The Role of Computation in Scientific Cognition

Ronald N. Giere

Department of Philosophy

Center for Philosophy of Science

University of Minnesota

The reigning conception of the cognitive revolution has been cognition as computation, or, more specifically, the rule-based manipulation of symbolic representations . Here the digital computer served as the premier exemplar of cognition. Connectionism challenged this conception by introducing representations distributed throughout a network and modified by the adjustment (externally imposed or internally driven) of network parameters. Nevertheless, the conception of cognition as computation seems largely to have survived by extending the basic notions to include such things as “neurocomputation”. More recent notions of distributed, or situated, cognition threaten further to extend the basic conception of cognition as computation. In this paper I wish to question whether making such an extension is the most fruitful way to proceed or whether another conception might be more fruitful. In particular, I wish to inquire whether dynamic systems theory offers promising ideas. I am not prepared to purse this issue in general, but will confine my remarks to the specialized case of cognition in science. I leave open possible applications to other examples of higher cognition.