitute a powerful support of the exploitative system (this, of course, is why moralists are concerned with the stability of the family, etc.). However, I would only include in the mode of exploitation those institutions which are under the direct control of the ruling class. The state and the church (and in America, the educational system) are clearly in this category, but socialization within the family is not, although the ruling class does attempt to influence it.
- 31 Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 37.
- 32 I am indebted to an article by Isaac Balbus, "Ruling Class Theory vs. Marxist Class Analysis," *Monthly Review* (May 1971), pp. 36–46, for emphasizing this point to me.
- 33 "The Marxist model of capitalist society is normally a two-class model; the two classes represent the two sides of a fundamental contradiction which is assumed to be the source of conflicts sufficiently important to produce significant structural change. In short, the assumption of two classes – a superordinate class and a subordinate class – defined in dialectical opposition to each other is the starting point for Marx's theory of social change and revolution." *Ibid.*, p. 38. It is to be emphasized that this fundamental contradiction in capitalist society is generated by a particular mode of exploitation.
- 34 Karl Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), pp. 171–172.
- 35 See "The Mode of Production Concept in Marxist Social Science," above, and fn. 10.
- 36 This is the reaction of Yu.I. Semonov in his "Comment" on my "Slavery, Surplus, and Stratification," *Current Anthropology* (in press, 1974) and of Gerald Berthoud's comments on my "Capitalism and Caste in Japan" paper.
- 37 Terray, *Marxism and "Primitive" Society*, pp. 166–176.
- 38 *Ibid.*, p. 102.
- 39 Nikolai Bukharin, *Historical Materialism* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1969), p. 245.
- 40 *Ibid.*, pp. 245–246.
- 41 Robert L. Carneiro, "Slash-and-Burn Cultivation among the Kuikuru and Its Implications for Cultural Development in the Amazon Basin," in Johannes Wilbert, ed., *The Evolution of Horticultural Systems in Native South America: Causes and Consequences*, (Caracas: Anthropologica Supplement Publication, no. 2, 1961); "A Theory of the Origin of the State," *Science*, vol. 169 (1970), pp. 733–738.
- 42 Robert McC. Adams, *The Evolution of Urban Society* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1966).
- 43 See Rushton Coulburn, ed., *Feudalism in History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956); Jack Goody, "Feudalism in Africa?" in George Dalton, ed., *Economic Development and Cultural Change* (New York: Natural History Press, 1971), pp. 148–168; Owen Lattimore, *Studies in Frontier History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 542–551. Neither Goody nor Lattimore, it should be noted, favors the term "feudalism" in reference to these societies.
- 44 V. Gordon Childe, *Man Makes Himself* (New York, Mentor Books, 1951), Chapter 9, cited by Lenski, *Human Societies*, pp. 248–250.
- 45 Marx, *Capital*, vol. I, p. 371.
- 46 Chi Ch'ao-ting, *Key Economic Areas in Chinese History* (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1936).
- 47 Leon Trotsky, *The Revolution Betrayed* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1972).
- 48 Lewis Henry Morgan, *Ancient Society* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 467.
- 49 Harris, *Rise of Anthropological Theory*, p. 230.
- 50 Lenski, *Human Societies*, p. 408. The statistics upon which Lenski bases this argument, however, may be faulted since they compare the share of the total social product of agrarian civilization received as income by the top 2 percent of the population with the share of the social product of advanced capitalist nations received by



the top 2 percent of the population of these nations. But the advanced capitalist nations are only a part of world capitalist civilization. If Lenski included the per capita income of the peasant masses of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, his conclusions might have been different.

- 51 Ibid., pp. 355–356, 409; see also Lenski's *Power and Privilege* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 313–318.
- 52 Philip S. Foner, *History of the Labor Movement in the United States*, vol. III, (New York: International Publishers, 1964), pp. 61–135. Two quotes, from a spokesman from the NCF and from an Archbishop, will illustrate the views of these organizations toward the labor movement: "Our experience has convinced us that the best way to control labor organizations is to lead and not to force them. We are also convinced that the conservative element in all unions will control when properly led and officered."  
 "A man cannot be a Catholic and a Socialist. . . . Consequently, the fight is on and will be continued as long as the Church is a power in the history of the future."
- 53 Marx and Engels, *Communist Manifesto*, p. 2.
- 54 Theodore Caplow, *Elementary Sociology* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 170.
- 55 Paul M. Sweezy and Charles Bettelheim, *On the Transition to Socialism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971).
- 56 J.P. Nettl, *The Soviet Achievement* (Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967), p. 254.
- 57 Nettl (ibid., p. 255) tells us that "the deliberate inequality of rewards . . . is a built-in condition of every modern industrial society," which is true but is very incompletely stating the case. There is simply no good reason to believe that inequality of reward is in any way necessary for production or efficiency. To take an example, M.D.'s in the Soviet Union earn \$1260, only slightly more than the \$1092 earned by coal miners. Does this make the Soviet doctor inferior in his medical practice to his \$100,000 American counterpart? Before considering an affirmative answer, read Milton Friedman's analysis of the reasons American doctors are so highly paid, in *Capitalism and Freedom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 149–160, and Joshua Horn's discussion of medicine in China in *Away With All Pests* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969).
- 58 Marx and Engels, *Communist Manifesto*, p. 9.
- 59 I have made an effort to specify some of these elsewhere. See "A Socialist Alternative for the Future," paper for symposium on "Cultural Alternatives," 72nd Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association, New Orleans, November 28–December 2, 1973 (to be published in the Symposium on Cultural Alternatives volume and in *World Anthropology*, Proceedings of the IXth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, Chicago, September 1–8, 1973).