The Fire and Human Impact

On Saturday, October 19, 1991, a “suspicious” fire occurred in Wildcat Canyon, near the ridgeline. After consuming five acres, this fire was extinguished. Firefighters acknowledged that the only factor missing for a disastrous fire to occur was the wind. Firefighters left the area early Saturday evening, returning to check the area for “hot spots” during the night.

On Sunday, October 20, 1991, firefighters returned to the burn area to “mop-up." Due to the dense build-up of natural fuels in the burn area, the Diablo winds re-ignited “hot spots” that had been smoldering in the duff. The Diablo winds, hot dry weather, natural fuels, unlimited use of wood shingles, terrain, narrow winding roads, and water supply were key factors in the Oakland Hills Fires of 1991, just as they had been in earlier fires. The 1923, 1970, and 1991 fires all originated in hills, and burned much of the same area.

The following timeline describes the events of the fire as they occurred on Sunday, October 20, 1991:

At 10:35, a citizen notified Oakland Fire Communications that there was a hot spot on the hill at 7290 Marlborough Terrace. Firefighters were already present at the scene of the fire.

Between 10:40 and 10:57, the 17 miles per hour wind velocity increased dramatically, gusting to 25 miles per hour, causing a major flare-up in a previously unburned area. The fire spread rapidly, changing the situation to a defensive rather than an offensive position, as the fire created two distinctive fire fronts.

At 11:20, firefighting forces realized that the fire spread was beyond conventional firefighting force abilities. The steep terrain and narrow, switchback roads limited access to and from the burn area. Firefighting forces were having radio communications problems, as well. Fifth and sixth alarms were called for by the Incident Commander, and mutual aid was requested from the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection .

By 11:30, fire companies retreated from their offensive positions, searching for safe areas to protect structures. Map: Federal Emergency Management Agency report, p.32

At 11:33, the Incident Commander reported “that the fire was totally out of control and moving rapidly on several fronts, involving more than 100 acres of trees, brush, and houses” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1992, p.33).

At 11:34, the fire moved downhill, threatening the Parkwood Apartments. Residents were already evacuating when Oakland Police officers arrive to warn of the impending fire danger. The single lane exit road became clogged quickly, with cars and pedestrians as residents tried to flee.

At 11:35, the Incident Commander requested Oakland Police officers to assist residents with evacuations. Fire crews perform interior search and rescue duties.

At 11:45, the fire was spreading through the Parkwood Apartments, towards Hiller Highlands. Fire companies are evacuating residents and abandoning their positions. “Life safety is only concern until additional resources arrive” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1992).

At 12:00, the fire sweeps into the 340 unit Hiller Highlands Development and forces the Command Post to relocate.

Between 11:30 and 12:00, most of the 25 fatalities caused by the fire had already occurred. The rapid spread of the fire trapped residents in their cars, and in the narrow, winding streets, as they were trying to flee ahead of the fire. Eleven of the fire victims died in traffic jams on Charing Cross Road, including Oakland Police Officer John Grubensky. Eight additional victims died on narrow streets in the same area. Some of the people who died were disabled, or unable to evacuate due to age factors. There was no firefighting force near-by, to make a stand against the fire.

By 12:00, approximately 40% of the area affected by the fire had been burned. The fire consumed 790 structures within the first hour, igniting a home every 11 seconds!

At 12:13, Berkeley called for a 1st Alarm after the fire was reported to have spread over the hilltop, above Vicente Road. Fire crews were trying to fight the fire, as ambers rained down on them, igniting numerous spot fires.

Between 12:30 and 12:45, the fire was out of control on four fronts. Berkeley called for 2nd and 3rd Alarms. Map: Federal Emergency Management Agency report, p.44

At 13:00, the fire was spreading on five fronts. The historic Claremont Hotel in Berkeley would be at risk if the winds shift, as would possibly be the flatlands of Berkeley and Oakland.

The firefighters continued the firefight on all fronts, evacuating residents ahead of the fire. In some instances, firefighters had to re-evacuate residents as they returned to look for relatives and friends, valuables, and check on their homes. The population of the area evacuated in the fire was estimated to be 20,000-30,000. “Some civilians posing as volunteers, entered the fire area and looted homes” (National Fire Protection Association report, 1992). Map: Federal Emergency Management Agency report, p.51

Between 15:00 and 16:00, a Unified Command structure was deployed by Oakland, Berkeley, and the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection services. Prior to the unified command structure, each service had been operating separately. A request was made for an “Overhead Team," along with supporting equipment, from the Operation of Emergency Services, to manage and assist with logistics, finance, and communications. Map: Federal Emergency Management Agency report, p.74

By 17:00, the Diablo winds began to die down to 5 miles per hour, allowing firefighting forces some reprieve from the previous six hours of exhaustive firefighting efforts, although a continued stance was still needed to fight the fire fronts.

On Monday, October 21, search and rescue efforts were performed, and damage assessment and preliminary investigative efforts initiated.

On Tuesday, October 22, missing persons reports were processed, and attempts to identify badly burned bodies found in the rubble were performed as searches continued through the burned area for additional victims.

Photographs of the disaster, taken by J. Gordon Routley one week after the fire except where otherwise noted, can be viewed in Appendix E, in the Federal Emergency Management Agency report, and maps can be found on the noted pages, at URL: http://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/tr-060.pdf
Aerial photographs of the burn area, before and after the burn, appear on p.12, and on p.64 of the Federal Emergency Management Agency report.

1991 East Bay Hills Fire Statistics

The 1991 East Bay Hills conflagration was responsible for 25 deaths, and over 150 injuries. The fatalities included Oakland Police Officer John Grubensky, and Battalion Chief Riley, who valiantly fought to help endangered citizens escape the fire. The fire consumed a total of 1,520 acres, with a fire perimeter of 5.25 miles. (A map of ultimate fire area is provided on p.64, of the Federal Emergency Management Agency report). Nearly 2,000 automobiles were burned in the fire area, many of which were abandoned in the streets by residents who were trying to evacuate.

2,843 single-family dwellings were destroyed, and 193 single-family dwellings were damaged. 433 apartment units were destroyed or damaged, increasing the total number of destroyed or damaged units to 3,469. Approximately 5,100 people were left homeless, many of them elderly. Relatives, friends, and neighbors provided support for the victims, as well as temporary shelter, helping them deal with the emotional trauma experienced from the East Bay Hills fire. Residents who escaped the path of the fire experienced mixed feelings of relief, for being spared by the fire, and feelings of guilt for escaping the fire’s path of destruction. Anxiety about future fires loomed large.

Psychological and Physical Stress on Firefighters

Firefighters suffered varying amounts of psychological and physiological stress effects, due to continued and intense fire suppression activity. Many firefighters were engaged in fire fighting activity for 12 hours or more, without so much as a few minutes rest at any time. Officers suffered from exhaustion, dehydration, fatigue, respiratory distress, eye irritations, smoke inhalation, strains, sprains, contusions, dislocations, and minor burns. No matter the capacity of firefighter’s duties, each firefighter was subjected to a maximum amount of stress and exertion in the East Bay Hills fire. “After several hours, volunteer groups, including the Red Cross and Salvation Army, began to deliver food and drinks to the suppression forces wherever they could be reached” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1992).

Response to the fire had a definite impact on the participants’ psychological state as well, due to the frustration felt and defeat experienced numerous times while fighting the fire fronts. The 1991 fire could not be, and would not be contained for three days! Firefighters feared this fire, as it was the greatest in magnitude any firefighter had ever experienced. Stress levels increased when firefighters discovered the remains of the Battalion Chief who was killed, as well as other victims who could not be saved. Firefighters, who served at the time of the Loma Prieta Earthquake, described the fire as more stressful than the earthquake because the fire kept getting bigger, and they were helpless in their attempts to stop it. Particularly stressful were the reports published after the fire accusing firefighting forces of being negligent and inadequate in their response to the fire.

A Critical Incident Stress Debriefing System was set up by the Oakland Fire Department immediately after the fire. Other mental health professionals and agencies in Berkeley and Oakland provided counseling for residents affected by the devastation.

Economic Effects as a Result of the Fire

The Oakland-Berkeley firestorm “was the third most costly urban fire disaster in US history after the San Francisco earthquake in 1906 and the Chicago fire of 1871” (Mitchell, 1999). Estimated dollar fire loss was US $1.537 billion (Captain Donald R. Parker, Oakland Office of Fire Services, Jan. 1992.) Fire victims lost personal possessions, art and music collections, and pets, as well as their homes. Although many residents had fire insurance, many of these personal losses were not covered.

On Monday, October 21, 1991, the Mayor of Oakland vowed to rebuild the Hills community. The East Bay Hills area “provided some of Oakland’s highest real estate tax revenues and that rebuilding would provide incomes to local merchants and contractors “ (Blakely, 12 August, 1993, as cited in Mitchell, 1999). Not rebuilding on the burned area was not seriously considered as an alternative, in the aftermath of the firestorm. Failure to consider this option could lead to future risk from wildfire hazard in the East Bay Hills area.

In 1993, 11,000 new construction jobs were created to support the reconstruction process of the East Bay Hills area. These jobs came to the area during a time of economic recession. By October 12, 1993, 1,368 building permits had been issued for the 2,777 residential sites that had burned in Oakland, and for 39 out of 69 sites that had been burned in Berkeley. Thirty percent of the residents chose not to rebuild in the East Bay Hills area.

Private insurance was a dominant force in financing rebuilding, in the post-disaster recovery phase of the fire. “One year after the disaster, 3,954 claims amounting to US $1.4 billion (c. US $350,000 per household) had been filed with 49 insurance companies. As settlements were reached on most claims, the fire victims received infusions of money” (Mitchell, 1999). Two-thirds of these owners had guaranteed replacement cost insurance coverage. They received reimbursement for temporary housing costs, along with federal and state tax relief. “The average net worth of families who lost homes was expected to rise from 10 to 25 percent compared with pre-firestorm levels” (San Francisco Examiner, 31 October 1993, E-1 and E-5, as cited in Mitchell, 1999).

In addition to having private insurance, residents became eligible for assistance from the federal government when the East Bay Hills area was declared a "major disaster area," on October 22, 1991, by President George Bush. The Federal Emergency Management Agency was responsible for assisting residents, although much of the disaster relief was covered by private insurance. “About four-fifths of federal funding after the fire was spent on reimbursing state and local governments for their response and recovery costs” (Mitchell, 1999). The Federal Emergency Management Agency set up and funded a Community Restoration Center, which provided residents’ access to city officials, utility representatives, and other services needed by the victims in the post-recovery process, at one location.

Vulnerability and Past-policy Analysis

Command officers responsible for directing and managing the fire suppression efforts knew the risk factors and previous fire history of the area, and had been advocates for mitigation measures to be utilized by local residents, to decrease their risk from wildland-urban interface fire hazards. For the past sixty years, the hills have become populated with residents who are at risk to hazard; however, they are not as vulnerable to hazard as one might think, as they can afford to recover from a disaster like the East Bay Hills fire. In fact, many of the homes that burned in the East Bay Hills fire of 1991 had been rebuilt after being burned in previous Oakland Hills’ fires. Most of the residents who were affected by the fire were affluent and well insured.
Although the East Bay Hills area will remain an area at risk to wildfire hazard, due to its wildland-urban interface component, people will still choose to reside there, enjoying their “Home with a View". “Household benefits seem higher than household costs, thus encouraging action on environmentally dysfunctional landscape values if households have the resources to act on them” (Rodrigue, 1993).
“No one can predict when or where the next fire will be, but nature gives us clues. The public must learn to recognize 'fire season' signs. Urban/interface residents must learn to adopt firesafe habits and firesafe lifestyles” (National Fire Protection Association, 1992).

Past policy legislation efforts have been:

“After a 1923 fire in Berkeley (Alameda County), a special commission offered more than 100 recommendations for mitigating future losses; most of these were ignored” (Blakely, 1992, as cited in Mitchell, 1999).
“After the 1923 fire in Berkeley, the city council passed legislation requiring fire-resistive wood coverings for roofs, then rescinded the legislation before it could take effect” (National Fire Protection Association, 1992).
“The City of Berkeley passed prohibitive ordinances after the Wildcat Canyon fire in 1980, but the City Council was persuaded to rescind the regulations soon after their adoption” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1992).
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (1990) Loma Prieta report urged installation of on-site emergency generators by water supply managers, but the district had not done so (Oakland Tribune, 1991, p.56) as cited in (Mitchell, 1999).
The city of Berkeley passed an ordinance in June 1991, requiring Class A roofs in a specific area.

Unfortunately, the area of Berkeley that burned in the 1991 fire was not part of the specified area for Class A roofing. There were no local fire protection regulations on fire-resistive roofs for the Oakland area at the time of the East Bay Hills fire in 1991. Area agencies and UC Berkeley have since unified to perform an extensive fire prevention effort to protect homes in a 30-acre area, in the hills above the university campus. The $400,000 project, funded by the campus, the state Office of Emergency Services, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, will involve extensive fuel reduction measures with the first phase scheduled to begin on September 5, 2000.